De Saele v. City of Sterling Heights

333 N.W.2d 496, 123 Mich. App. 610

• Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 16, 1982
• Docket: Docket 46173, 46174, 66255, 66256
• Status: Published

Opinions

Per Curiam.

Plaintiffs Roger A. De Saele and Borman, Inc., for themselves and all property owners in two special property tax assessment districts, appeal a trial court decision granting defendant City of Sterling Heights’ motion for accelerated judgment. The trial court’s order barred separate class action suits brought by the named plaintiffs, which alleged fraud by the defendant’s creation of the special assessment districts and sought injunctive relief prohibiting collection of the assessments. Hearings on the motion were held on January 29, April 30, and June 25, 1979. On April 6, 1979, the trial court issued its opinion granting the defendant’s motion. On June 14, 1979, the lower court issued an amended opinion further explicating the bases for its decision. Due to the identical nature of the issues and arguments raised by the named plaintiffs, these cases have been consolidated for appeal. Plaintiffs appeal as of right.

The trial court in this case concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ actions based upon the equitable remedies sought therein. See Romulus City Treasurer v Wayne County Drain Comm’r, 86 Mich App 663, 669-670; 273 NW2d 514 (1978), lv gtd 406 Mich 976 (1979), read by the lower court as creating an exception to the otherwise "exclusive” jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal.

Other cases before this Court, however, have found the tribunal’s jurisdiction to encompass claims for relief similar to that sought herein. In Edros Corp v City of Port Huron, 78 Mich App 273, 275; 259 NW2d 456 (1977), plaintiff sought in part "a temporary and permanent restraining order preventing any further action regarding the district”. The Edros Court specifically rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Tax Tribunal jurisdiction was unavailable. In its analysis of the Tax Tribunal’s jurisdiction, the Court stated:

"MCL 205.731; MSA 7.650(31) grants the tribunal exclusive jurisdiction to review directly final decisions regarding special assessments. Additionally, the powers of the tribunal are extensive and include the authority to issue the relief requested by plaintiff.

"Thus upon a proper showing the tribunal has the authority to order or direct the taxing agency to take no further action relating to a disputed tax assessment until the merits of the controversy have been determined. The fact that the tribunal, as a quasi-judicial agency, has no contempt powers does not diminish the validity and binding force of its writs, orders or directives. Enforcement is obtainable by application to the circuit court.” Edros Corp, supra, 277-278. (Emphasis added; footnotes omitted.)

Additionally, in State Treasurer v Eaton, 92 Mich App 327, 332; 284 NW2d 801 (1979), this Court held that where a taxpayer "asserted a tenable claim of fraud”, as defined in MCL 211.76; MSA 7.122, review of the claim by the Tax Tribunal was proper.

We conclude that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the actions consolidated in this appeal. Accordingly, the circuit court’s grant of accelerated judgment was proper, albeit for the wrong reason. The court granted defendant’s motion pursuant to GCR 1963, 116.1(5), whereas accelerated judgment properly should have been granted under GCR 1963, 116.1(2). Where the trial court achieves the correct result but assigns the wrong reason therefore, this Court will not disturb that result on appeal. Durbin v K-K-M Corp, 54 Mich App 38, 46; 220 NW2d 110 (1974), lv den 394 Mich 789 (1975).

To conclude, we affirm the result reached by the trial court, without prejudice to plaintiffs’ right to petition the Tax Tribunal for relief within 30 days of the date of release of this opinion.

Such petition, of course, is subject to all defenses which defendant can fairly raise, including those raised in the circuit court. We direct the Tax Tribunal to waive any prior expiration of the 30-day filing rule found in MCL 205.735(3); MSA 7.650(35X3). GCR 1963, 820.1(7).

Affirmed.