De Witt v. City of Elizabeth

27 A. 801, 56 N.J.L. 119, 27 Vroom 119, 1893 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 19
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedNovember 15, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 27 A. 801 (De Witt v. City of Elizabeth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
De Witt v. City of Elizabeth, 27 A. 801, 56 N.J.L. 119, 27 Vroom 119, 1893 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 19 (N.J. 1893).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Abbett, J.

The certiorari in this case brings up for review the proceedings taken by the city of Elizabeth in relation to sewering Salem avenue from North Broad street to the city line, and the assessments made on Salem avenue lands for benefits thereto by reason of the construction of this sewer, and also the trunk sewers into which it empties in order to have an outlet.

All the prosecutors except Alfred De Witt have paid the assessment on their lands. At the present time he and a Mrs. Clark, who is not one of the prosecutors, are the only property owners who have not paid their assessments for this sewer improvement. De Witt and Helen I. Halsey, two of the original prosecutors, on October 9th, 1890, protested against the construction of said sewer, but withdrew their protest November 7th, 1890. The other prosecutor, Leonella F. Dunlap, October 17th, 1890, petitioned "the city council for the sewer. The ordinance for the improvement [121]*121was passed November 18th, 1890. The improvement was made in accordance therewith and paid for by the city. The city of Elizabeth many years ago was laid out in sewer districts, so as to make a complete system of drainage for the lands embraced therein. The plan was to place the larger sewers, built of brick, nearest to the outlet, and then other sewers were to be constructed connecting therewith, diminishing in size and finally terminating in twelve-inch pipe sewers at the extreme outskirts of the district, the trunk sewers to be constructed large enough to receive all the sewage that would come from the laterals connected therewith. One of these districts is known as the “Mill lane and Morris avenue sewer district.” In that district, as part thereof, is the Salem avenue sewer. This sewer, as part of this sewerage scheme, empties into the Union avenue extension sewer, which empties into the Union avenue sewer, which empties into Mill lane sewer, which has its outlet in the Elizabeth river. All these sewers are embraced in and form part of the “ Mill lane and Morris avenue sewer district.” These main or trunk sewers were constructed many years ago, before any .application was made for the Salem avenue sewer. When these main or trunk sewers were constructed, the Salem avenue property -was deemed to be prospectively benefited thereby, as they were necessary to give an outlet to the proposed Salem avenue sewer when it should be constructed, and assessments were made on the basis of these prospective ¡benefits. These assessments for prospective benefits had, however, to be abandoned, because the Supreme Court, in State, Kellogg, pros., v. Elizabeth, 11 Vroom 274, held that “ land which can be drained into a trunk sewer only after connecting laterals are built, cannot be assessed for the cost of the trunk sewer until such laterals are constructed.” The court in that case, however, said: “ When the laterals are built so that sewerage through the mains is furnished to this property, them, it will be lawful for the corporation to reimburse itself for the cost not only of the laterals, but also of [122]*122this principal sewer, so far as the peculiar advantage then accruing to that property will warrant.”

The act of March 8th, 1892 (Pamph. L., p. 58), provided for the contingency suggested by the court in the above case. Its provisions authorized the commissioners appointed to assess the lots specially benefited by the lateral sewer, not only so much of the cost of the lateral as specially benefited said lands, but also so much of the cost of the main sewers connected with the lateral and giving it a-n outlet, as in their judgment was proper, provided the total amount assessed did not exceed the special benefit accruing to the lots from both the main and lateral sewers combined; and all lots or parcels of land so specially benefited were to be assessed in proportion to the benefits received by each.

From the foregoing considerations it appears that if the prosecutors’ lands derived a special and peculiar benefit from this sewerage system, including the main sewers and the lateral or Salem avenue sewer combined, that these sewers having all been built, that the time has arrived when it is proper to assess prosecutors’ lands therefor. Mere irregularities or defects in form or illegality in assessing are no longer available to set aside such an assessment. The act of March 23d, 1881, entitled “A general act respecting taxes, assessments and water rates ” (Pamph. L., p. 194), was passed for the purpose of limiting objections of property owners to cases where the tax or assessment was unjust, and was intended to compel them to pay so much of the assessment as was justly due; and the court is required to amend all irregularities, errors or defects, and may determine and fix, by decree, a proper sum in all cases in which there may lawfully be an assessment.

This act has been liberally construed so as to enable the court summarily to settle disputes about assessments where there is sufficient before the court to enable it to determine what is a proper tax or assessment without doing injustice to any one. See Printing Co. v. Assessors, 22 Vroom 75; Jones v. Landis Township, 21 Id. 374; Endicott v. Corson, Id. 381; In re Commissioners of Elizabeth, 20 Id. 488; State [123]*123Board of Assessors v. Morris and Essex Railroad Co., Id. 193; Pfeiffer v. Miles, 19 Id. 450; Childs v. Howland, Id. 425; Saunders v. Morris, Id. 100; Dodge v. Love, 18 Id. 436; Newcomb v. Franklin Township, 17 Id. 437; Con-over v. Honce, Id. 347; Hetfield v. Plainfield, Id. 119; Elisabeth v. Meeker, 16 Id. 157; Morgan v. Comptroller of Elizabeth, 15 Id. 571; Clark v. Mulford, 14 Id. 550; State v. Montclair and Greenwood Lake Railroad Co., Id. 524. The Court of Errors and Appeals, in the case of Elizabeth v. Meeker, 16 Vroom 159, says, in construing the act of March 23d, 1881: “The language here employed appears to leave no doubt as to the purpose of the legislature. It was to assign to the court the province of seeing that its suitors who were liable, or whose property was subject to these assessments for public improvements, and who were seeking to vacate any of such assessments, should in every event be made to bear their fair and legal share of'the burthen. This provision was well timed and most salutary, for, while it preserves to the owner of property the ability to relieve himself from so much of his tax as is unjust, it at -the same time and by a summary procedure compels him to do justice to the public by paying such part of his assessment as is justly due. This law is, in the highest sense, remedial and should be construed with liberality so as to abate the mischief of taxpayers avoiding, by litigation, their honest dues to the government.” The court also held that the statute referred “ to the state of affairs-existing at the time when the court is called upon to act. If, at that period, there may lawfully be an assessment, imposition or levy, then, in all cases, the judicial duty to impose the-proper tax arises.”

The constitutionality of this act of March 8th, 1892 (Pamph. L., p.

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Bluebook (online)
27 A. 801, 56 N.J.L. 119, 27 Vroom 119, 1893 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 19, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/de-witt-v-city-of-elizabeth-nj-1893.