RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1721-18T1
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
R.F.,
Defendant-Appellant. __________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF H.S.F.,
a Minor. ___________________________
Submitted October 2, 2019 – Decided October 9, 2019
Before Judges Sabatino and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County, Docket No. FG-16-0066-18.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Carol A. Weil, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Patricia O'Dowd, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; James Joseph Gross, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this Title 30 guardianship case, R.F., the father of H.S.F. 1 ("Heather")
appeals from the trial court's termination of his parental rights after a two -day
trial. We affirm the final judgment. We do so substantially for the sound
reasons set forth on November 30, 2018 in the twenty-nine-page written opinion
of Judge Imre Karaszegi, Jr., who presided over the trial.
The father has a long history of mental illness, including schizoaffective
disorder and alcohol use disorder. He has had hallucinations and several in-
patient psychiatric hospitalizations. He has a history of drug and alcohol
addiction and relapses.
1 We use initials to protect the privacy of the minor. R. 1:38-3(d)(12). We will refer to the child by the pseudonym "Heather." A-1721-18T1 2 Heather was born in June 2012. She was first removed from her parents
by the Division of Child Protection and Permanency ("the Division") in the fall
of 2015 because her mother, M.S., overdosed on heroin. Heather was initially
placed in a non-family foster placement. Several months later in April 2016,
the mother died.
After the death of the mother, the father made a voluntary surrender of
Heather to his sister (the paternal aunt) and her husband in May 2017. Heather
was taken out of the foster home and placed in the care of the paternal aunt and
uncle.
The aunt and uncle had difficulties in caring for Heather. They reported
that Heather was struggling in school, exhibiting "multiple personalities," and
behaving in antisocial ways towards their non-adoptive children.
In light of these persisting problems with Heather's placement, in March
2018 the aunt informed the Division that she and her husband were no longer
interested in adopting Heather. Several days later, the Division placed Heather
back with her previous resource parents.
In the meantime, the father continued to have behavioral and substance
abuse problems. However, the father did maintain visitation with Heather and
the two of them developed significant bonds.
A-1721-18T1 3 At the trial, the judge considered testimony from two caseworkers who
described the pertinent chronology of events and the Division's involvement.
The judge also heard testimony from the Division's psychological expert, Dr.
Carolina Mendez, Ph.D. Dr. Mendez recommended termination of the father's
parental rights, despite the bonding with his daughter.
Among other things, Dr. Mendez opined that the father's history of mental
illness, persisting substance abuse problems, and noncompliance with treatment
regimens indicated he would be "overwhelm[ed]" by the responsibilities of
parenting Heather. She concluded the father would not be able to "parent
independently now or in the foreseeable future." Dr. Mendez also found that
Heather had bonded well with her resource family. The resource family would
like to adopt Heather, and Heather told Dr. Mendez that she would like to live
with them.
The Division also presented expert testimony from a psychiatrist, Joel
Federbush, M.D., who had performed an evaluation of the father to assess his
parenting abilities. According to Dr. Federbush, the father's history of mental
health issues and substance abuse, his living situation, and consistent
unemployment all raised significant issues about his ability to parent. The father
A-1721-18T1 4 admitted to Dr. Federbush he had multiple positive tests for alcohol in the past
year and was "hearing voices" as recently as a month prior to the evaluation.
Dr. Federbush acknowledged that the father stated he wanted to parent
Heather. But he also noted the father's contrary actual behavior – for instance,
not taking advantage of scheduled phone calls with Heather – was inconsistent
with this desire. The psychiatrist concluded the father was not currently able to
parent Heather, and that this was unlikely to change in the immediate future.
The judge heard competing testimony from a psychological expert, Dr.
Andrew Brown called by the defense. Dr. Brown recommended against
termination largely because of Heather's deep emotional attachment to her
father. Dr. Brown recommended that additional services be provided to
potentially enable the father to maintain the relationship with the child.
After considering this testimony and other proofs, Judge Karaszegi
concluded all four statutory factors for termination under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
15.1(a) had been proven by the requisite level of clear and convincing evidence.
The judge specifically found the testimony of the Division's witnesses to be
credible. The Law Guardian supported the court's determination.
On appeal, the father argues: (1) the Division did not adequately consider
the paternal aunt as an alternative to termination; (2) reasonable services were
A-1721-18T1 5 not provided by the Division to the father or to Heather; and (3) the judge
erroneously found the Division had satisfied the first and second pro ngs of the
termination standard.
