RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2698-18T3
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
A.G.,
Defendant,
and
J.G.,
Defendant-Appellant, ____________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF J.G.,
a Minor. ____________________________
Submitted February 10, 2020 – Decided February 26, 2020
Before Judges Rothstadt and Mitterhoff. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County, Docket No. FG-16-0063-18.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Howard B. Tat, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Donna Sue Arons, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Toni Lynn Imperiale, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Noel Christian Devlin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant J.G. appeals from an order entered by the trial court on
February 1, 2019, which terminated his parental rights to his biological
daughter, a minor. 1 After Jesse alleged that J.G. sexually assaulted her, he was
arrested and charged with aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, and
endangering the welfare of a child. The Division of Child Protection and
Permanency (the Division) executed an emergency removal, seeking to
terminate the parental rights of both J.G. and A.G., Jesse's biological mother,
1 We refer to the minor as "Jesse" to protect her anonymity. See R. 1:38-3. A-2698-18T3 2 for neglect. After a trial, the court terminated the parental rights of J.G. but
found that the Division had failed to satisfy its burden of proof to terminate
A.G.'s parental rights. Having reviewed the record, and in light of the applicable
law, we affirm.
I.
We discern the following facts from the record. Jesse, the biological child
of J.G. and A.G., was born in 2005. During their marriage, J.G. and A.G. had
six children in addition to Jesse. The family had been involved with the Division
for numerous referrals since February 2012, 2 and in July 2012, the court entered
an order to show cause (OTSC) for care and supervision of the children after
neglect was substantiated against J.G. because he had "left . . . the children
unattended while he slept." The July 2012 litigation was terminated in January
2015, after the court found that J.G. and A.G. had remediated the issues which
prompted its initiation.
Thereafter, in May 2015, "[t]he Division received a referral of sex abuse
of [Jesse]." Namely, A.G. alerted officials at Jesse's school that J.G. had been
sexually abusing Jesse. Jesse, then nine years old, confirmed to school staff that
2 The family had been the subject of several referrals to child protective services in Florida before moving to New Jersey in 2011. A-2698-18T3 3 J.G. had been "touching her privates" since she was five, so the staff contacted
the Division. Division caseworker Jessica Nunez interviewed A.G., who
claimed that Jesse told her that J.G. would make her "watch movies and . . . do
disgusting things," and "he threatened to hurt her if she told anyone." A.G. also
claimed that J.G. physically abused her.
Giselle Henriquez, an employee of the Child Advocacy Center,
interviewed Jesse, who "mentioned several incidents of sexual abuse." Jesse
recounted one instance where J.G. "put his hands on her 'butt' underneath her
clothing. She reported telling him to stop at which point [J.G.] pushed her on
the floor, spit on her 'butt' and began rubbing her 'butt.' She reported he later
put 'sticky white stuff on her butt.'" Jesse advised Henriquez that "she never
told anyone because [J.G.] 'threatened to hit her until she dies' and also
threatened to hurt [A.G.]" Jesse also mentioned an incident where "she would
have to 'rub' [J.G.'s penis] back and forth and also 'put her mouth on it'" and that
"white stuff would go in her mouth," causing her to gag and spit it out.
Jesse also recounted another incident where "[J.G.] put his mouth on her
'[vagina]' and asked her 'how does it feel,'" while "he was also 'touching his
[penis].'" Jesse claimed that J.G. would make her "watch[] cartoon
pornography" and that she would be "tied up with 'blue and white ropes'" on
A-2698-18T3 4 several occasions. Jesse added that J.G. would regularly smoke a "plant" in the
home and "would also force her to smoke with him." Jesse also explained that
she had "witnessed [J.G.] punch [A.G.] in [the] face and throw her down the
stairs." Jesse also "reported [J.G.] would watch videos on his cell phone and
touch his [penis]," and she believed that he may have had a video of her on his
phone.
