1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9
10 ORLANDO SANCHEZ DE TAGLE, Case No. 24-cv-07175-NC 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING 12 COMPLAINT WITH v. PREJUDICE BASED ON RES 13 JUDICATA SANTA CLARA COUNTY, 14 Re: ECF 9, 11 Defendant. 15 16 Self-represented Plaintiff Orlando Sanchez de Tagle1 brings a claim for invasion of 17 privacy against Santa Clara County District Attorney Olivia Mendoza. It is not his first 18 case in this Court doing so. Upon screening the complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. 19 § 1915, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by res judicata based on judgment 20 entered against him in a prior action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint in this matter is 21 DISMISSED with prejudice. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 A. de Tagle v. Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office, No. 24-cv-03353- EKL (Prior Action)2 24 25 Plaintiff filed an action alleging District Attorney Olivia Mendoza violated his 26 1 Plaintiff has proceeded in various matters as either Orlando Sanchez de Tagle or Austin 27 de Tagle. 1 rights by way of invasion of privacy and violations of the American with Disabilities Act. 2 No. 24-cv-03353-EKL, ECF 1. The Court granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed in 3 forma pauperis, but, upon screening his complaint, determined 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 4 mandated dismissal because Mendoza’s alleged conduct was protected by prosecutorial 5 immunity. No. 24-cv-03353-EKL, ECF 13 (report and recommendation). The Court 6 dismissed the complaint with prejudice and entered judgment against Plaintiff. No. 24-cv- 7 03353-EKL, ECF 17 (adopting report and recommendation), ECF 18 (judgment). Plaintiff 8 appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which granted voluntary dismissal of the appeal. See No. 9 24-cv-03353-EKL, ECF 19, 23. 10 B. de Tagle v. Santa Clara County, Case No. 24-cv-07175-NC (This Action) 11 Plaintiff brings this action alleging one claim for invasion of privacy by District 12 Attorney Olivia Mendoza. ECF 1 (Compl.). The Court granted Plaintiff’s application to 13 proceed in forma pauperis and, in screening the complaint, entered a stay of this case. 14 ECF 7. The Court stayed the matter upon finding the complaint contains similar 15 allegations and claims to Case No. 24-cv-03353-EKL, which was then on appeal. ECF 7 16 at 2. Following the dismissal of that appeal, the Court lifted the stay of this matter and 17 ordered Plaintiff to show cause as to why his complaint should not be dismissed as barred 18 by res judicata. ECF 9. Plaintiff responded. ECF 11. 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 The Court must review the complaint of any person proceeding in forma pauperis 21 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to 22 state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a 23 defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 24 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). In doing so, courts construe complaints 25 from self-represented litigants liberally. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 26 2012). A complaint may be dismissed at the screening stage if it is barred by res judicata. 27 Wescott v. Moon, No. 23-cv-06624-RFL, 2024 WL 3379684, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1 res judicata applied); Love v. Macomber, No. 23-cv-00790-DJC-EFB, 2023 WL 3645515, 2 at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 25, 2023) (raising the issue of res judicata sua sponte at the screening 3 stage); see also Clements v. Airport Auth. of Washoe Cnty., 69 F.3d 321, 329 (9th Cir. 4 1995) (noting courts may raise res judicata on their own). 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits the litigation “of any 7 claims that were raised or could have been raised in the prior action.” Owens v. Kaiser 8 Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Res 9 judicata applies where there is “(1) an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the 10 merits, and (3) identity or privity between parties.” Id. Here, each element is met, and res 11 judicata applies. 12 A. Identity of Claims 13 As to the first element of res judicata, “[t]he central criterion in determining 14 whether there is an identity of claims between the first and second adjudications is 15 ‘whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.’” Id. (citation 16 omitted). 17 Plaintiff’s complaint raises the same claim for invasion of privacy against Mendoza 18 as his prior action. Both claims are based on allegations that Mendoza demanded Plaintiff 19 wear a GPS ankle monitor during a mid-December 2023 hearing for a state criminal 20 matter, No. C2314686. Both claims allege that the ankle monitor’s location-tracking 21 function invaded Plaintiff’s privacy and that Mendoza used his location against him. And 22 both claims seek millions of dollars in damages. See Love, 2023 WL 3645515, at *2 23 (finding “action was premised on the same factual contentions and raised the same claims 24 for relief” as prior action). 25 At the very least, Plaintiff’s claim here arises from “the same set of facts as the 26 allegations” in his prior complaint. See Owens, 244 F.3d at 714 (citation omitted). 