De Fernandez v. CMA CGM S.A.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedJuly 30, 2024
Docket1:21-cv-22778
StatusUnknown

This text of De Fernandez v. CMA CGM S.A. (De Fernandez v. CMA CGM S.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
De Fernandez v. CMA CGM S.A., (S.D. Fla. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 1:21-CV-22778-DAMIAN/AUGUSTIN-BIRCH

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

CMA CGM S.A., et al.,

Defendants. ________________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY FROM PLAINTIFF [DE 250]

This cause comes before the Court on Defendants CMA CGM S.A. and CMA CGM (America) LLC’s Motion to Compel Discovery from Plaintiff. DE 250. Plaintiff Odette Blanco De Fernandez responded to the Motion to Compel, and Defendants replied. DE 252; DE 253. The Court has scheduled a Discovery Hearing on the Motion to Compel for August 1, 2024, at 3:00 p.m. DE 249. However, upon review of the briefing, the Court concludes that it can resolve the Motion to Compel without the Discovery Hearing. The Court has carefully considered the briefing and the record and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Discovery Hearing scheduled for August 1, 2024, at 3:00 p.m. is CANCELED. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint raises one count under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, also known as the Helms-Burton Act. DE 160 at 50. The Court summarized the relevant provisions of the Helms-Burton Act and Plaintiff’s allegations in a prior Order entered on May 24, 2024, at docket entry 230. In the Motion to Compel that is now before the Court, Defendants make requests that fall under two categories: (1) compliance with that May 24 Order, and (2) production of purportedly privileged documents. A. Compliance with the May 24 Order Ruling on a prior Motion to Compel [DE 209] wherein Defendants sought Plaintiff’s

responses to their third set of requests for production of documents, the Court’s May 24 Order provided as follows: [F]or any documents (whether or not subject to a protective order) that Plaintiff received from a defendant in De Fernandez v. Seaboard Marine Ltd., 1:20-cv- 25176 (S.D. Fla.) or from a defendant in De Fernandez v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 1:21-cv-20443 (S.D. Fla.), the Motion to Compel is denied. Of the various lawsuits that Plaintiff lists as having brought against shipping companies, those two lawsuits are the ones in which protective orders have been entered. See DE 160 ¶ 87 & n.9 (listing lawsuits). Defendants have the option to subpoena the defendants to those lawsuits to produce documents. For any other responsive documents that Plaintiff has within her possession, custody, or control, the Motion to Compel is granted, there being no protective order barring production.

DE 230 at 10. This ruling resolved Plaintiff’s objection that she could not produce certain responsive documents because she received them subject to protective orders entered in other lawsuits, and the providing parties in those other lawsuits would not grant her permission to disclose the documents for the purpose of this lawsuit. Before turning to the instant Motion to Compel, the Court must correct Plaintiff’s misrepresentation of the Court’s prior ruling. Plaintiff states that the May 24 Order “only requires her to produce documents to the extent she receives documents from other defendants in her other lawsuits.” DE 252 at 3. Plaintiff’s statement is a misrepresentation because the May 24 Order does not limit production to documents Plaintiff receives in other lawsuits. As already quoted above, the May 24 Order requires production of “any . . . responsive documents that Plaintiff has within her possession, custody, or control” other than those “documents (whether or not subject to a protective order) that Plaintiff received from a defendant in De Fernandez v. Seaboard Marine Ltd., 1:20-cv-25176 (S.D. Fla.) or from a defendant in De Fernandez v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 1:21-cv-20443 (S.D. Fla.).” DE 230 at 10 (emphasis added). In the instant Motion to Compel, Defendants request that Plaintiff “be compelled to . . . search for and collect responsive documents as previously ordered by this Court.” DE 250 at 3.

Plaintiff, as well as Defendants, already are obligated to comply with Court Orders. The Court does not need to enter a separate Order compelling a party to comply with Court Orders. The parties’ briefing presents an additional issue concerning the scope of Plaintiff’s obligation to produce responsive documents. The parties do not disagree about the basic standard that governs the obligation to produce responsive documents. That standard is that a responding party is required to produce “items in the responding party’s possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). “Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, control is the test with regard to the production of documents. Control is defined not only as possession, but as the legal right to obtain the documents requested upon demand.” Searock v. Stripling, 736 F.2d 650, 653 (11th Cir. 1984); see also Costa v. Kerzner Int’l Resorts, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 468, 471 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (“Control,

therefore, does not require that a party have legal ownership or actual physical possession of the documents at issue; indeed, documents have been considered to be under a party’s control (for discovery purposes) when that party has the right, authority, or practical ability to obtain the materials sought on demand.” (quotation marks omitted)). “The party seeking production bears the burden of establishing that the opposing party has control over the documents sought.” Al-Saadi v. Annchery Fajas USA, Inc., No. 20-23937-CIV, 2021 WL 8773350, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2021). Defendants contend that Plaintiff refuses to confirm that she produced responsive documents that her attorneys, her disclosed agent Jorge Rosado, and her family members possess. DE 250 at 2–3. Documents that an attorney gathers or creates pursuant to the representation of a client are documents within that client’s control. Marshall v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 8:07-CV-703- T-23MSS, 2008 WL 11336590, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2008). Plaintiff does not contest this proposition. She represents to the Court that Defendants already have her responsive documents.

DE 252 at 3 (“Defendants . . . have Plaintiff’s responsive documents.”). At least one attorney of record must sign a discovery response. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1). “[T]he signature certifies that the lawyer has made a reasonable effort to assure that the client has provided all the information and documents available to him that are responsive to the discovery demand.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. Further, a party responding to a request for production of documents or materials shall serve a Notice of Completion of Production at the time that party produces (or otherwise makes available) the last of the documents or other materials that are responsive to the request that are not being withheld pursuant to an objection.

Southern District of Florida Local Rule 26.1(e)(7). If Plaintiff’s responses are complete as she maintains, an attorney should sign them in accordance with Rule 26(g)(1), thereby certifying that they are complete, and Plaintiff should serve a Notice of Completion of Production in accordance with Local Rule 26.1(e)(7).

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De Fernandez v. CMA CGM S.A., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/de-fernandez-v-cma-cgm-sa-flsd-2024.