De Shazer v. National RV Holdings, Inc.

391 F. Supp. 2d 791, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37385, 2005 WL 1745444
CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedJuly 25, 2005
Docket2:03-cv-00869
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 391 F. Supp. 2d 791 (De Shazer v. National RV Holdings, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
De Shazer v. National RV Holdings, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d 791, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37385, 2005 WL 1745444 (D. Ariz. 2005).

Opinion

ORDER

MARTONE, District Judge.

Before the court are Defendant National RV Holdings, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 116), Plaintiffs Response (doc. 131), Defendant National RV Holdings, Inc.’s Reply (doc. 148), Defendant Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 118), Plaintiffs Response (doc. 143), Defendant Freightliner Custom Chassis Corp.’s Reply (doc. 149), Plaintiffs Second Motion to Supplement Plaintiffs Response to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (doc. 156), Defendant National RV’s Response (doc. 158), Defendant Freightliner’s Response (doc. 159), and Plaintiffs Reply (doc. 160).

On or about January 8, 1999, Plaintiff purchased a 1999 Tradewinds 7370 recreation vehicle (Tradewinds) from Beaudry RV. 1 National RV’s Statement of Facts (NSOF) ¶ 1. National RV is a final stage manufacturer of recreational vehicles that manufactures some, but not all, components and systems and integrates them into a final product. NSOF ¶ 3. Freight-liner supplied and warranted the vehicle’s chassis. Freightliner’s Statement of Facts (FSOF) ¶ 3. Plaintiffs complaint alleges fifty-one defects in his motor home. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint ¶ 8. Plaintiff claims that these defects constitute a breach of various warranties by National RV and Freightliner. Complaint ¶ 18. Defendants move for summary judgment individually. Freightliner argues Plaintiffs claim fails because he can not demonstrate that Freightliner breached its warranty by *794 supplying a defective chassis component. National RV argues summary judgment is appropriate because the alleged defective components are either 1) already fixed to Plaintiffs satisfaction, 2) expressly excluded from the language of National RV’s limited warranty coverage, 3) Plaintiff would not allow National RV’s expert to inspect the alleged defects, or 4) expert inspection revealed that the alleged defects are not defective.

I. Applicable Law

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) creates minimum disclosure and content requirements for written consumer product warranties. 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et. seq. Additionally, the MMWA authorizes a private right of action by a consumer when a warrantor has failed “to comply with any obligation under ... a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract.” § 2310(d)(1); Milicevic v. Fletcher Jones Imports, Ltd., 402 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir.2005). However, while the MMWA creates additional requirements for consumer protection warranties and creates a private cause of action for breach of a warranty, “state warranty law lies at the base of all warranty claims under Magnuson-Moss.” Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1016 (D.C.Cir. 1986).

The parties disagree as to which state’s law applies to Plaintiffs claims. 2 Because the parties have not agreed to a choice of law provision, we look to the Restatement of Conflicts which states:

The validity of a contract for the sale of an interest in a chattel and the rights created thereby are determined, in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, by the local law of the state where under the terms of the contract the seller is to deliver the chattel unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state-has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 191 (2005). Section 6 outlines other factors in determining which state law to apply, including, “the needs of the interstate and international systems,” “the relevant policies of the forum,” “the relevant policies of the interested states and the relatives interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,” “the protection of justified expectations,” “certainty, predictability and uniformity of result,” and “ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.” Id. § 6.

Plaintiff argues that because the motor home was delivered to him in New Mexico, under the Restatement analysis, New Mexico law should apply. Defendants argue that Arizona law applies because Arizona has a much more significant relationship to the transaction and the parties. Defendants state that the contract for sale was negotiated and executed in Arizona, Plaintiff lives in Arizona, many of the repairs were done in Arizona and Plaintiff chose to prosecute this case in Arizona. We agree with the Defendants that the law of Arizona should apply because of the significant relationship of the parties and the transaction to Arizona.

Although the amended complaint is not very precise, it appears that Plaintiff brings his claim pursuant to federal statutory requirements and Arizona common law. The parties agree that because there is no privity of contract between Plaintiff and Defendants, the Uniform Commercial Code does not apply. However, lack of *795 privity between a manufacturer and retail purchaser does not preclude a claim outside the U.C.C. for breach of express warranty. Flory v. Silvercrest Industries, Inc., 129 Ariz. 574, 633 P.2d 383 (1981), Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 130 Ariz. 596, 601, 638 P.2d 210, 215 (1981). Therefore, Plaintiff may state a claim for breach of an express warranty against both Defendants.

Plaintiff further asserts the he is bringing his claim for breach of an implied warranty pursuant to Arizona common law, and thus the privity requirement of the U.C.C. does not apply. In Flory, the court stated, “[although we allow recovery for ‘breach of implied warranty’ without privity under the theory of strict liability, plaintiffs can not recover purely economic damages under that theory. And although we allow recovery for purely economic damages for breach of U.C.C. warranties, plaintiffs can not recover under that theory ... due to their lack of privity with that defendant.” Flory 633 P.2d at 388. Because Plaintiffs damages here are purely economic, and he is not in privity of contract with the Defendants, he can not recover under a theory of breach of implied warranty.

II. National RV

National RV is the final stage manufacturer of recreational vehicles. It manufactures some, but not all, components and systems of the motor home and integrates all of them into a final product.

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Bluebook (online)
391 F. Supp. 2d 791, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37385, 2005 WL 1745444, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/de-shazer-v-national-rv-holdings-inc-azd-2005.