De Simone v. Frosina

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

De Simone v. Frosina

221 A.D.2d 410, 633 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12050

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 13, 1995

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 221 A.D.2d 410 (De Simone v. Frosina) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

De Simone v. Frosina, 221 A.D.2d 410, 633 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12050 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995).

Pincite

Opinion

—In an action to recover damages, inter alia, for personal injuries and wrongful death, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dye, J.), dated December 19, 1994, which denied his motion to dismiss the complaint as barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

This action, commenced more than three years after the causes of action accrued, should have been dismissed as time barred. Because statutory authorization existed for obtaining jurisdiction over the defendant by means other than personal delivery of the summons within this State, the tolling provi[411]*411sion of CPLR 207 was unavailable to salvage the plaintiffs action (see, Yarusso v Arbotowicz, 41 NY2d 516; Rachlin v Ortiz, 133 AD2d 76). Bracken, J. P., O’Brien, Ritter, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—In an action to recover damages, inter alia, for personal injuries and wrongful death, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dye, J.), dated December 19, 1994, which denied his motion to dismiss the complaint as barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

This action, commenced more than three years after the causes of action accrued, should have been dismissed as time barred. Because statutory authorization existed for obtaining jurisdiction over the defendant by means other than personal delivery of the summons within this State, the tolling provi[411]*411sion of CPLR 207 was unavailable to salvage the plaintiffs action (see, Yarusso v Arbotowicz, 41 NY2d 516; Rachlin v Ortiz, 133 AD2d 76). Bracken, J. P., O’Brien, Ritter, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

221 A.D.2d 410, 633 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12050, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/de-simone-v-frosina-nyappdiv-1995.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack