RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4188-16T3
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
G.G.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
A.W. and J.T.L.,
Defendants.
IN THE MATTER OF J.L., N.G. and N.G.,
Minors.
Submitted April 23, 2018 – Decided July 9, 2018
Before Judges Sabatino and Rose.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County, Docket No. FN-16-0014-16.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Janet A. Allegro, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Kathryn A. Kolodziej, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors (Nancy P. Fratz, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant G.G,1 appeals from an April 27, 2017 Family Part
order terminating litigation after a fact-finding hearing that
determined he sexually abused or neglected J.L., the thirteen-
year-old daughter of his paramour, A.W. Because the court's
decision was largely based on inadmissible hearsay statements that
were later recanted, we reverse.
I.
We derive the following facts from the record developed at
the fact-finding hearing. On May 13, 2015, the Division received
a referral from J.T.L., the putative father of J.L., reporting
that J.L. said defendant "tried to rape her in February, touched
her butt, and tried to kiss her." J.L. also said defendant
threatened to kill her if she told anyone and that "nobody wants
1 We use initials to protect the privacy of the parties. See R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
2 A-4188-16T3 to believe [her]." Except for one time shortly before he made the
referral, J.T.L. had not seen J.L. in several years.
The next day, the caseworker met with J.L. and pointedly
asked if defendant attempted to rape her. J.L. "shook her head
in a yes motion." Asked to elaborate, J.L. explained, "one time
[defendant] walked inside her bedroom and exposed himself and
touched her butt over her clothing and tried to kiss her, but she
told him to get out." J.L. said she disclosed that incident to
A.W., but her mother did not believe her. J.L. claimed that on
another occasion, defendant asked J.L. to expose herself to him,
or he would not buy her a new phone. A.W. told the caseworker
"she is not dismissing what her daughter is saying, but she knows
that either her father or aunt put her up to this, because they
have been trying to screw her and [G.G] over for the longest time."
At some point, the Division caseworker learned J.L. did not
disclose the allegations directly to J.T.L. Rather, J.L. told her
cousin, B.M., who in turn told her mother.2 Apparently, B.M.'s
mother told J.T.L. The caseworker did not interview B.M. or B.M.'s
2 The record is unclear whether B.M.'s mother was the sister of A.W. or J.T.L.
3 A-4188-16T3 mother.3 The Division referred the case to the Passaic County
Prosecutor's Office ("PCPO").
Six days later, a PCPO detective advised the caseworker that
J.L. recanted her accusations against defendant. The PCPO
detective and the caseworker then met J.L. at her school. J.L.
indicated to the caseworker that defendant did not touch her or
expose himself. She claimed she made the initial allegations
because she disliked defendant and wanted him to leave their home.
A few days later, the Division and the PCPO interviewed
defendant. He denied the allegations and claimed he was never
alone with J.L. The PCPO did not interview B.M. or B.M.'s mother.
The PCPO declined to criminally charge defendant.
The Division referred J.L. to the Audrey Hepburn Children's
House ("AHCH") for a psychosocial evaluation, which was conducted
on June 9, 2015 by Kirsten Byrnes, Psy.D., a staff psychologist.
Dr. Byrnes authored a report that was countersigned by her
supervising psychologist, Anthony V. D'Urso, Psy.D.
In the sexual abuse assessment portion of her report, Dr.
Byrnes noted a "marked change" in J.L.'s demeanor. In particular,
3 Although B.M. was identified by name in a psychological report furnished to the Division, the caseworker testified at the hearing that she did not know the cousin's name.
4 A-4188-16T3 "[J.L.] was much less engaged, her mood dampened, she demonstrated
ruptured eye contact, preferring instead to look at the couch."
During the interview, J.L. disclosed that, while at their
grandmother's home, B.M. asked if defendant "had ever touched her
inappropriately, to which [J.L] 'said yeah . . . I wanted him to
leave my home.'" However, J.L. again denied defendant had touched
her inappropriately, reiterating she told her cousin about the
alleged abuse because she wanted defendant out of the house.
