De Mott v. Benson

4 Edw. Ch. 297
CourtNew York Court of Chancery
DecidedSeptember 15, 1844
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 4 Edw. Ch. 297 (De Mott v. Benson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
De Mott v. Benson, 4 Edw. Ch. 297 (N.Y. 1844).

Opinion

The Vice-Chancellor :

Two of the bonds and mort[298]*298gages having been given on the settlement of accounts, for balances appearing at the time to be due, they are, prima facie, evidence that the amounts, payable by the condition of the bonds, are due.

The defendants undertake to controvert the evidence which the instruments furnish upon their face. The burthen of proof is, then, on the defendants to impeach the consideration, by showing that they were given for more than was due at the time or that they have been reduced by subsequent payments. From the course of proceeding taken in this cause, the defendants, Benson and Myers, are in the condition of parties surcharging and falsifying stated or settled accounts. Their answers, used before the master upon the reference, point out various errors, omissions and false charges in the accounts, which, it is alleged, formed the consideration of the first two bonds and mortgages. The answers are not evidence, however, except so far as they are responsive : for the defendants can have no other benefit from them than from answers replied to. Hence, the defendants’ first exception, viz.—“that the master has computed the amount due as upon bill pro confesso, wholly disregarding the answers in all respects”—if true, in point of fact, would be well taken; and the case would have to be sent back to the master. But, I do not understand that the master has done so. It nowhere appears that the answers were offered to be read and were rejected or not looked into on the reference. I cannot, therefore, assume such to have been the fact; and as the first exception depends on an alleged matter of fact, which does not appear, it must be overruled.

The second exception insists, that the amount reported to be due on the two first bonds and mortgages is excessive. It appears that the master has allowed the whole of the principal sums payable by the bonds—viz., two thousand five hundred and sixty-one dollars and seventy cents, and one thousand nine hundred and twenty-six dollars and twenty-nine cents, with interest on both, as claimed by the bill from the thirtieth day of October one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven—and has given credit only for the money admitted by the bill to have been received from Yan Lew on account, being five hundred and fifteen dollars [299]*299and eighteen cents, and has deducted nothing for errors, omissions and false charges in the accounts, which, the defendants say, formed the principal alleged consideration of these two bonds and mortgages. The first point to be established is, that these instruments were based upon previously existing accounts and were given to secure the balances therefor. The bill is silent as to the origin of the bonds and mortgages, except in stating that Benson became indebted to -the complainant in the sums for which they were given and, in order to secure the payment thereof, he executed those instruments and that the whole of the principal sums and the interest, from the thirtieth day of October one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven (with an exception as to some money received of Van Lew applicable to the interest) are actually due; and it calls on the defendants to answer under oath. The defendants in answering (Benson, of his own knowledge) deny that, at the time of giving the bonds and mortgages, Benson was justly indebted in the sums therein mentioned or to near those sums. Now, this is a responsive denial as to the amount of the indebtedness at the time ; but, beyond this denial, the answers going on to state the origin of the bonds and mortgages and the considerations on which they were founded, such as balances of account— and that such accounts were false and erroneous—are not strictly responsive and, therefore, not, of themselves, evidence. Nor is there any direct proof, from the examination of witnesses, to connect these bonds and mortgages with stated accounts in the books of the complainant and of the partnership of De Mott and Sandford in his possession. It is left to inference; but the inference is strong and irresistible. The complainant has not attempted to show the contrary; but has, seemingly, acquiesced in that assertion, by allowing the books to be examined by persons produced as witnesses, for the purpose of tracing out the indebtedness upon the books and showing the considerations on which the bonds and mortgages were founded. As to the bond and mortgage of one thousand nine hundred and twenty-six dollars and twenty-nine cents, it does appear from the books how that sum was made up, corresponding in date, as well as amount, with the bond and mortgage so as to leave no [300]*300doubt of the fact that they were founded upon that consideration. I think it may be safely assumed that the first bond an¿ mortgage was, likewise, given to secure what was originally a book-account indebtedness and for an amount which had been ascertained by the striking of a balance and for which notes had, in the first place, been given, which were cancelled upon the giving of the bond and mortgage. The next point, then, under the same second exception is, whether there were any errors and false and fraudulent charges in the accounts which unjustly swelled the balance and induced the giving of bonds and mortgages for a greater amount than was fairly due ? This is strongly asserted in the answer of Benson; and various particulars, both of omission and commission, are set out. The first is, the alleged omission to credit him with the amount of the "Rowley note; but, even supposing the complainant to have received that money for Benson, the evidence fails to prove that Benson has not had credit for it or been allowed the amount in the settlement of one thousand eight hundred and thirty-three or in the previous one, which appears by the books to have taken place in one thousand eight hundred and twenty-seven. The accounts previous to one thousand eight hundred and twenty-seven do not appear to have been investigated. The amount of the note may have been passed to the credit of Benson at that early day. The presumption is that it was so ; and it rests with Benson to show affirmatively that he was not only entitled to an allowance for that note, but that, through error or mistake, it has been entirely omitted in any of the accounts. This, he has not done.

The next complaint is that Benson has been charged with compound interest on his account of many years standing, and thus the balance has been swelled which entered into the first bond and mortgage. I find no evidence whatever in support of this allegation of the answer. The next is that, on striking the balance when the first bond and mortgage were given, an item of one hundred and ninety dollars and thirteen cents was charged on the complainant’s books and included in the bond and mortgage as and for interest on the balance of an account of about seven hundred and fifty dollars for six months, whereas the interest was only [301]*301twenty-six dollars and twenty-five cents and thus an error of one hundred and sixty-three dollars has crept into the accounts to the prejudice of Benson. The testimony of Charles W. Ingersoll, in relation to the excessive nature of this item, is far from being satisfactory. He merely says, he found a charge for interest of one hundred and ninety dollars and thirteen cents on the complainant’s ledger which he, the witness, supposes was too much. He supposes the charge ought to have been about twenty-five dollars to thirty dollars. The grounds or reasons for his supposition are not given. The court cannot receive this in evidence of overcharge or mistake.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
4 Edw. Ch. 297, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/de-mott-v-benson-nychanct-1844.