Dean v. Caldwell Police Department

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

MICHAEL DEAN, Case No. 1:23-cv-00296-BLW Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE

CALDWELL POLICE DEPARTMENT; CANYON COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; DEPUTY K. CURL; DEPUTY DEMELO; CPL. C. GURROLA; OFFICER J. CORDELL; and OFFICER N. DOUTHIT,

Defendants.

The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff’s Complaint as a result of Plaintiff’s status as an inmate. The Court now reviews the Complaint to determine whether it or any of the claims contained therein should be summarily dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Having reviewed the record, and otherwise being fully informed, the Court enters the following Order. REVIEW OF COMPLAINT 1. Pleading Standards and Screening Requirement

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under modern pleading standards, Rule 8 requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Iqbal/Twombly “facial plausibility” standard is met when a complaint contains “factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[D]etailed factual allegations” are not required, but a plaintiff must offer “more than ... unadorned, the-defendant- unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

If the facts pleaded are “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability,” or if there is an “obvious alternative explanation” that would not result in liability, the complaint has not stated a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 678,

682 (internal quotation marks omitted). Bare allegations that amount to a mere restatement of the elements of a cause of action, without adequate factual support, are not enough. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)1 requires that the Court review complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity to

determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court must dismiss any claims that do not have adequate factual support or are frivolous or malicious. Id.

The Court also must dismiss claims that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. These last two categories—together with claims that fall outside a federal court’s narrow grant of jurisdiction—encompass those claims that

might, or might not, have factual support but nevertheless are barred by a well- established legal rule. The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case

should be dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory or for the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989)

(discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that Rule 12(b)(6) authority to dismiss claims was expanded by the PLRA,

1 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et seq. giving courts power to dismiss deficient claims, sua sponte, before or after opportunity to amend).

2. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is a prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction. On June 22, 2022, before Plaintiff was incarcerated, he was walking his bicycle when numerous police officers approached him. It appears that some were officers

with the City of Caldwell, and others were with the Canyon County Sheriff’s Office. Defendant Corporal Gurrola “place[d] hands on” Plaintiff. Compl., Dkt. 3, at 10. Defendants Deputy Curl, Deputy Demelo, Officer Cordell, and Officer

Douthit were also present. Plaintiff was searched and arrested. Corporal Gurrola allegedly placed Plaintiff in handcuffs so tight that they “cut[] into [Plaintiff’s] wrists.” Id. The other officers did not intervene to stop this use of force. Plaintiff states that, as a

result of the use of force, he has “lost the ability to use [his] hands.” Id. Plaintiff was criminally charged in state court. The court later dismissed the charges after concluding that the search and seizure was unreasonable under the

Fourth Amendment.2 Id. at 2–3.

2 The conviction for which Plaintiff is incarcerated appears to be unrelated to the events described in the Complaint. Plaintiff sues the individual police officers involved in the incident, as well as the Caldwell Police Department and the Canyon County Sheriff’s Office. He

asserts Fourth Amendment claims of excessive force and unreasonable search and seizure. 3. Discussion A. Standards of Law Governing Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d

1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Government officials generally are not liable for damages in their individual capacities under § 1983 unless they personally participated in the alleged

constitutional violations. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“[E]ach Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”). Section 1983 does not allow for recovery against an employer or principal simply because an

employee or agent committed misconduct. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. However, “[a] defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists ... a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). A

plaintiff can establish this causal connection by alleging that a defendant (1) set in motion a series of acts by others that violated the Constitution, or knowingly refused to terminate a series of such acts, which the supervisor “knew or

reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury”; (2) knowingly failed to act or acted improperly “in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates”; (3) acquiesced in the constitutional deprivation; or (4) engaged in “conduct that showed a reckless or callous

indifference to the rights of others.” Id. at 1205–09 (internal quotation marks omitted). To bring a § 1983 claim against a local governmental entity such as the City

of Caldwell or Canyon County, a plaintiff must allege that the execution of an official policy or unofficial custom inflicted the injury of which the plaintiff complains, as required by Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Under Monell, the requisite elements of a § 1983 claim

against such an entity are the following: (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the entity had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the

policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001). An entity also “may be held liable under § 1983 when the individual who committed the

constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority” or when “such an official ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir.