After these allegations came to light, J.G. "was taken into custody at the
Passaic County Prosecutor's Office." He refused to address any claims that he
abused his daughter. He was "arrested and charged with aggravated [s]exual
[a]ssault . . . , [s]exual [a]ssault . . . , and [e]ndangering the [w]elfare of a
[c]hild."
The Division substantiated these allegations against J.G. after conducting
a thorough investigation. The Division's investigation also revealed that the
family's "home was in [a] deplorable condition[]." After A.G. failed to
remediate these conditions, on May 21, 2015, the Division executed a notice of
emergency removal, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.29 and N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.30,
without court order. The Division filed an OTSC to remove the children from
the home, and the court granted the Division custody, care, and supervision of
the children on May 26, 2015. J.G.'s visitation with Jesse was temporarily
A-2698-18T3 5 suspended due to his charges of sexual assault and child endangerment. 3 The
Division asked J.G. for relatives who could act as placement resources for the
children, but he expressed "that he did not really have any," and he did not
advocate for any of the relatives that the Division identified.
On June 4, 2015, the Division referred Jesse to the Audrey Hepburn
Children's House at Hackensack University Medical Center for a psychosocial
evaluation to assess how J.G.'s abuse affected her emotional functioning.
During the evaluation, Jesse admitted to suicidal thoughts "when she thinks of
[A.G.'s] functioning following her disclosure of sexual abuse and her siblings'
removal, her removal, and the sexual abuse of [J.G.]" She also reported being
upset for not disclosing J.G.'s abuse earlier but that she was deterred by his
threats to harm her or A.G. The results of the evaluation clinically supported
that Jesse had been sexually abused, physically abused, and exposed to domestic
violence, substance abuse, and environmental neglect, as a result of J.G.'s
conduct. The results also supported a diagnostic impression of post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD).
After Jesse's removal, the Division provided A.G. with "[a] psychological
evaluation, [domestic violence] counseling, and parenting" services, and Jesse
3 Visitation was suspended throughout the pendency of this litigation. A-2698-18T3 6 and two of her siblings were reunified with A.G., pursuant to a court order dated
September 15, 2015. The Division terminated litigation on May 16, 2016 , but
it was reopened on May 25, 2016 after the children were again removed pursuant
to a notice of emergency removal due to "[u]nsafe housing" as there was no
electricity in the family home. On May 27, 2016, the court granted the Division
custody, care, and supervision of Jesse and her siblings and granted A.G. twice
weekly visitation.
From June 16 through June 24, 2016, Jesse was admitted to Hoboken
University Medical Center (HUMC) "for aggressive behavior towards [A.G.]"
Jesse presented with depression, hopelessness, and symptoms of PTSD. In
connection with her PTSD, HUMC staff noted that Jesse suffered from
"intrusive thoughts about her abuse, hypervigilance, startling easily, and
nightmares," and she exhibited "[p]oor impulse control" and "difficulty
regulating her emotions at times."
On July 11, 2016, the Division was ordered to explore whether any
maternal relatives would be appropriate for placement and to facilitate the
relocation of A.G. and her children to Florida. Thereafter, the Division
determined that the residence of Jesse's maternal grandparents was suitable for
A-2698-18T3 7 placement, and it contacted child protective services in Florida to continue
services for A.G. and her children.
Jesse was again hospitalized from January 31 through February 7, 2017 at
Bergen Regional Medical Center, "for running away from school twice and
express[ing] suicidal ideation with a plan to hang herself." Following a March
8, 2017 compliance review order, the Division admitted Jesse to a care program
at Legacy Treatment Services' Hawthorne House on June 12, 2017. Jesse
attended various therapy sessions and received services but still struggled with
regulating her emotions. On two separate occasions, Jesse "purposefully [went]
missing" after becoming upset during therapy sessions, requiring staff and the
police to locate her.
On November 15, 2017, the trial court entered an order providing that
"[A.G.] shall provide contact information for [Jesse's] paternal uncle to the
Division, as he is interested in visitation with [Jesse]," and "[a] Division worker
shall visit [J.G.] at the Passaic County Jail within the next [ten] days to explore
his concerns." After the Division followed up with A.G., she denied having
contact information for Jesse's paternal uncle and stated that the uncle was ill-
suited for placement based on prior events.
A-2698-18T3 8 On April 6, 2018, the Division filed a complaint for guardianship, seeking
to terminate both J.G.'s and A.G.'s parental rights to Jesse. On April 19, 2018,
Judge Imre Karaszegi, Jr., held a hearing on the Division's OTSC, during which
he directed the Division to explore whether Jesse's paternal aunt could act as a
resource placement. On May 25, 2018, the judge held a hearing on the return
OTSC, at which he ordered that Jesse remain in the custody of the Division and
that the Division meet with J.G. monthly. On August 6, 2018, Jesse was
discharged from Hawthorne House and "transitioned to treatment home level of
care" at a Devereux therapeutic foster home.
On November 27, 2018, a jury found defendant guilty on twelve counts
related to his sexual abuse of Jesse. 4 The guardianship trial commenced on
January 8, 2019 and continued through January 18, 2019.
At trial, the Division called as its first witness Paree Freeman, a Division
adoption worker assigned to Jesse's case. Freeman testified as to the Division's
efforts to facilitate placement with paternal relatives and explained that none
were suitable or able to care for Jesse. The paternal grandmother, with whom
J.G. wanted Jesse to be placed, was already preoccupied with acting as a
4 J.G. is ineligible for parole until May 2066. A-2698-18T3 9 resource parent for Jesse's siblings. Freeman also explained that Jesse's current
resource parent was interested in adopting her.
The Division next called Dr. Robert Miller as a witness, who testified "as
an expert in the field of clinical psychology pursuant to N.J.R.E. 702." Dr.
Miller testified that he had evaluated A.G., who disclosed numerous instances
where J.G. physically and emotionally abused her. A.G. also advised Dr. Miller
that Jesse had witnessed several instances of domestic violence, which included
physical abuse "during critical moments of aggression."
Dr. Miller also testified that he psychologically evaluated Jesse on
November 30, 2018. He explained that the purpose of the evaluation was "to
describe her current psychological functioning and to receive her views of . . .
the psycho-legal questions regarding the sexual abuse, exposure to domestic
violence, her relationships with . . . her mother and her father and her siblings,
and to make recommendations regarding . . . treatment[]." When Jesse spoke of
the sexual abuse, Dr. Miller noted that "[she] appeared to dissociate. She
appeared highly anxious. . . . Her leg was shaking. . . . Her behavior was
markedly different when questioned regarding the history of sexual abuse[ and]
her mother's lack of support. It was quite noticeable."
A-2698-18T3 10 Dr. Miller also testified to Jesse's description of J.G.'s abuse. This
included "being stripped naked in the shower and hit with a wire, being
slapped[,] . . . being punched[,] and being threatened and called [a] whore and
told she was nothing." Jesse told Dr. Miller that "her mother [was] present
during many incidents of physical abuse and did nothing." She also "described
her father threatening her on multiple occasions." Jesse also detailed witnessing
J.G. abuse A.G., which made her "depressed and angry." Dr. Miller explained
that while Jesse "understood that it was not her fault that her father was in jail[,]
. . . when she heard the length of [his] sentence, she expressed some remorse"
and showed "an inappropriate internalization of responsibility."
Dr. Miller also testified that he had conducted "a [PTSD] symptom inquiry
of [Jesse]." Dr. Miller concluded that Jesse "experienc[es] chronic PTSD,
meaning she experiences intrusive memories regarding the sexual abuse or
exposure to domestic violence . . . three or four times a month. This is diagnostic
criteria for chronic PTSD. She also described dissociative symptoms." Dr.
Miller testified that Jesse
experiences them at any reminder, sometimes not reminders of the trauma. She has them sometimes coming unbidden when she doesn't want to think about them. They can come any time. They come sometimes at night. They come sometimes with a reminder of the trauma, a trigger that reminds her of a specific event.
A-2698-18T3 11 She described sometimes she tries to push these memories out of her mind, that it's very difficult.
Jesse explained to Dr. Miller that she would cope by listening to music and
"going into the shower and trying to wash herself several times . . . a day . . . to
clean off the disgusting feeling from her body [from] the sexual abuse." Dr.
Miller also found that Jesse gets "cognitive distortions . . . meaning she
misunderstands sometimes people's wanting to be friends with her." This often
causes "feeling[s] of shame . . . [and] embarrassment, and because that feeling
is very painful for her, she translates it into a rage attack . . . and she lashes out."
Jesse also described having such feelings when hearing "[l]ies that her mother
tells." Dr. Miller testified that Jesse's anger is a symptom of PTSD, stemming
from her parents' neglect, her exposure to domestic violence, the sexual assault
and abuse by J.G., and A.G.'s rejection of her disclosure.
Dr. Miller also testified that the results of Jesse's psychological testing
revealed that she suffers from dysthymic syndrome, which is characterized by
"broken attachments in childhood" and a distrust of others, which he attributed
to "her history of emotional neglect[ and] physical and sexual abuse as a child."
Dr. Miller testified that Jesse will always be impacted by her childhood trauma,
although she would likely develop effective coping strategies within two to five
years.
A-2698-18T3 12 Dr. Miller opined that Jesse would suffer no harm if her parents' parental
rights were terminated:
[Jesse] does not want to see her father, the perpetrator in this case of sexual assault[s] [for] many years. She is very aware of her mother's limitation and does not want to live with her mother, does not believe her mother can provide her with . . . a basis for which she can achieve her dreams and goals[,] and [she] wants to have a chance at that in adoption. She requested select home adoption, which is the plan. She wants to be in a family[.]
Dr. Miller testified that for these reasons, he recommended against reunification
with either parent. On cross-examination, Dr. Miller conceded that no bonding
evaluation was conducted between Jesse and either parent but that it was
unnecessary because "there[ was] no identified select home adoption yet," and
Jesse had no desire to see A.G.
After calling Jessica Checo, the Division adoption supervisor assigned to
Jesse's case, as a witness, the Division next called Jesse. Jesse testified that she
was currently receiving Division services to address her trauma-related
symptoms and her anger that resulted from her "abuse at home and . . . the sexual
abuse from [her] father." Jesse explained that in addition to being abused by
both of her parents, both of whom would hit her, she was forced to care for her
brothers and sisters. Jesse further testified that her therapy was going well, and
A-2698-18T3 13 she was now "stable" and able to relate to others in her household. Jesse testified
to her desire to be adopted by her resource parent, but if her resource parent was
unable to adopt her, she would still want to be adopted.
On February 1, 2019, the trial judge entered an oral decision and executed
a judgment of guardianship terminating J.G.'s parental rights to Jesse. The judge
considered whether the Division had satisfied its burden to terminate the
parental rights of J.G. and A.G. under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). The judge
concluded that, with respect to J.G.,
[t]he Division established that [Jesse] has been endangered by the parental relationship, as [J.G.] has been found guilty in a separate criminal case on three charges of aggravated sexual assault, three charges of sexual assault, five charges for endangering the welfare of a child, one charge of abuse, abandonment, cruelty, and neglect of a child, and one charge of terroristic threats as it relates to [Jesse].
With respect to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1), the judge determined tha
the Division has shown by clear and convincing [evidence] that [Jesse's] safety, health, or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship with [J.G.] [J.G.] has been convicted following a criminal trial for the sexual abuse of [Jesse] and is currently incarcerated and will be sentenced in February . . . 2019.
The judge also found that
A-2698-18T3 14 [N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2)] has been satisfied, as the Division has established by clear and convincing evidence that [J.G.] is unable to eliminate the harm facing [Jesse] and is unable to provide [her] with a . . . safe and stable home, as [he] remains incarcerated for the sexual abuse of [Jesse], [Jesse] corroborated such abuse through her testimony, and [J.G.] shall remain incarcerated for the foreseeable future.