In considering these arguments, we must bear in mind that the scope of
our review in an appeal of a judgment terminating parental rights is limited. A
reviewing court should not "disturb the family court's decision to terminate
parental rights when there is substantial credible evidence in the record to
support the court's findings." New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008). The reviewing court should defer to the trial
court's findings of fact "if supported by adequate, substantial, and credible
evidence in the record." New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L.,
191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007).
We also must recognize the considerable expertise of the Family Part,
which repeatedly adjudicates cases brought by the Division under Title 9 and
Title 30 involving the alleged abuse or neglect of children. See, e.g., N.J. Div.
of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012); N.J. Div. of Youth
& Family Servs. v.
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RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1721-18T1
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
R.F.,
Defendant-Appellant. __________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF H.S.F.,
a Minor. ___________________________
Submitted October 2, 2019 – Decided October 9, 2019
Before Judges Sabatino and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County, Docket No. FG-16-0066-18.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Carol A. Weil, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Patricia O'Dowd, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; James Joseph Gross, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this Title 30 guardianship case, R.F., the father of H.S.F. 1 ("Heather")
appeals from the trial court's termination of his parental rights after a two -day
trial. We affirm the final judgment. We do so substantially for the sound
reasons set forth on November 30, 2018 in the twenty-nine-page written opinion
of Judge Imre Karaszegi, Jr., who presided over the trial.
The father has a long history of mental illness, including schizoaffective
disorder and alcohol use disorder. He has had hallucinations and several in-
patient psychiatric hospitalizations. He has a history of drug and alcohol
addiction and relapses.
1 We use initials to protect the privacy of the minor. R. 1:38-3(d)(12). We will refer to the child by the pseudonym "Heather." A-1721-18T1 2 Heather was born in June 2012. She was first removed from her parents
by the Division of Child Protection and Permanency ("the Division") in the fall
of 2015 because her mother, M.S., overdosed on heroin. Heather was initially
placed in a non-family foster placement. Several months later in April 2016,
the mother died.
After the death of the mother, the father made a voluntary surrender of
Heather to his sister (the paternal aunt) and her husband in May 2017. Heather
was taken out of the foster home and placed in the care of the paternal aunt and
uncle.
The aunt and uncle had difficulties in caring for Heather. They reported
that Heather was struggling in school, exhibiting "multiple personalities," and
behaving in antisocial ways towards their non-adoptive children.
In light of these persisting problems with Heather's placement, in March
2018 the aunt informed the Division that she and her husband were no longer
interested in adopting Heather. Several days later, the Division placed Heather
back with her previous resource parents.
In the meantime, the father continued to have behavioral and substance
abuse problems. However, the father did maintain visitation with Heather and
the two of them developed significant bonds.
A-1721-18T1 3 At the trial, the judge considered testimony from two caseworkers who
described the pertinent chronology of events and the Division's involvement.
The judge also heard testimony from the Division's psychological expert, Dr.
Carolina Mendez, Ph.D. Dr. Mendez recommended termination of the father's
parental rights, despite the bonding with his daughter.
Among other things, Dr. Mendez opined that the father's history of mental
illness, persisting substance abuse problems, and noncompliance with treatment
regimens indicated he would be "overwhelm[ed]" by the responsibilities of
parenting Heather. She concluded the father would not be able to "parent
independently now or in the foreseeable future." Dr. Mendez also found that
Heather had bonded well with her resource family. The resource family would
like to adopt Heather, and Heather told Dr. Mendez that she would like to live
with them.
The Division also presented expert testimony from a psychiatrist, Joel
Federbush, M.D., who had performed an evaluation of the father to assess his
parenting abilities. According to Dr. Federbush, the father's history of mental
health issues and substance abuse, his living situation, and consistent
unemployment all raised significant issues about his ability to parent. The father
A-1721-18T1 4 admitted to Dr. Federbush he had multiple positive tests for alcohol in the past
year and was "hearing voices" as recently as a month prior to the evaluation.
Dr. Federbush acknowledged that the father stated he wanted to parent
Heather. But he also noted the father's contrary actual behavior – for instance,
not taking advantage of scheduled phone calls with Heather – was inconsistent
with this desire. The psychiatrist concluded the father was not currently able to
parent Heather, and that this was unlikely to change in the immediate future.
The judge heard competing testimony from a psychological expert, Dr.
Andrew Brown called by the defense. Dr. Brown recommended against
termination largely because of Heather's deep emotional attachment to her
father. Dr. Brown recommended that additional services be provided to
potentially enable the father to maintain the relationship with the child.
