Deal v. Kijakazi

District Court, N.D. California·Decided July 10, 2024·No. 5:23-cv-04631·Unknown

Opinion

S.D., Case No. 23-cv-04631-NC Plaintiff, ORDER REVERSING v. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION IN PART KILOLO KIJAKAZI, et al., AND REMANDING FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS Defendants. Re: ECF 1, 7, 11, 12 Claimant S.D. appeals from an Administrative Law Judge’s denial of her application for social security benefits. Claimant contends the ALJ erred in (1) rejecting medical opinion evidence; and (2) finding Claimant’s testimony inconsistent with the record. This Court finds that the ALJ did not provide an explanation supported by substantial evidence for rejecting the medical opinion evidence but did give clear and convincing evidence for finding Claimant’s testimony inconsistent. Accordingly, this Court reverses the ALJ’s decision in part and remands for further proceedings. A. Procedural History Claimant filed for disability insurance benefits on November 15, 2017, under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging that she had become disabled on April 22, 2017. AR 337–338. Claimant’s application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. AR 134– 136, 138–140. An ALJ held an administrative hearing on June 13, 2022, at which Claimant and a vocational expert testified. AR 47–49. The ALJ issued an unfavorable in disability determinations and found that (1) Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 22, 2017, the alleged onset date; (2) Claimant had several severe impairments; (3) Claimant’s impairments did not meet or equal the criteria in the Listing of Impairments; (4) Claimant had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), except she was able to occasionally perform postural activities and her job should not include regular interaction and communication with the general public for primary duties; (5) Claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record; (6) Claimant could not perform any past relevant work, and (7) that jobs existed in significant numbers matching Claimant’s RFC. AR 23–36. Therefore, the ALJ found that Claimant was not disabled at any time from Claimant’s alleged onset date of April 22, 2017, through the date of the ALJ’s decision. AR 36. Claimant timely filed a complaint with this Court on September 11, 2023. ECF 1. All parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. ECF 3, 5. B. Factual History 1. Medical Opinion Evidence Claimant challenges the ALJ’s weighing of opinions from physicians Dr. Radabaugh, Dr. Regets, and Dr. Brown. This Court briefly summarizes the findings of those physicians below. a. Dr. Radabaugh Dr. Radabaugh performed a psychological consultative examination of Claimant on March 26, 2018. AR 810–815. Dr. Radabaugh opined that Claimant’s functioning in several areas was fair to poor. AR 810–815. b. Dr. Regets Dr. Regets completed a mental RFC assessment, finding, among other things, that Claimant was capable of understanding, carrying out, and remembering short, simple, and normal workday/workweek while remaining focused and attentive for extended, two-hour or more segments. AR 92. Dr. Regets found that Claimant would be able to work in an independent work setting requiring only quick and short social demands/interactions with the general public and coworkers. AR 92. Dr. Regets also opined that Claimant had the ability to ask and accept simple instructions. AR 92. Dr. Regets found that Claimant had depressive, bipolar and related disorder, and anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders. AR 89. Dr. Regets found that Claimant had moderate impairments in the ability to interact with others and moderate impairments in concentration, persistence, or pace, as well as no limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information and adapting or managing oneself. AR 89. c. Dr. Brown Dr. Brown made similar findings to Dr. Regets but also included the ability to function with well-learned semi-skilled work. AR 129. 2. Symptom Testimony Claimant testified that the following impairments limit her ability to work: bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety, grief, thyroid, arthritis, bladder leakage, stress, oral lichen planus, and carpal tunnel syndrome. AR 28. She reported she is 5’3” and 226 pounds, establishing the presence of obesity, and she is unable to lose weight because of her thyroid problems. AR 28–29. Claimant testified that she does not engage in any social activities, reported conflict with her landlord, and said she had lost a job due to erratic behavior. AR 28. Claimant stated that she has been unable to work since her boyfriend died in 2017, which caused her to develop PTSD. AR 29. Claimant testified that she is tired frequently because of her depression and thyroid problems. AR 29. A district court has the “power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014). A court should disturb the decision of the Commissioner only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[It] is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.”). Even when the ALJ commits legal error, the decision must be upheld if the error is harmless. Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). “A reviewing court may not make independent findings based on the evidence before the ALJ to conclude that the ALJ’s error was harmless.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015). Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision should be upheld. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 102, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 1995). This Court addresses Claimant’s two challenges to the ALJ’s decision: (1) weighing of medical evidence, and (2) consistency determination on Claimant’s symptom testimony. A. Medical Opinion Evidence An ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). And where medical opinions contradict one another, the ALJ must resolve the conflict. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041 (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F. 2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). This requires “setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Id. (citing Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998)). Under the revised rules, the ALJ is no longer required to defer to or assign each medical opinion a specific evidentiary weight. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Instead, the ALJ will articulate the persuasiveness of the medical opinions or prior administ

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