In addition to interviewing J.L., Dr. Byrnes interviewed the
caseworker and A.W. Dr. Byrnes did not interview B.M. or B.M.'s
mother. Dr. Byrnes concluded "sexual abuse is clinically supported
and [J.L.'s] statement should be perceived as a recantation rather
than false allegation[]."
On July 9, 2015, the Division filed a verified complaint and
order to show cause against defendant, seeking care and supervision
of J.L. and defendant's three-year-old twin daughters with A.W.4
The judge interviewed J.L.5 in camera, but in the presence of her
law guardian. J.L. told the judge she had lied about the
4 The complaint named A.W. and J.T.L. for dispositional purposes. As such, they are not parties to this appeal. Although the twins also were named in the complaint, they were not part of the abuse and neglect finding. Their law guardian filed a letter brief taking no position regarding this appeal. 5 J.L. was fourteen years old when she testified.
5 A-4188-16T3 allegations against defendant "[s]o he could just leave and get
away from [her]." The judge indicated he did not interview J.L.
long enough to determine whether or not she had lied when
disclosing the allegations against defendant. The judge granted
the Division's application.
A fact-finding hearing was conducted on three non-consecutive
days in March, April and June 2016 before another judge. The
Division presented J.L.'s statements through the testimony of the
caseworker and sought to corroborate them through the testimony
of Dr. D'Urso. Defendant and J.L. did not testify, nor call any
witnesses. The Division entered into evidence, without objection,
documents, including its summary reports and Dr. Byrnes'
psychosocial report. The law guardian entered into evidence
therapy reports regarding J.L. and the draft psychosocial report,
which differed in some respects, including the clinical
impression, from the report introduced by the Division.
Before Dr. D'Urso testified, defendant and the law guardian
objected to his testifying about the contents of the psychosocial
report prepared by Dr. Byrnes, in particular, because Dr. D'Urso
did not observe J.L. They also objected to "the failure to notify
J.L. of the true purpose of the evaluation: to determine whether
she was actually sexually abused or not." Following voir dire,
the trial judge qualified Dr. D'Urso as an expert "with respect
6 A-4188-16T3 to issues of child sexual abuse, and specifically the clinical
signs of child sexual abuse."
At the outset of his testimony, Dr. D'Urso described the
"team approach" employed at AHCH:
So, we have in our center[,] triage conducted by nurses for the appropriateness of evaluations and to establish questions that we can answer from either a medical or psychological perspective. Once those evaluations are reviewed by myself, or . . . [the] medical director, the evaluations are scheduled, clinicians are assigned, we have an early morning meeting to go over referral questions to make sure everybody is clear about what we [are] answering. They then conduct the evaluations, and on a weekly basis we have rounds. At the end of the evaluation period we go over the assessments. The clinicians then provide reports, the clinicians and I go over those reports, and then those reports are finalized, sent out.
. . . .
So, we have standardized protocols relative to questions, inquiries during the psychological assessments. We have them for adults, we have them for kids. And so the evaluation is meant to cover a series of areas, not only general history and background and developmental functioning, but also specific functioning relative to the allegations, in this case . . . allegations of sexual abuse. . . .
Apparently, after Dr. Byrnes met with J.L., she reviewed her
findings with Dr. D'Urso and they finalized her report. Dr. D'Urso
7 A-4188-16T3 agreed with Dr. Byrnes' conclusion that inappropriate sexual
boundaries or contact was clinically supported.
To support his findings, Dr. D'Urso testified that J.L.
disclosed "information of discomfort"; lacked A.W.'s support; was
confronted by defendant; and felt responsible for reporting the
abuse. Further, J.L. "was [not] a particularly sophisticated
child[;] . . . she was [not] engaging in Conduct Disorder or any
antisocial behavior or any sophisticated methods of lying."