The judge also determined that, regarding N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3),
the Division has shown by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts were provided to [J.G.] to help correct the circumstances that led to . . . [Jesse's] removal. The Division offered substance abuse assessments, housing assistance, ECAP services, and relative exploration. The Division has met its burden for the second part of this prong, as there are no alternatives to the termination of . . . [J.G.'s] parental rights. . . . [I]t is the opinion of the [c]ourt that the Division has met its burden for the third prong by clear and convincing evidence.
Finally, regarding N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4), the judge explained that
the Division relied on [J.G.'s] criminal conviction for sexual assault and other criminal counts as they pertain to [Jesse] as well as the trauma experienced by [Jesse] as a result of the sexual abuse by [J.G.] [J.G.] was convicted and remains incarcerated for his sexual abuse of [Jesse]. This [c]ourt finds that in light of the evidence presented by the Division, that the Division has met its burden on prong four by clear and convincing evidence.
For these reasons, the judge concluded "that the Division has established all four
prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing [evidence] as to
A-2698-18T3 15 [J.G.]" and ordered that his parental rights to Jesse be terminated. The judge
determined, however, that the Division had not met its burden with respect to
A.G., so he declined to terminate her parental rights. Thus, the judge entered a
judgment of guardianship terminating J.G.'s parental rights. This appeal ensued.
On appeal, J.G. raises the following arguments:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY APPLYING THE INCORRECT STANDARD IN FINDING [J.G.] CAUSED [JESSE] HARM AS THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED OF AN ASSAULT OUTSIDE OF [J.G.'S] CRIMINAL CONVICTION.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DIVISION HAD PROVIDED [J.G.] WITH REASONABLE SERVICES AS NO SERVICES WERE PROVIDED WHICH ADDRESSED THE ALLEGED SEXUAL ASSAULT.
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE DIVISION HAD PROVEN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE TERMINATION OF [J.G.'S] PARENTAL RIGHTS WOULD NOT DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD FOR [JESSE].
We find J.G.'s arguments to be unpersuasive and affirm for substantially the
same reasons set forth by the trial judge in his well-reasoned opinion. See R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(A). We add the following comments.
II.
A-2698-18T3 16 We begin our discussion with the well-settled legal framework regarding
the termination of parental rights. Parents have a constitutionally protected right
to the care, custody, and control of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 753 (1982); In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999).
However, that right is not absolute. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G.,
217 N.J. 527, 553 (2014); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J.
591, 599 (1986). At times, a parent's interest must yield to the State's obligation
to protect children from harm. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.M., 198
N.J. 382, 397 (2009); In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992). To
effectuate these concerns, the Legislature created a test to determine when it is
in the child's best interest to terminate parental rights. In order to secure parental
termination, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) requires the Division to prove four prongs
by clear and convincing evidence:
(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;
A-2698-18T3 17 (3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.
See also A.W., 103 N.J. at 604-11. The four prongs of the test "are not discrete
and separate" but "relate to and overlap with one another to provide a
comprehensive standard that identifies a child's best interests." K.H.O., 161 N.J.
at 348. "The considerations involved in determinations of parental fitness are
'extremely fact sensitive' and require particularized evidence that address the
specific circumstances in the given case." Ibid. (quoting In re Adoption of
Children by L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 139 (1993)).
Our review of a family judge's factual findings is limited. Cesare v.
Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). "When a biological parent resists termination
of his or her parental rights, the [judge's] function is to decide whether that
parent has the capacity to eliminate any harm the child may already have
suffered, and whether that parent can raise the child without inflicting any
further harm." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J. Super. 81,
87 (App. Div. 2006). The factual findings that support such a judgment "should
not be disturbed unless 'they are so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial
A-2698-18T3 18 of justice,' and should be upheld whenever they are 'supported by adequate,
substantial and credible evidence.'" In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super.
172, 188 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co.
of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974)). "[T]he conclusions that logically flow
from those findings of fact are, likewise, entitled to deferential consideration
upon appellate review." R.L., 388 N.J. Super. at 89.
III.
J.G. first argues that the Division failed to provide sufficient evidence to
show that he sexually assaulted Jesse, and the termination of his parental rights
was exclusively predicated on his conviction for sexual assault. We disagree
and concur with the trial judge's finding that there was ample, credible evidence
in the record supporting a finding that J.G. sexually assaulted Jesse. See J.T.,
269 N.J. Super. at 188. We defer to those findings. See R.L., 388 N.J. Super.
at 89.
We add that the court may consider a parent's criminal conviction in
determining whether to terminate his or her parental rights. L.A.S., 134 N.J. at
143. Nevertheless, we conclude that the testimony of Dr. Miller and Jesse,
concerning both the extent of J.G.'s abuse and its effect on Jesse, amply
supported the conclusion that J.G. endangered Jesse and adversely impacted her
A-2698-18T3 19 health and development. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R., 405
N.J. Super. 418, 435 (App. Div. 2009).
Next, J.G. argues that the trial judge erred in finding that the Division
afforded him reasonable services to remedy the circumstances that caused
Jesse's removal. He claims that the Division should have provided him with
services tailored to address his sexual assault of Jesse, such as psychological
treatment or psychosexual evaluations. We disagree.
The Division must show that it has made reasonable efforts to reunite the
family by helping the parent correct the conditions that led to the child's
removal. K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 354. This may include, but is not limited to
(1) consultation and cooperation with the parent in developing a plan for appropriate services;
(2) providing services that have been agreed upon, to the family, in order to further the goal of family reunification;
(3) informing the parent at appropriate intervals of the child's progress, development, and health; and
(4) facilitating appropriate visitation.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(c).]
"Whether particular services are necessary in order to comply with the diligent
efforts requirement must . . . be decided with reference to the circumstances of
A-2698-18T3 20 the individual case before the court, including the parent's active participation
in the reunification effort." In re Guardianship of DMH, 161 N.J. 365, 390
(1999). "[W]here one parent has been the custodial parent and takes the primary
. . . role in caring for the children, it is reasonable for [the Division] to continue
to focus its efforts of family reunification on that custodial parent, so long as [it]
does not ignore or exclude the non-custodial parent." Id. at 393. Such a course
of action may be inappropriate where both "biological parents are hostile to one
another." Ibid.
Particularly, "the Division is necessarily impeded by the difficulty and
possible futility of providing services to an incarcerated person." R.G., 217 N.J.
at 557. In such circumstances, "reasonable efforts may be satisfied when the
Division provides services to, and seeks reunification with, the custodial parent
from whom the child was removed." Id. at 558; see N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. T.S., 417 N.J. Super. 228, 242-43 (App. Div. 2010) (finding that,
because a father had no relationship with his daughter prior to his incarceration,
providing services to him would be futile). However, "[a]bsent an order under
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3, the Division may not ignore requests or avoid providing
services to an incarcerated parent." R.G., 217 N.J. at 558.
A-2698-18T3 21 Here, the judge relied on ample, credible evidence in finding that the
Division's efforts to provide services were reasonable, see J.T., 269 N.J. Super.
at 188, and we defer to those findings, see R.L., 388 N.J. Super. at 89.
We comment that the Division was naturally precluded from affording
J.G. certain services, such as visitation, by virtue of his incarceration and the no
contact order. See R.G., 217 N.J. at 557. Further, as A.G. was Jesse's sole
custodial parent at the time she was removed, the Division's efforts were
reasonable if they were tailored towards reunification with A.G., not J.G., and
that the Division provided A.G. with services to that effect is not in dispute. See
R.G., 217 N.J. at 558; DMH, 161 N.J. at 390; T.S., 417 N.J. Super. at 242-43.