27 Although Plaintiff now offers additional allegations as to how Mendoza “used [Plaintiff’s] 1 monitor Mendoza allegedly demanded he wear in connection with his criminal case, and 2 her alleged monitoring of his location. Plaintiff could have included these allegations in 3 his prior action. See McClain v. Apodaca, 793 F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[A 4 plaintiff] cannot avoid the bar of res judicata merely by alleging conduct by the defendant 5 not alleged in his prior action . . .”). 6 Although Plaintiff states that he thought this case “would be differnt [sic] and 7 allowed” because it is a “strictly invasion of privacy case,” ECF 11, res judicata applies on 8 a claim-by-claim basis. It is irrelevant that Plaintiff’s prior action included other claims in 9 addition to invasion of privacy. Plaintiff also contends the requested relief is “completely 10 different.” ECF 11. The Court is not convinced. 11 B. Final Judgment on the Merits 12 “Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or 13 their privies based on the same cause of action.” Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147, 153 14 (1979). “[I]nvoluntary dismissal generally acts as a judgment on the merits for the 15 purposes of res judicata.” Owens, 244 F.3d at 714 (citation omitted). As such, “the phrase 16 ‘final judgment on the merits’ is often used interchangeably with ‘dismissal with 17 prejudice.’” Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002). 18 Plaintiff’s prior action was dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. 19 See No. 24-cv-03353-EKL, ECF 17 (adopting report and recommendation to dismiss with 20 prejudice “in every respect” and dismissing without leave to amend).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9
10 ORLANDO SANCHEZ DE TAGLE, Case No. 24-cv-07175-NC 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING 12 COMPLAINT WITH v. PREJUDICE BASED ON RES 13 JUDICATA SANTA CLARA COUNTY, 14 Re: ECF 9, 11 Defendant. 15 16 Self-represented Plaintiff Orlando Sanchez de Tagle1 brings a claim for invasion of 17 privacy against Santa Clara County District Attorney Olivia Mendoza. It is not his first 18 case in this Court doing so. Upon screening the complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. 19 § 1915, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by res judicata based on judgment 20 entered against him in a prior action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint in this matter is 21 DISMISSED with prejudice. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 A. de Tagle v. Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office, No. 24-cv-03353- EKL (Prior Action)2 24 25 Plaintiff filed an action alleging District Attorney Olivia Mendoza violated his 26 1 Plaintiff has proceeded in various matters as either Orlando Sanchez de Tagle or Austin 27 de Tagle. 1 rights by way of invasion of privacy and violations of the American with Disabilities Act. 2 No. 24-cv-03353-EKL, ECF 1. The Court granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed in 3 forma pauperis, but, upon screening his complaint, determined 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 4 mandated dismissal because Mendoza’s alleged conduct was protected by prosecutorial 5 immunity. No. 24-cv-03353-EKL, ECF 13 (report and recommendation). The Court 6 dismissed the complaint with prejudice and entered judgment against Plaintiff. No. 24-cv- 7 03353-EKL, ECF 17 (adopting report and recommendation), ECF 18 (judgment). Plaintiff 8 appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which granted voluntary dismissal of the appeal. See No. 9 24-cv-03353-EKL, ECF 19, 23. 10 B. de Tagle v. Santa Clara County, Case No. 24-cv-07175-NC (This Action) 11 Plaintiff brings this action alleging one claim for invasion of privacy by District 12 Attorney Olivia Mendoza. ECF 1 (Compl.). The Court granted Plaintiff’s application to 13 proceed in forma pauperis and, in screening the complaint, entered a stay of this case. 14 ECF 7. The Court stayed the matter upon finding the complaint contains similar 15 allegations and claims to Case No. 24-cv-03353-EKL, which was then on appeal. ECF 7 16 at 2. Following the dismissal of that appeal, the Court lifted the stay of this matter and 17 ordered Plaintiff to show cause as to why his complaint should not be dismissed as barred 18 by res judicata. ECF 9. Plaintiff responded. ECF 11. 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 The Court must review the complaint of any person proceeding in forma pauperis 21 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to 22 state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a 23 defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 24 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). In doing so, courts construe complaints 25 from self-represented litigants liberally. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 26 2012). A complaint may be dismissed at the screening stage if it is barred by res judicata. 27 Wescott v. Moon, No. 23-cv-06624-RFL, 2024 WL 3379684, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1 res judicata applied); Love v. Macomber, No. 23-cv-00790-DJC-EFB, 2023 WL 3645515, 2 at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 25, 2023) (raising the issue of res judicata sua sponte at the screening 3 stage); see also Clements v. Airport Auth. of Washoe Cnty., 69 F.3d 321, 329 (9th Cir. 4 1995) (noting courts may raise res judicata on their own). 