Dr. D'Urso determined J.L.'s initial allegations were
consistent and detailed, and the disclosure to her cousin on the
playground was "not a purposeful disclosure." In this regard, he
testified that
the tipping point was that we saw this not as a false allegation where she was able to manipulate people or she did [not] have that kind of background necessarily. All kids certainly tell non-truths, but to come up with this entire story, to be on a playground, or be crying, have her cousin come to her . . . it seemed like a pretty far plot.
Dr. D'Urso also cited the observations Dr. Byrnes made during
the interview. He noted the change in J.L.'s demeanor when the
topic turned to the sexual assault allegations. Specifically,
J.L. became withdrawn, whereas she was upbeat and forthright on
other topics. He conceded on cross-examination, however, that the
8 A-4188-16T3 "sexualized topic" of conversation might have caused that change
in demeanor.
Ultimately, Dr. D'Urso agreed with Dr. Byrnes that J.L.'s
subsequent denial of the allegations was a recantation and the
original disclosure was not a false statement. Dr. D'Urso
explained a recantation is "a phenomen[on] that happens in child
abuse cases, when kids make allegations about abuse that are true
. . . and take back those allegations."
Following closing arguments on June 17, 2016, the trial judge
commenced his oral decision, summarizing the legal principles and
testimony. Among other things, he noted his concerns about the
caseworker's interviewing techniques, "introduc[ing] the concept
of rape." Specifically, "we have a child who was interviewed by
a caseworker, who asked in essence whether it was true that she
was raped." The judge also was concerned that J.L. "after having
given a statement supporting the sexual contact and the
inappropriate exposure then recanted the testimony." Shortly
thereafter, he reserved decision.
On June 23, 2016, the judge continued his oral decision. He
found credible the testimony of the caseworker and Dr. D'Urso.
The judge acknowledged Dr. D'Urso did not interview J.L., nor had
he ever met her, and "that should be grounds for discrediting or
giving sufficiently light weight to the report." However, the
9 A-4188-16T3 judge was persuaded by the protocol in place at AHCH, including
the "team approach" as explained by Dr. D'Urso. He also discounted
discrepancies in the report regarding the lack of interviews of
J.L.'s relatives, ultimately finding the report "credible and
weighty . . . corroborating . . . the clinician's conclusion that
this is a case involving inappropriate boundaries and contact."
In sum, the trial court found the Division proved, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that J.L. was abused or neglected,
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(3) and (4)(b), through "the
child['s] statements, in conjunction with the [AHCH] report." This
appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court's decision was
not supported by sufficient, credible evidence. Defendant
primarily claims the trial court abused its discretion by finding
J.L.'s statements were sufficiently corroborated by Dr. D'Urso.
In her merits brief, the law guardian joined defendant in urging
us to reverse the trial court's finding of abuse or neglect.
Following our decision in New Jersey Division of Child
Protection and Permanency v. N.B., 452 N.J. Super. 513 (App. Div.
10 A-4188-16T3 2017), defendant filed a letter brief, pursuant to Rule 2:6-11(d).6
Defendant cites N.B. for our observation that "[o]ur courts have
rejected the concept that mental health professionals may opine
about the trustworthiness of a child's hearsay statements." Id.
at 523 (citation omitted). Defendant claims that concept applies
with equal force, here, where the trial court inappropriately
relied on Dr. D'Urso's "unsupported belief" that J.L.'s
recantation "was not a true denial."
In its responding letter, the Division attempts to
distinguish N.B., arguing the supervising psychologist did not
opine about the trustworthiness of J.L.'s statements. Instead,
he was "offered as an expert to explain why the [AHCH] team found
that the child's statements of sexual abuse were clinically
supported." The Division also argues that the findings of the
supervising psychologist were based on clinical support, including
her "change in affect when speaking about the conduct."
6 Rule 2:6-11(d) provides in pertinent part that "A party may . . . without leave, serve and file a letter calling to the court's attention, with a brief indication of their significance, relevant published opinions issued . . . subsequent to the filing of the brief."
11 A-4188-16T3 After consulting with J.L.7 on April 18, 2018, the law
guardian changed her position and moved to withdraw her initial
brief and file a substituted brief. We granted the motion.
On April 19, 2018, the law guardian responded to defendant's
Rule 2:6-11(d) letter, now contending J.L.'s statements were
sufficiently corroborated by substantial evidence "and more than
mere consistency" to satisfy N.B. In her April 25, 2018
substituted brief, other than summarizing the facts and procedural
history, the law guardian "makes no further legal argument after
consultation with the minor child. The family is reunified, and
all look forward to closure. [J.L.] begs this court that
regardless of whether the judgment under review is affirmed or
reversed, that the litigation not be remanded and reopened."
III.
We begin our analysis of the legal issues raised on appeal
by reaffirming the applicable standard of review. Generally, our
review of the trial judge's decision is limited. N.J. Div. of
Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014). "To the
extent the appellate issues concern a trial court's findings of
fact or credibility determinations, we accord substantial
deference and defer to the factual findings of the Family Part if
7 J.L. was seventeen years old at the time of the consultation.
12 A-4188-16T3 they are sustained by 'adequate, substantial, and credible
evidence' in the record." N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 521 (quoting
R.G., 217 N.J. at 552).
Here, the trial court based its abuse or neglect finding, in
part, on J.L.'s initial allegations that defendant sexually abused
her when she was thirteen years old. The court also found Dr.
Byrnes' psychosocial report corroborated J.L.'s statements
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4).
Where, as here, "the trial court's rulings 'essentially
involved the application of legal principles and did not turn upon
contested issues of witness credibility' we review the court's
corroboration determination de novo." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &
Permanency v. A.D., ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2018)
(slip op. at 11) (quoting N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 521)
(conducting a de novo review of the trial court's determination
whether a child's statements were corroborated pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4)).8 Accordingly, we owe no deference to
the trial court's "interpretation of the law and the legal
consequences that flow from established facts." Manalapan Realty
LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
8 While the trial court did not have the benefit of our decisions in N.B. and A.D., these cases clarified legal principles but did not enunciate a new rule of law. See State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 51, 57 (1997).
13 A-4188-16T3 Abuse and neglect cases are fact sensitive and "[e]ach case
requires careful, individual scrutiny" as many cases are
"idiosyncratic." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R.,
205 N.J. 17, 33 (2011). In a Title 9 action, the Division must
prove by a preponderance of "competent, material and relevant
evidence" that a child is abused or neglected. N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.46(b). In making that determination, the court should base its
decision on the totality of the circumstances. N.J. Div. of Youth
& Family Servs. v. V.T., 423 N.J. Super. 320, 329 (App. Div. 2011).
Pertinent to this appeal, where the trial court found J.L.
was abused or neglected pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(3) and
(4)(b), an "abused or neglected child" finding is appropriate if
a parent or guardian:
(3) commits or allows to be committed an act of sexual abuse against the child; (4) or a child whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or guardian, as herein defined,[9] to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . (b) in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof, including the infliction of excessive corporal punishment; or by any other acts of a
9 N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(a) provides, in pertinent part, a "[p]arent or guardian" means "any . . . paramour of a parent, or any person, who has assumed responsibility for the care, custody, or control of a child or upon whom there is a legal duty for such care."
14 A-4188-16T3 similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the court[.]
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4), an uncorroborated
statement of sexual abuse by a child is admissible in an abuse or
neglect proceeding. However, "an uncorroborated statement . . .
is not alone 'sufficient to make a fact finding of abuse or
neglect.'" N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. J.A., 436
N.J. Super. 61, 66-67 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.46(a)(4)). "Stated another way, 'a child's hearsay statement
may be admitted into evidence, but may not be the sole basis for
a finding of abuse or neglect.'" Id. at 67 (quoting P.W.R., 205
N.J. at 33). Corroborative evidence is therefore required. Ibid.