2010), overruled in part on other grounds by Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). An unwritten policy or custom must be so “persistent and widespread” that it constitutes a “permanent and well settled” practice. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691

(quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-168 (1970)). “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency

that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). A claim that a supervisor or training official failed to adequately train subordinates ordinarily requires that, “in light of the duties assigned to specific

officers or employees[,] the need for more or different training [was] so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the [supervisor or training official] can reasonably be said to have been

deliberately indifferent to the need.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). That is, to maintain a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing a “pattern of violations” that amounts to deliberate indifference. Connick

v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 72 (2011). Likewise, “a failure to supervise that is sufficiently inadequate may amount to deliberate indifference” that supports a § 1983 claim, but there generally must be a pattern of violations sufficient to render

the need for further supervision obvious. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, if a supervisory or training official had “knowledge of the unconstitutional conditions” through such a pattern of violations—including knowledge of the “culpable actions

of his subordinates”—yet failed to act to remedy those conditions, that official can be said to have acquiesced “in the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates” such that a causal connection between the supervisor and the constitutional

violation is plausible. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208. The Fourth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. “[T]he application of the Fourth Amendment depends on

whether the person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by government action.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). This inquiry “normally embraces two discrete questions. The first is whether the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of

privacy—whether ... the individual has shown that he seeks to preserve something as private. The second question is whether the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Id. (internal

quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). The Fourth Amendment also protects against police officers using excessive force during the course of an arrest. Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1985). Arresting officers may use only an amount of force that is “objectively

reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Not every push or shove, even if it may

later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment,” and whether an officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable is based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 396 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

This objective reasonableness standard requires that a Court “balanc[e] the nature and quality of the intrusion on a person’s liberty with the countervailing governmental interests at stake,” which involves several factors. Davis v. City of

Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the “quantum of force” must be assessed. Second, the governmental interests at stake must be analyzed in light of the following: (1) the severity of the crime for which the plaintiff was

arrested; (2) whether the plaintiff posed a threat to the safety of the officers or others; (3) whether the plaintiff was actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee; and (4) the availability of alternative methods of subduing the plaintiff. Id.

A plaintiff cannot simply restate these standards of law in a complaint. Instead, a plaintiff must provide specific facts supporting the elements of each claim and must allege facts showing a causal link between each defendant and Plaintiff’s injury or damage. Alleging “the mere possibility of misconduct” is not

enough. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. B. Discussion Plaintiff’s Complaint, liberally construed, appears to state colorable claims of an unreasonable search and seizure against the individual Defendants. The

Complaint also states a plausible excessive force claim against those Defendants based on the tightness of the handcuffs. Therefore, Plaintiff will be allowed to proceed on these claims.

But Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim based on Defendant Gurrola’s placing her hands on Plaintiff. There is nothing in the Complaint to suggest that simply placing her hands on Plaintiff was an unreasonable use of force. Plaintiff has also failed to state Fourth Amendment claims against the City of Caldwell or Canyon County. Plaintiff alleges, in a conclusory fashion, that these

entities failed to adequately train their officers and that they have an improper practice of Fourth Amendment violations. However, because the Court is not obligated to treat such conclusions as true, Plaintiff has not stated plausible policy

claims as required by Monell. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the municipal Defendants will be dismissed. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL Plaintiff also seeks appointment of counsel. Because Plaintiff is not

proceeding in forma pauperis, appointment of pro bono counsel is not appropriate. Plaintiff is encouraged to seek his own counsel on a paid or contingency fee basis. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff may proceed as outlined above. This Order does not guarantee that any of Plaintiff’s claims will be successful. Rather, it merely finds that one or more are plausible, meaning that they will not be summarily dismissed at this time but will proceed to the next stage of litigation. This Order is not intended to be a final

or a comprehensive analysis of Plaintiff’s claims. Defendants may still file a motion for dismissal or motion for summary judgment if the facts and law support such a motion.3 Because (1) prisoner filings

must be afforded a liberal construction, (2) governmental officials often possess the evidence prisoners need to support their claims, and (3) many defenses are supported by governmental records, an early motion for summary judgment—

rather than a motion to dismiss—is often a more appropriate vehicle for asserting procedural defenses such as non-exhaustion or qualified immunity. Plaintiff will be responsible for serving a summons and the Complaint upon Defendants by formal service of process or by obtaining signed waivers of service

of summons from each Defendant or their counsel. Plaintiff must do so within 90 days. If he does not, his claims against unserved Defendants will be dismissed without prejudice, after notice to Plaintiff. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

