De Betz's Petition

9 Abb. N. Cas. 246
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 15, 1878
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 9 Abb. N. Cas. 246 (De Betz's Petition) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
De Betz's Petition, 9 Abb. N. Cas. 246 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1878).

Opinion

Daniels, J.

The petitioners reside, two of them in Antwerp and the other in Paris, and are sworn to own in the aggregate $345,000 of the bonds of the Erie Railway Company, secured by its second consolidated mortgage, which was executed and delivered to the plaintiff as trustee for the holders of such bonds. This action has been instituted as it now stands for the [248]*248foreclosure of that mortgage, and the sale of the mortgaged property. A plan has been adopted for the acquisition of the mortgaged property, and the formation of a new corporation to own and operate it, which has received the assent of most of the bondholders under this and the preceding mortgage, and the other persons interested in the property ; and in conformity to that plan and the understanding of those who are desirous of promoting it, a judgment has been entered in this action. A minority of the bondholders appear to dissent from this plan and the proceedings taken to render it effectual; and in support of their dissent it has been maintained that they have been unjustly discriminated against by those engaged in the success of this plan, that the plaintiff as their trustee has espoused the interests of those supporting and expecting to be benefited by it, and that together they have allowed the receiver, who has had charge of the property and managed the affairs of the railroad company since May 26, 1875, an improper measure of compensation for himself and extravagant charges claimed for expenditures in the performance of his trust. Much proof has been submitted in support of these charges, and others of a similar but more incidental nature ; and they have been met by direct denials and sustaining evidence on the part of the parties whose conduct has thus been brought in question. The most serious of these charges, as well indeed all of them, may, in the end, appear to be without foundation; but, as the evidence now appears, there seems to be reason for believing that the plan adopted for the sale of the mortgaged property, and the reorganization of the company, nas, to a certain extent at least, been devised for the more complete protection of those assenting to and sustaining it, than of others not as extensively interested in the property and franchises to be affected [249]*249by its success ; and it also appears tó be the fact that the plan has secured the friendly co-operation of the plaintiff. That may very well have been yielded, because of the conviction that it was the best thing that could be done for the persons interested in the securities held by it; and such a conclusion may yet prove entirely proper and just; for in the foreclosure and sale of so vast a property, and interests so diversified and extensive, the ordinary course of proceeding must prove entirely inadequate to the exigencies of the case. But few combinations of capital could be secured which would be adequate to the purchase of such property and interests ; and if one could be created that would make the purchase, it would only be upon terms that must prove injurious if not ruinous to many of the interested individual owners of bonds and stock. Primarily for those reasons the Legislature of the State has made provision by the enactment of laws, for the persons in interest in such cases, among themselves to devise and adopt a suitable mode for the sale and transfer of the property for their own immediate benefit and for its future use by a new organization created in their interest (L. 1874 c. 430 ; L. 1876, c. 446). And without such legislation similar expedients have been found to be indispensable, and have been sanctioned when fairly and justly planned by the approbations of courts of justice. The interests to be protected and the objects to be secured can be practically and fairly promoted in no other way. f Bat at the same time neither the statutes nor the principles properly applicable to such an emergency will justify any discrimination which jeopardizes the rights or interests of those who may withhold their approbation. These rights and interests, while in a certain degree they are mutual, are still beyond that separate and distinct, and each owner must exercise his own judgment as to whar may be best for himself. This is a right secured to [250]*250all owners of property, and if the' convictions of the minority should materially differ from those of the majority as to what may be most advisable or expedient, that difference should not be made a reason for depriving them of their just proportion of the benefits ultimately to be secured from the success of the plan deemed most feasible by the majority. They should still be allowed, so far as that may be done, to enjoy the advantages which they can properly claim as persons interested in the enterprise, and it may very well be that these interests of the minority have been properly cared for and guarded in this instance. ,5 Whether that be so or not, it is not necessary now to determine.

It does appear that the plaintiff has given its friendly co-operation to the success of this plan, and for that reason it may not have scrutinized as closely as it otherwise would, and as it certainly should, the charges made against the mortgaged property. It has been very positively, and certainly with some degree of plausibility, averred that it has been remiss in this respect. \ The plaintiff in its reply to these allegations has affirmed its constant readiness to contest any item to which its attention might have been directed as improper by any one of the bondholders suggesting its interposition. But that was not the full measure of its duty in this respect. It was bound by its relation to the bondholders to see that the property securing their obligations was not improperly burdened by unjust demands or unnecessary expenditures, and from the examination into the accounts, as they have been subjected to the investigation of the learned referee in the case, that may have been already thoroughly accomplished. But still the truth of the matter is very positively affirmed to be the other way, and as this has been done in the interest of parties entitled to the favorable consideration of courts of justice, they ought to be afforded an opportunity for the vindication of their [251]*251rights by an ample investigation. Of this the receiver himself has felt the propriety, for in his letter to the referee on the 15th of September, 1877, he suggested that persons having a substantial interest in the proceedings, as an owner "of the bonds, &c., might be allowed C6to be present in person or by representatives,’ ’ and to raise any question which may be proper concerning the accounts. This was an entirely just and proper thing to be done, and it probably resulted from his own convictions that the charges made would in the end prove to have been without foundation. But it has been declared in support of the application made, that this liberty, for some reason not necessary to be now considered, has not been enjoyed by bondholders desirous of availing themselves of it, and it appears probable that they have been obliged to submit to some restraint inconsistent with entire freedom in this respect. That, however, has been denied, and possibly their conclusions may have been more imaginary than real. But as the plaintiff has apparently given in its adhesion to the success of the purposes of the majority who support the plan adopted for the sale and reorganization, those who are otherwise inclined ought to be at least placed in a position where they may be able to protect their interests against unjust or unlawful charges.

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Bluebook (online)
9 Abb. N. Cas. 246, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/de-betzs-petition-nysupct-1878.