"The most effective types of corroborative evidence may be
eyewitness testimony, a confession, an admission or medical or
scientific evidence." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.A.,
357 N.J. Super. 155, 166 (App. Div. 2003). We have also
recognized, "Such evidence has included a child victim's
precocious knowledge of sexual activity, a semen stain on a child's
blanket, a child's nightmares and psychological evidence." N.J.
Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Z.P.R., 351 N.J. Super. 427, 436
(App. Div. 2002) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Expert witnesses may testify about facts or data that inform
their analyses and opinions, as long as that information is "of a
15 A-4188-16T3 type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject[.]" N.J.R.E. 703.
An expert witness need not have personal, first-hand knowledge of
a case. "Indeed, an expert's testimony may be based on the work
done or even hearsay evidence of another expert, particularly when,
as here, the latter's work is supervised by the former." State
v. Dishon, 297 N.J. Super. 254, 281 (App. Div. 1997); accord State
v. Stevens, 136 N.J. Super. 262, 264 (App. Div. 1975).
As previously stated, however, "mental health professionals
may [not] opine about the trustworthiness of a child's hearsay
statements." N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 523 (citing State v. J.Q.,
130 N.J. 554, 582-83 (1993)). Pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6),
hearsay statements of opinions and diagnoses are further subject
to N.J.R.E. 808, which states, in pertinent part:
Expert opinion which is included in an admissible hearsay statement shall be excluded if the declarant has not been produced as a witness unless the trial judge finds that the circumstances involved in rendering the opinion, including . . . the complexity of the subject matter, and the likelihood of accuracy of the opinion, tend to establish its trustworthiness.
However, "The evidence must be independently admissible for a
court to deem it corroborative of a child's statement." A.D.,
(slip op. at 12) (citing N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 524-26).
16 A-4188-16T3 Here, Dr. D'Urso testified that he based his expert opinion
on the Division's screening summary, AHCH's intake form completed
by the Division caseworker, "collateral contacts" with the
caseworker and A.W., and Dr. Byrnes' clinical evaluation of J.L.
Dr. D'Urso also reviewed and approved the psychosocial evaluation
authored by Dr. Byrnes whom he supervised at AHCH. Because he was
duly qualified as an expert witness by the trial judge, and
supervised Dr. Byrnes in this matter, we find no error in Dr.
D'Urso's testifying about the facts contained in Dr. Byrnes'
written reports. See N.J.R.E. 703 ("The facts or data in the
particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before
the hearing.").
We part company with the trial judge, however, in permitting
Dr. D'Urso to testify about Dr. Byrnes' findings concerning J.L.'s
change in demeanor during the sexual abuse assessment of her
evaluation. Dr. D'Urso did not observe J.L. during the evaluation.
Nor is there any indication in the record that Dr. Byrnes disclosed
to Dr. D'Urso her specific line of questioning that prompted J.L.'s
change in demeanor. Because the report does not cite Dr. Byrnes'
inquiry in question and answer format, it is unclear whether J.L.'s
affect changed when the topic of sex was raised by Dr. Byrnes,
generally, or specifically as to J.L.'s allegations against
17 A-4188-16T3 defendant. As Dr. D'Urso candidly admitted, J.L.'s change in
demeanor could have been prompted merely by Dr. Byrnes' switching
the topic of discussion to sex. Similarly, the report does not
describe J.L.'s affect when she acknowledged the allegations
against defendant compared with her demeanor when she denied the
abuse to Dr. Byrnes.
Because Dr. D'Urso was not present during the interview of
J.L., "the likelihood of accuracy of the opinion" concerning J.L.'s
change in demeanor is not trustworthy. N.J.R.E. 808. As the
trial judge aptly observed, Dr. D'Urso did not evaluate J.L., nor
did he meet her. While, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 702, Dr. D'Urso was
permitted to testify about the facts contained in the AHCH report,
his opinion about whether her recantation was truthful was
improper. N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 523. Thus, in this particular
case, the Division should have called Dr. Byrnes, instead of Dr.