ORDER IT IS ORDERED: 1. Plaintiff’s Request for Appointment of Counsel (Dkt. 5) is DENIED. 2. Plaintiff may proceed on his Fourth Amendment claims, as described

above, against Defendants Gurrola, Curl, Demelo, Cordell, and Douthit. All other claims against all other Defendants are

3 The standards for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) are the same standards that the Court has used to screen the Complaint under § 1915A. Therefore, motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are disfavored in cases subject to § 1915A and may be filed only in extraordinary circumstances. DISMISSED, and the Caldwell Police Department and the Canyon County Sheriff’s Office are TERMINATED as parties to this action.

If Plaintiff later discovers facts sufficient to support a claim that has been dismissed, Plaintiff may move to amend the complaint to assert such claims.4

3. Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time (Dkt. 13) is GRANTED IN PART. Defendants must file an answer or pre-answer motion no later than 21 days after entry of this Order. 4. Plaintiff’s Motion to Enter Default Judgment (Dkt. 14) is DENIED.

5. Unless otherwise ordered, the parties must follow the deadlines and guidelines in the Standard Disclosure and Discovery Order for Pro Se Prisoner Civil Rights Cases, issued with this Order.

6. Any amended pleadings must be submitted, along with a motion to amend, within 150 days after entry of this Order. 7. Dispositive motions must be filed by the later of (a) 300 days after

4 Any amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff’s allegations in a single pleading and cannot rely upon or incorporate by reference prior pleadings. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 15.1 (“Any amendment to a pleading, whether filed as a matter of course or upon a motion to amend, must reproduce the entire pleading as amended. The proposed amended pleading must be submitted at the time of filing a motion to amend.”); see also Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[An] amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court erred by entering judgment against a party named in the initial complaint, but not in the amended complaint). entry of this Order or (b) 300 days after entry of an order denying all or part of a preliminary Rule 12(b) or Rule 56 motion.

8. Each party must ensure that all documents filed with the Court are simultaneously served upon the opposing party (through counsel if the party has counsel) by first-class mail or via the CM/ECF system,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5. Each party must sign and attach a proper mailing certificate to each document filed with the court, showing the manner of service, date of service, address of service, and name of person upon whom service was made.

9. The Court will not consider ex parte requests unless a motion may be heard ex parte according to the rules and the motion is clearly identified as requesting an ex parte order, pursuant to Local Rule of

Civil Practice before the United States District Court for the District of Idaho 7.2. (“Ex parte” means that a party has provided a document to the court, but that the party did not provide a copy of the document to the other party to the litigation.)

10. All Court filings requesting relief or requesting that the Court make a ruling or take an action of any kind must be in the form of a pleading or motion, with an appropriate caption designating the name of the

pleading or motion, served on all parties to the litigation, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7, 10 and 11, and Local Rules of Civil Practice before the United States District Court for the District of Idaho 5.1 and 7.1. The Court will not consider requests made in the form of letters. 11. No party may have more than three pending motions before the Court at one time, and no party may file a motion on a particular subject matter if that party has another motion on the same subject matter currently pending before the Court. Motions submitted in violation of this Order may be stricken, summarily denied, or returned to the moving party unfiled. 12. Plaintiff must notify the Court immediately if Plaintiff's address changes. Failure to do so may be cause for dismissal of this case without further notice. 13. Pursuant to General Order 324, this action is hereby RETURNED to the Clerk of Court for random civil case assignment to a presiding judge, on the proportionate basis previously determined by the District Judges, having given due consideration to the existing caseload. Az tT DATED: October 31, 2023 Ines Warnell Ss U 5. District Court Judge

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 15