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits the litigation “of any 7 claims that were raised or could have been raised in the prior action.” Owens v. Kaiser 8 Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Res 9 judicata applies where there is “(1) an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the 10 merits, and (3) identity or privity between parties.” Id. Here, each element is met, and res 11 judicata applies. 12 A. Identity of Claims 13 As to the first element of res judicata, “[t]he central criterion in determining 14 whether there is an identity of claims between the first and second adjudications is 15 ‘whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.’” Id. (citation 16 omitted). 17 Plaintiff’s complaint raises the same claim for invasion of privacy against Mendoza 18 as his prior action. Both claims are based on allegations that Mendoza demanded Plaintiff 19 wear a GPS ankle monitor during a mid-December 2023 hearing for a state criminal 20 matter, No. C2314686. Both claims allege that the ankle monitor’s location-tracking 21 function invaded Plaintiff’s privacy and that Mendoza used his location against him. And 22 both claims seek millions of dollars in damages. See Love, 2023 WL 3645515, at *2 23 (finding “action was premised on the same factual contentions and raised the same claims 24 for relief” as prior action). 25 At the very least, Plaintiff’s claim here arises from “the same set of facts as the 26 allegations” in his prior complaint. See Owens, 244 F.3d at 714 (citation omitted). 27 Although Plaintiff now offers additional allegations as to how Mendoza “used [Plaintiff’s] 1 monitor Mendoza allegedly demanded he wear in connection with his criminal case, and 2 her alleged monitoring of his location. Plaintiff could have included these allegations in 3 his prior action. See McClain v. Apodaca, 793 F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[A 4 plaintiff] cannot avoid the bar of res judicata merely by alleging conduct by the defendant 5 not alleged in his prior action . . .”). 6 Although Plaintiff states that he thought this case “would be differnt [sic] and 7 allowed” because it is a “strictly invasion of privacy case,” ECF 11, res judicata applies on 8 a claim-by-claim basis. It is irrelevant that Plaintiff’s prior action included other claims in 9 addition to invasion of privacy. Plaintiff also contends the requested relief is “completely 10 different.” ECF 11. The Court is not convinced. 11 B. Final Judgment on the Merits 12 “Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or 13 their privies based on the same cause of action.” Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147, 153 14 (1979). “[I]nvoluntary dismissal generally acts as a judgment on the merits for the 15 purposes of res judicata.” Owens, 244 F.3d at 714 (citation omitted). As such, “the phrase 16 ‘final judgment on the merits’ is often used interchangeably with ‘dismissal with 17 prejudice.’” Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002). 18 Plaintiff’s prior action was dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. 19 See No. 24-cv-03353-EKL, ECF 17 (adopting report and recommendation to dismiss with 20 prejudice “in every respect” and dismissing without leave to amend). The dismissal order 21 and judgment were therefore final and on the merits. See Westcott, 2024 WL 3379684, at 22 *2 (concluding “dismissal with prejudice and entry of judgment” in prior action screening 23 a complaint “constitutes a final decision on the merits”). That Plaintiff voluntarily 24 dismissed his appeal is inapposite because the Ninth Circuit’s order and mandate did not 25 disturb the Court’s final judgment. See No. 24-cv-03353-EKL, ECF 23. 26 C. Identity or Privity Between Parties 27 Plaintiff’s prior action named the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office as 1 || the text of the complaint and as the only “defendant[] who violated” his rights by invading 2 || his privacy. No. 24-cv-03353-EKL, ECF 1 at 2-3. Here, Plaintiff names Santa Clara 3 || County as the defendant in the caption of his complaint, but lists the Santa Clara District 4 || Attorney’s Office as “Defendant 1” in the text of the complaint, and Mendoza as the only 5 || “defendant who violated” his rights by invading his privacy. Compl. 2-3. 6 Despite these variations, the Court understands Plaintiff to bring his invasion of 7 || privacy claims against Mendoza in both suits. Although both complaints are “silent as to 8 whether plaintiff is suing defendant[] in [her] individual or official capacit[y] . □ . it is fair 9 || to say that plaintiff intends to sue [her] in [her] individual capacit[y]” because actions for 10 || monetary damages may only be brought against state officials in their individual 11 || capacities. See Love, 2023 WL 3645515, at *3. As a result, there is identity or privity 12 || between the parties because Plaintiff sues the same defendant. 13 Because all three elements of res judicata are satisfied, Plaintiff's complaint is C 14 || barred and does not survive screening under section 1915. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 3 15 Although Plaintiff asks that this matter move forward, ECF 11, courts do not have 16 || discretion to ignore res judicata. See Owens, 244 F.3d at 714. 8 17 || Iv. CONCLUSION 5 18 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's complaint. Amendment would be 19 || futile because the complaint is legally barred. The dismissal is therefore with prejudice. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 22 || Dated: January 22, 2025 he ———— _ NATHANAEL M. COUSINS 23 United States Magistrate Judge 24 25 26 27 28