D'Urso, to testify specifically about how and when J.L.'s demeanor
shifted during the interview.
Moreover, based on our de novo review of the record, we
discern no other "psychological evidence" corroborating J.L.'s
allegations. Z.P.R., 351 N.J. Super. at 436. As Dr. Byrnes
observed, "There was no evidence of suicidal ideation or psychotic
processes." J.L. "denied any experiences of enuresis, nightmares,
auditory or visual hallucinations, suicidal ideation or ever
18 A-4188-16T3 engaging in self-harming behaviors." She denied using substances
and also "earns As and Bs" in school. See N.B., 452 N.J. Super.
at 522. Further, J.L. consistently denied the allegations after
her initial disclosure.
Without behavioral corroboration, Dr. D'Urso's remaining
findings supporting his opinion that J.L.'s recantation was false
either impermissibly opine about her trustworthiness, or are not
supported by the record. Although we recognize Dr. D'Urso was
qualified by the court as an expert in "the clinical signs of
child sexual abuse," his finding, in part, that J.L. did not engage
in "any sophisticated methods of lying" transgressed from a
clinical finding to "truth-telling." See J.Q., 130 N.J. at 582.
Nor are we persuaded by his finding that J.L.'s initial disclosure
was consistent. See N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 523 (recognizing
"consistency alone does not constitute corroboration" pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4)).
Further, it is unclear from the record whether J.L.
spontaneously disclosed the allegations to B.M. in the playground
when B.M. found her crying, or whether B.M. directly asked J.L.,
when they were at their grandmother's home, if defendant had
touched her. Although the location of disclosure is not
dispositive, both accounts were contained in Dr. Byrnes' report.
Yet, Dr. D'Urso found, as a reason to support his opinion that the
19 A-4188-16T3 recantation was false, "her cousin asked her a broad question, and
she answered with specific responses." His finding, however, is
inconsistent with one version of J.L.'s disclosure.10 Moreover,
he mistakenly believed B.M. had been interviewed.
We also find disconcerting that none of the investigating
authorities, i.e., the Division, the PCPO, and AHCH, interviewed
B.M., the first person to whom J.L. reported the allegations. See
State v. R.K., 220 N.J. 444, 455 (2015) (recognizing, the fresh-
complaint doctrine "allows the admission of evidence of a victim's
complaint of sexual abuse, otherwise inadmissible as hearsay, to
negate the inference that the victim's initial silence or delay
indicates that the charge is fabricated"). Although the PCPO
determined rather quickly it would not prosecute defendant, the
statement of B.M. may have assisted the Division and AHCH in its
evaluation and assessment of J.L., and may have corroborated J.L.'s
statement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4). See also Biunno,
Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, cmt. 4 on
N.J.R.E. 607 (2018) (permitting fresh complaint testimony to
support the credibility of a witness).
10 We find troubling, as did the trial judge, the method of inquiry employed by the caseworker when initially questioning J.L. See State v. Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. 579, 622 (App. Div. 1993) (recognizing, in child sexual assault investigations, "the possibility of distorting recollections by suggestive or leading questions").
20 A-4188-16T3 In sum, we are constrained to find J.L.'s statements were not
sufficiently corroborated, and as such, the trial court's
determination that defendant abused or neglected J.L. "was not
sufficiently supported by competent, admissible evidence." N.B.,
452 N.J. Super. at 527. In light of our ruling, we need not reach
defendant's remaining claims. Accordingly, we vacate the June 23,
2016 order, and direct the Division to remove defendant's name
from the Child Abuse Registry, regarding this incident, within
thirty days.
Reversed and remanded for the sole purpose of carrying out
the directives of this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
21 A-4188-16T3