Dealers' Granite Corp. v. Faubion

18 S.W.2d 737, 1929 Tex. App. LEXIS 698
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 29, 1929
DocketNo. 7306.
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 18 S.W.2d 737 (Dealers' Granite Corp. v. Faubion) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dealers' Granite Corp. v. Faubion, 18 S.W.2d 737, 1929 Tex. App. LEXIS 698 (Tex. Ct. App. 1929).

Opinion

BAUGtl, J.

Appeal is from a judgment for-appellee, Eaubion, against appellant corporation upon three promissory notes executed by it to him under the following circumstances:

On April 28,1923, Grady Eaubion and Philip Welhausen entered into a written contract whereby Eaubion, for a consideration of $5,-000 to be paid him by Welhausen, agreed to convey to the latter two quarry leases held by him on lands in Llano county, Tex., and certain machinery, tools, etc., used thereon. Said contract also provided:

“As a further consideration of said transfer, the said Eaubion shall be paid the sum 'of $7,500, in three installments of $2,500, each payable six months, twelve months and eighteen months after date out of the net profits of the company hereinafter'to"be^organizecT.
“The said Welhausen agrees upon the transferring assignments of the leases, to use due diligence to procure a charter from the State of Texas, with a capital stock of $75,000, fully paid, of which the said Welhausen is to own, and hold $45,000, of said capital stock, and said Eaubion $25,000 of said capital stock and L. H. Baldwin, $5,000 of said capital stock.
“Upon the formation of said company as above stated, which is to become the owner of said leases and property herein contracted to toe conveyed and transferred, said Wel-hausen is to advance two payrolls of $1,000 each, and advances $2,500 in payment of a cable which has not yet been paid for, but such advances to be the obligation of the newly formed company. The advance of $2,500 may be over a period of 4- months.”

Appellant corporation was formed, and its stock issued, in accordance with the provisions of said contract. Eaubion conveyed the leases to the corporation, Welhausen was made president, E'aubion was elected secretary, and in addition to the $25,000 in stock issued to him, the corporation by and throughi its president executed to him three notesJj dated June 15, 1923, each for $2,500, due re-ll spectively October 28, 1923, April 28, 1924, and October 28, 1924; and each reciting that it was “payable out of the net profits of the corporation.” Further facts pertinent to the issues raised will 'be stated in discussing them.

The first contention made by the appellant is that said notes are not binding obligations of the corporation: (a) Because appellant had no corporate existence at the time of the execution of said contract*} (b) because under said contract they were 'made the obligations of Welhausen and not of appellant; (c) because issued in violation of articfe 1348, R. S., in that, appellant received no money, property, or labor in consideration therefor; and (d) ■because issued by one officer of the corporation to another in payment of a personal debt, *739 and not resulting in any benefit to the corporation.

"We do not sustain any of these contentions. The general proposition urged by appellant that promoters of a corporation are not its agents, and their contracts in its behalf, unless made so by charter or statute, are not binding upon the corporation when formed, is well settled. Weatherford, M. W. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Granger, 86 Tex. 350, 24 S. W. 795, 40 Am. St. Rep. 837; 14 C. J. 255, et seq. But a contract for the benefit of a corporation, adopted or ratified by it after its formation and such benfits accepted, is binding upon, and becomes the obligation of, the corporation.' That was what occurred in this case. The contract between Welhausen and Eaubion contemplated the formation of appellant corporation, and specified the obligations of each signer, together with certain obligations to be imposed upon the corporation. All of its terms were complied with. The property was conveyed to the corporation, the stock issued as provided, the notes executed as prescribed. No clearer evidence of adoption of the contract is needed than the undisputed fact that the corporation accepted the benefits of it and carried it out in detail. Nor is it material that the incorporators, including appellee, made affidavit in securing the charter that all the capital stock had been subscribed and fully paid. No fraud in pro-" curing the charter is alleged, and no irregularity in granting it is charged, and had there been, the corporation is in no position to raise such questions here.

The next question presented is whether the enhanced values of the properties of the corporation constitute “net profits” of the corporation. As stated above, the notes sued upon were “payable out of the net profits of the corporation.” It is not controverted that the corporation had never accumulated any surplus funds. The auditor’s report in evidence showed that after deducting depreciation of machinery, amortization of leaseholds, and all operating expenses and interest charges from the time of incorporation to December 31, 1927, the books showed a net loss of approximately $44,000. There was evidence, however, that great improvements in the operation of the quarries had been made, the cost of production diminished, and the resulting value of such quarries greatly increased. The trial court found:

“Sixth: That the valuation of said property placed upon same and accepted by all parties to the suit at the time of the incorporation of the defendant, was the sum of $75,-000.00, and that of said amount Six Thousand ($6,000.00) Dollars was the machinery and the balance was the value of the quarry leases and quarries to the defendant corporation ■conveyed by plaintiffs; that during the trial of the ease, -in open court, all parties to the suit agreed and accepted such values for the purposes of this trial; that since the date of the incorporation of the defendant, the value of the physical assets and properties of the defendant corporation, by virtue of improvements made thereon, of the development of the business of the corporation, of the discovery of great quantities of valuable stone and because the defendant corporation virtually owns and controls a monopoly of the most valuable kind of ‘Polishing Granite’ has increased and developed to such an extent that the present assets of the corporation greatly exceed the sum total of its capital stock and all of its liabilities, and that the corporation is in possession of and has acquired, a ‘Net Profit’ greatly in excess of the amount due upon the notes sued upon in this cause, and therefore said notes are each past due, and same are wholly unpaid.”

His conclusions of law were:

“I conclude that by the term ‘Net Profits’ as set forth in the contract between the parties, and in the notes sued upon, is meant the clear ■gain of the corporation, ascertained by deducting from the present value of all its assets the capital stock of the corporation and all its liabilities. '
“Third: “I further' conclude that the excess or the sum or amount of the properties owned by the corporation by virtue of the present value of all of its assets, over and above the amount of the corporation’s capital stock and its liabilities, constitutes ‘Net Profits’ and the same is liable for plaintiff’s cause of action.”

What constitutes the net profits of a corporation has been variously defined in numerous jurisdictions. See 14 C. J. 803; 45 C. J. 1386; 7 R. C. L. § 261, p. 284; 3 Words and Phrases, Second Series, 592; 3 Bouv. Law Dict. p. 2737; Cook on Corporations (6th Ed.) vol. 2, p. 1479; Thompson on Corporations (3d Ed.) vol. 7, p. 169 et seq.

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Bluebook (online)
18 S.W.2d 737, 1929 Tex. App. LEXIS 698, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dealers-granite-corp-v-faubion-texapp-1929.