De Lamar v. De Lamar Min. Co.

110 F. 538, 1901 U.S. App. LEXIS 4879
U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Idaho·Decided August 23, 1901·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

BEATTY, District Judge.

The complainant, the owner of patent No. 607,719, issued July 19, 1898, “for a process of recovering precious metals from their solution,” brings this action against the defendant as an infringer. As gathered from the record of this case, • the process known as the cyanide process for separating the precious metals from the ore state consists of pulverizing the ore and then subjecting it to an aqueous solution of cyanide of potassium. The pulverized ore and this solution being mingled, the cyanogen, an clement in the solution, having a greater affinity for the gold and silver than for the potassium, unites with the former and forms a new solution. By subjecting this last solution to contact with zinc, the gold and silver are separated from the solution. Such was, and is, tlie general process. The complainant’s contention is that, under the only processes in existence prior to his patent, zinc in some massive form, as in plates, shavings, etc., was used; that to mechanically reduce the zinc to any of these forms was a considerable expense; that it was not in any of these forms so minute that all of it would be reached by the solution, and as a result an amount of zinc beyond that actually needed to precipitate all the metal was necessarily used, which resulted in so fouling the solution with zinc that to some extent it was rendered unfit for future use; that it required much time to work the ores by this process; and that, prior to his patent, there was no process by which each particle of the necessary amount of zinc could be brought into contact with each atom of the precious metal contained in the solution, which, he claims, is done by the process described in his patent, and "through which all the difficulties referred to in the prior processes are avoided. The patent specifies that it “relates to the recovery of the precious metals from their solutions by the use of a definite quantity of a finely-divided precipi-taring reagent in a state of agitation”; that the zinc alloys, shavings, turnings, etc., heretofore used, had to be used in 'excess of the quantity actually required for precipitation; that the by-product known as “zinc dust,” being a very fine powder resulting from the manufacture of zinc products, is a cheap substitute, which can be used in the exact quantity which the solution may require for precipitation, for tlie use of which, with agitation, the claims provide. The chief improvement claimed by the patent over prior processes is that by the use of zinc dust, with agitation of it with the solution, it can be used in the exact quantity needed for precipitation, thus so avoiding the fouling of the solution with a surplus of zinc that it can again be used. If the court does not reach the correct result in the consideration of this cause, it will not be from want of either ability or diligence upon the part of counsel, for each party has been ably and faithfully represented. If the court does not, in its discussion "of the issues, refer to all the questions and details presented by counsel', it is no reflection upon their judgment.

In this examination we start with the presumption in favor of the validity of the patent, which is but the logical conclusion of its issuance. This presumption, however, is but prima facie evidence, and is not of such conclusive weight as to sway the judgment of the court against the conviction naturally following from the evidence and the [540] law. We are justified in concluding this presumption is not controlling when we consider the great number of patents that the courts hold void. Either the courts or the patent office often err. The system, as it is, certainly is vicious. Almost it seems the practice is to issue patents and leave the courts to wrestle with the question of their validity, thus affording ample opportunity for the display of erudition upon technical subtleties at the expense and cruel disappointment of unfortunate patentees and litigants. •

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De Lamar v. De Lamar Min. Co., 110 F. 538, 1901 U.S. App. LEXIS 4879 (circtdid 1901).

110 F. 538 (De Lamar v. De Lamar Min. Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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