After considering this testimony and other proofs, Judge Karaszegi
concluded all four statutory factors for termination under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
15.1(a) had been proven by the requisite level of clear and convincing evidence.
The judge specifically found the testimony of the Division's witnesses to be
credible. The Law Guardian supported the court's determination.
On appeal, the father argues: (1) the Division did not adequately consider
the paternal aunt as an alternative to termination; (2) reasonable services were
A-1721-18T1 5 not provided by the Division to the father or to Heather; and (3) the judge
erroneously found the Division had satisfied the first and second pro ngs of the
termination standard.
In considering these arguments, we must bear in mind that the scope of
our review in an appeal of a judgment terminating parental rights is limited. A
reviewing court should not "disturb the family court's decision to terminate
parental rights when there is substantial credible evidence in the record to
support the court's findings." New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008). The reviewing court should defer to the trial
court's findings of fact "if supported by adequate, substantial, and credible
evidence in the record." New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L.,
191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007).
We also must recognize the considerable expertise of the Family Part,
which repeatedly adjudicates cases brought by the Division under Title 9 and
Title 30 involving the alleged abuse or neglect of children. See, e.g., N.J. Div.
of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012); N.J. Div. of Youth
& Family Servs. v. L.J.D., 428 N.J. Super. 451, 476 (App. Div. 2012).
That said, we recognize our scope of review is broadened "where the focus
of the dispute is . . . alleged error in the trial judge's evaluation of the underlying
A-1721-18T1 6 facts and the implications to be drawn therefrom[.]" See N.J. Div. of Youth &
Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014) (quoting In re J.T., 269 N.J.
Super. 172, 188-89 (App. Div. 1993)). In such instances, a trial court's
interpretations of the law and subsequent legal consequences of the facts are
afforded no special deference. See R.G., 217 N.J. at 552.
Having applied these standards of review to the record and the trial court's
analysis, we discern no persuasive reason to set aside the final judgment of
termination. The judge carefully analyzed the evidence in his comprehensive
written decision. He articulated ample grounds for why the Division met its
burden of proof on all four of the statutory factors.
The judge adopted the opinions of the Division's experts over the more
optimistic assessments of the defense expert. The judge had the prerogative to
do so, having heard their testimony and evaluated their credibility. Angel v.
Rand Express Lines, Inc., 66 N.J. Super. 77, 85-86 (App. Div. 1961).
There was ample evidence presented to establish that the father
endangered Heather by his past conduct and behavioral issues, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
15.1(a)(1) (prong one), and that he was unable to eliminate that harm in the
future and provide Heather with "a safe and stable home," N.J.S.A. 30:4C -
15.1(a)(2) (prong two). There was also credible proof showing that separating
A-1721-18T1 7 Heather from her resource parents would cause her "serious and enduring
emotional or psychological harm to the child." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) (also
prong two).
We reject the father's contentions under prong three of the statutory
factors, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3), that the Division failed to make reasonable
efforts to provide services, and failed to adequately consider other alternatives
to termination of his rights. There is ample proof the Division provided or
offered services to the father, the paternal aunt and uncle, and the child while
she was placed with them. The eight-month placement simply did not work out,
in part due to Heather's own behavioral issues. In addition, the Division and the
trial court adequately considered other alternatives to termination.
The father's suggestion that kinship legal guardianship ("KLG") should
have been pursued in this case is of no avail. As attested to by a caseworker's
unrefuted trial testimony, the paternal aunt and uncle expressly asked to end the
adoption process and have Heather removed from their home. Moreover, since
the resource parents are committed to adopting Heather, KLG is inapplicable.
See New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 508 (2004)
(stating KLG, is only available "[w]hen adoption is neither feasible nor likely.")
A-1721-18T1 8 Id. at 509; see also New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. M.M., 459
N.J. Super. 246, 264 (App. Div. 2019).
Lastly, the trial court had ample grounds to conclude termination would
not cause Heather more harm than good. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4) (prong
four). The Division's experts articulated cogent reasons that support the judge's
conclusion. The judge properly considered and implemented in this regard the
strong policies in Title 30 cases to provide a child with permanency. See, e.g.,
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.F., 392 N.J. Super. 201, 209 (App. Div.
2007) ("Children must not languish indefinitely in foster care while a birth
parent attempts to correct the conditions that resulted in an out-of-home
placement.").
Affirmed.
A-1721-18T1 9