De Leon-Rios v. Blanche

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DIMAS DE LEON-RIOS, No. 25-5212 Agency No. Petitioner, A042-318-604 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 22, 2026**

Before: CANBY, BENNETT, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Dimas De Leon-Rios, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal

from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial

evidence the agency’s factual findings. Arrey v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th

Cir. 2019). We review de novo constitutional claims. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400

F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petition for review.

De Leon-Rios does not challenge the BIA’s conclusion that he waived

review of the IJ’s dispositive determination that his conviction for a particularly

serious crime rendered him ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and

withholding of removal under the CAT, so we do not address it. See Lopez-

Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of deferral of removal

under the CAT because De Leon-Rios failed to show it is more likely than not he

will be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if

returned to Mexico. See Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009).

De Leon-Rios’ contention that the agency ignored evidence of the likelihood

of future torture is unsupported by the record.

To the extent De Leon-Rios raises a due process claim that the IJ failed to

address his request for a waiver of removability, his claim fails for lack of

prejudice because he is not eligible for a waiver. See Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d

967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[P]rejudice . . . means that the outcome of the

proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.”).

2 25-5212 De Leon-Rios’ new allegations of harm to his family are not properly before

the court because he did not raise them before the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)

(administrative remedies must be exhausted); see also Suate-Orellana v. Garland,

101 F.4th 624, 629 (9th Cir. 2024) (the exhaustion requirement is not

jurisdictional, but must be enforced if properly raised by a party).

We do not consider the materials De Leon-Rios references in the opening

brief that are not part of the administrative record. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955,

963-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

We do not address De Leon-Rios’ challenge to the BIA’s February 19, 2026

order denying his motion to reopen because that challenge is not properly before

this court. See Dela Cruz v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 946, 948 (9th Cir. 2008)

(“Congress envisioned two separate petitions filed to review two separate final

orders.” (internal quotation marks, emphasis, and citation omitted)).

All pending motions are denied as moot.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

3 25-5212