de Jesus v. UnitedHealth Group

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedMay 5, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-00532
StatusUnknown

This text of de Jesus v. UnitedHealth Group (de Jesus v. UnitedHealth Group) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
de Jesus v. UnitedHealth Group, (D. Ariz. 2022).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Myrna de Jesus, No. CV-22-00532-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 UnitedHealth Group,

13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court 16 Without Prepaying Fees or Cost (Doc. 6). Upon review, Plaintiff’s Application, signed 17 under penalty of perjury, indicates that she is financially unable to pay the filing fee. The 18 Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application and allow him to proceed in forma pauperis 19 (“IFP”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court will proceed to screen Plaintiff’s 20 Complaint (Doc. 1). 21 I. Legal Standard 22 When a party has been granted IFP status, the Court must review the complaint to 23 determine whether the action: 24 (i) is frivolous or malicious; 25 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 26 (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1 In conducting this review, “section 1915(e) not only 28 1 “While much of § 1915 outlines how prisoners can file proceedings in forma pauperis, 1 permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.” 2 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires complaints to make “a short and plain 4 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While Rule 8 does 5 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the 6 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 7 (2009).2 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 8 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint “must contain sufficient factual 9 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting 10 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when 11 the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 12 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 13 556). A complaint that provides “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 14 elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor will a complaint 15 suffice if it presents nothing more than “naked assertions” without “further factual 16 enhancement.” Id. at 557. 17 The Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and interpret the 18 facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 19 435 (9th Cir. 2000). That rule does not apply, however, to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 20 U.S. at 678. The Court is mindful that it must “construe pro se filings liberally when 21 §1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners.” 22 Long v. Maricopa Cmty. College Dist., 2012 WL 588965, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 2012) 23 (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints[.]”); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 24 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”) (citation omitted). Therefore, section 1915 applies to this non-prisoner IFP complaint. 25

26 2 “Although the Iqbal Court was addressing pleading standards in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court finds that those standards also apply in the initial screening of 27 a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A since Iqbal discusses the 28 general pleading standards of Rule 8, which apply in all civil actions.” McLemore v. Dennis Dillon Automotive Group, Inc., 2013 WL 97767, at *2 n. 1 (D. Idaho Jan. 8, 2013). 1 evaluating them under Iqbal.” Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763–64 (9th Cir. 2014) 2 (quoting Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)). 3 II. Discussion 4 Plaintiff alleges that she was hired to work for Defendant United Health Group. 5 (Doc. 1 at 1). She alleges that Defendant falsely claimed she “screamed loudly and cursed 6 at everyone inside the hospital for no reason” and that Defendant terminated her 7 employment. (Id. at 4). The Court infers two causes action; defamation, and breach of 8 contract. (Id.) (“Defendant defamed Plaintiff; defendant recklessly slandered plaintiff . . . 9 . Defendant made the following breaches . . . .). 10 To bring a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must show the defendant published a 11 false and defamatory communication and that the defendant “(a) knows that the statement 12 is false and it defames the other, (b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters, or (c) acts 13 negligently in failing to ascertain them.” Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 757 P.2d 14 105, 110 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (citation omitted). To be published, a communication must 15 be made to a third party. Dube v. Likins, 167 P.3d 93, 104 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). The 16 Court can reasonably infer from Plaintiff’s Complaint that she alleges Defendant recklessly 17 made a false statement about her. However, the Court cannot determine whether or how 18 Defendants published this statement to a someone besides Plaintiff or Defendant. While 19 Plaintiff may have received the statement, it is uncertain whether anyone else besides 20 Defendant did. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s defamation claim. 21 To bring a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must show the existence of a 22 contract, the breach of that contract, and subsequent damages. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. 23 Johnson Bank, 372 P.3d 292, 297 (Ariz. 2016). Although Plaintiff makes shows she has 24 been harmed, through her termination, she does not show what specific contractual 25 agreement has been breached. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s breach of 26 contract claim. 27 III. Leave to Amend 28 Because the Court has dismissed both of Plaintiff’s Claims, it will dismiss the 1 Complaint and grant leave for Plaintiff to file a first amended complaint within thirty (30) 2 days from the date of entry of this Order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (stating that leave 3 to amend should be “freely” given “when justice so requires”).

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Michael Henry Ferdik v. Joe Bonzelet, Sheriff
963 F.2d 1258 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
Jesse J. Calhoun v. Donald N. Stahl James Brazelton
254 F.3d 845 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Michael Lacey v. Joseph Arpaio
693 F.3d 896 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Dube v. Likins
167 P.3d 93 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2007)
Frederick Jackson v. Michael Barnes
749 F.3d 755 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
First American Title Insurance v. Johnson Bank
372 P.3d 292 (Arizona Supreme Court, 2016)
McHenry v. Renne
84 F.3d 1172 (Ninth Circuit, 1996)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Shwarz v. United States
234 F.3d 428 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)

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de Jesus v. UnitedHealth Group, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/de-jesus-v-unitedhealth-group-azd-2022.