De Ford v. Koutoulas

District Court, M.D. Florida·Decided August 29, 2025·No. 6:22-cv-00652·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ORLANDO DIVISION

ERIC DE FORD, SANDRA BADER, SHAWN R. KEY, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No: 6:22-cv-00652-PGB-DCI

JAMES KOUTOULAS and LGBCoin, LTD.,

Defendants.

ORDER Pending before the Court are two motions to file documents under seal: 1) Defendants’ Motion to Seal (Doc. 478); and 2) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal Exhibits to Opposition to Defendants’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment and Rule 56(F) Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 487). For the reasons below, the motions are due to be DENIED. I. BACKGROUND On May 22, 2025, Defendants James Koutoulas and LGBCoin, LTD. (collectively, Defendants) filed an Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 477) (Summary Judgment Motion) and a motion to seal Exhibits J and K to the Amended Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. 478 (Defendants’ Motion to Seal). Exhibit J is Defendant James Koutoulas’ response to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 19. Doc. 478 at 1. Exhibit K is the rough transcript of the deposition of James Koutoulas. Id. Defendants seek to file these documents under seal because “Defendant, James Koutoulas, has designated the entirety of his deposition and response to Interrogatory No. 19 as ‘Highly Confidential’ and portions of each are quoted and referred to in the Motion for Summary Judgment.” Id. at 2. On June 12, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a response in Opposition to Defendants’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment and Rule 56(f) Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Doc. 486 (the Response). Plaintiffs concurrently filed a motion to seal exhibits E, F, and I to the

Response. Doc. 487 (Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal). Plaintiffs describe the documents as: 1) the “March 3, 2025 Transcript of Deposition of James Koutoulas;” 2) “Koutoulas-PL 000390;” and 3) “Koutoulas-PL 000399.” Doc. 487 at 1. Plaintiffs seek to file these documents under seal because “Defendant James Koutoulas has designated these documents as ‘Confidential’ or ‘Highly Confidential.’” Id. at 1-2. Defendants’ Motion to Seal and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal are unopposed. The Court will refer to the five exhibits the Parties seek to seal as “the Documents.” II. LEGAL STANDARD The filing of items under seal is governed by Local Rule 1.11(b), which provides as

follows: (b) Motion to Seal. A motion to seal an item: (1) must include in the title “Motion to Seal Under [Statute, Rule, or Order]” or, if no statute, rule, or order applies, “Motion to Seal”; (2) must describe the item; (3) must establish: (A) that filing the item is necessary, (B) that sealing the item is necessary, and (C) that using a redaction, a pseudonym, or a means other than sealing is unavailable or unsatisfactory; (4) must include a legal memorandum; (5) must propose a duration for the seal; (6) must state the name, mailing address, email address, and telephone number of the person authorized to retrieve a sealed, tangible item; (7) must certify the name, mailing address, email address, and telephone number of any non-party the movant knows or reasonably should know has an interest in establishing or maintaining the seal and the day on which, and the means by which, the movant served or otherwise delivered the motion to the non-party; and (8) must include the item, which is sealed pending an order resolving the motion. Local Rule 1.11(b). Once the court has assessed compliance with the Local Rule, the Court then must determine whether the movant has shown good cause for sealing the documents. In deciding whether to grant a motion to seal, the Court must remain cognizant of a “presumptive common law right to inspect and copy judicial records.” U.S. v. Rosenthal, 763 F.2d 1291, 1292-93 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)). This common law right “is instrumental in securing the integrity of the [judicial] process.” See Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1571 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“The district court must keep in mind the rights of a third party—the public, ‘if the public is to appreciate fully the often significant events at issue in public litigation and the workings of the legal system.’”) (citation omitted). Although the common law right of access creates a presumption against sealing court records, a party may overcome that presumption with a showing of good cause. Romero v. Drummond Co., 480 F.3d 1234, 1246 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Perez-Guerrero v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 717 F.3d 1224, 1235 (11th Cir. 2013). III. DISCUSSION A review of Defendants’ Motion to Seal and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal (collectively, the Motions) reveals that they are nearly identical, boilerplate motions. See generally Docs. 478, 487. The only substantive differences between the Motions are the list of exhibits to be sealed, Plaintiffs’ addition of two facts under paragraph three in Plaintiffs’ Motion to seal, and slight

changes in wording to reflect which party has filed the motion and which filing the exhibits pertain to. Id. That Plaintiffs and Defendants (collectively, the Parties) submitted virtually the same motion underscores the extent to which the Motions lack the requisite detail required by Rule 1.11.1 Specifically, the Parties have failed to establish: 1) that sealing the Documents is necessary; 2) that good cause exists to overcome the presumptive public right of access; and 3) that using a redaction or a means other than sealing is unavailable or unsatisfactory. For these reasons, the Motions are due to be denied. First, the Parties have not established that sealing the Documents is necessary, as required by Local Rule 1.11(b)(3)(B). The Parties assert that sealing is necessary “considering the

substantive nature of the document, the risks inherent in disclosure, and the potential breach of the Confidentiality Agreement.” Doc. 478 at 5; Doc. 487 at 6. But neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants explain the substantive nature of the Documents nor the risks inherent in disclosure. To the extent the Parties’ basis for relief is that Defendant James Koutoulas previously designated the materials “Confidential,” the Parties do not have the right to stipulate what judicial records will be sealed. See Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1571 (11th Cir. 1985). Local Rule 1.11 specifies that “sealing is not authorized by a confidentiality agreement, a protective order, a designation of

1 Given that the Motions are nearly identical, the Court will address the Motions’ shortcomings collectively. confidentiality, or a stipulation.” Local Rule 1.11(a). The Parties’ one-sentence blanket assertion that sealing is necessary is insufficient. Further, the Parties’ confidentiality agreement does not militate sealing here. Although the Parties quote from the Second Amended Case Management and Scheduling Order (CMSO)— seemingly implying that the Court has already committed to enforcing the Parties’ confidentiality

agreement—the quoted language is pulled from the section of the CMSO addressing “Discovery.” Doc.

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