Moreover, nowhere in the record does it indicate that J.G. ever requested
services to remediate his sexual assault of Jesse. Under these circumstances, the
Division was required to do no more than it did by meeting with J.G. on a
monthly basis and attempting to facilitate both Jesse's visitation and her
placement with a paternal family member. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(c); DMH,
161 N.J. at 390, 393. In this regard, we concur that the Division's efforts to
provide services to J.G. were reasonable.
Finally, J.G. claims that because no bonding evaluation was conducted,
and because no evidence was gleaned as to Jesse's well-being in his care or his
A-2698-18T3 22 future unfitness to act as Jesse's parent, the trial judge "erred in finding
termination of [his] parental rights would not do more harm than good and was
in [Jesse's best interest]." We disagree.
To satisfy N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4), the Division need not "show[] that
no harm will befall the child as a result of the severing of biological ties."
K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 355. Instead, the issue "is whether, after considering and
balancing the two relationships, the child will suffer a greater harm from the
termination of ties with her natural parents than from the permanent disruption
of her relationship with her foster parents." Ibid. The underlying concern of the
fourth prong is the child's need for permanency within a reasonable amoun t of
time. J.C., 129 N.J. at 26.
To satisfy this prong, "[the Division] must 'offer testimony of a "well-
qualified expert who has had full opportunity to make a comprehensive,
objective, and informed evaluation" of the child's relationship with both the
natural parents and the foster parents.'" A.R., 405 N.J. Super. at 442 (quoting
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 281 (2007)). A
comparative bonding evaluation between a child and her natural parent is
generally required because the child's relationship with foster parents "must be
viewed not in isolation but in a broader context that includes . . . the quality of
A-2698-18T3 23 the child's relationship with his or her natural parents." Id. at 439 (quoting J.C.,
129 N.J. at 18). There are "very few scenarios in which comparative evaluations
would not be required." Id. at 440.
However, "a parent's lengthy incarceration is a material factor that bears
on whether parental rights should be terminated. Incarceration may be such a
factor based on either abandonment or parental unfitness." L.A.S., 134 N.J. at
143. "[T]he nature of the underlying crime giving rise to incarceration is
relevant in determining whether parental rights should be terminated, because it
may bear on parental unfitness." Ibid. "[C]rimes of abuse against one's own
children that result in substantial injury ordinarily warrant termination of
parental rights. They directly violate our laws that authorize the termination of
parental rights based on acts of abuse or endangerment[] and are the most
extreme and obvious examples of parental unfitness." Id. at 141.
Here, we find that the judge relied on ample, credible evidence in finding
that the termination of J.G.'s parental rights would not do more harm than good,
see J.T., 269 N.J. Super. at 188, and we defer to those findings, see R.L., 388
N.J. Super. at 89.
We note that J.G.'s incarceration and ineligibility for parole until 2066 are
alone sufficient to support a finding that he is unavailable to care for Jesse if his
A-2698-18T3 24 parental rights were preserved. See L.A.S., 134 N.J. at 143. More persuasive,
however, is the nature of J.G.'s crime, which overwhelmingly renders him unfit
to act as Jesse's parent and warrants termination of his parental rights. J.G.'s
abuse of Jesse not only constituted unfit parenting but caused her substantial
injury which, although she may learn to cope with according to Dr. Miller, she
will never truly recover from. See ibid. We can discern few situations that
would offer a greater reason to terminate parental rights than the egregious and
sustained sexual assault of a child by his or her parent.
Finally, the claim that a bonding evaluation should have been conducted
is without merit. Undoubtedly, this is one of the few circumstances in which
such an evaluation is unnecessary, a matter for which we have not developed a
bright-line rule. See A.R., 405 N.J. Super. at 439-40. There would be no benefit
to Jesse in preserving J.G.'s parental rights, as she wants no relationship with
him, and her significant psychiatric problems are almost entirely caused by his
actions. Further, while Dr. Miller did not conduct a bonding evaluation, he
nonetheless evaluated Jesse's relationship with J.G. and rendered a report
supporting these conclusions. Under these circumstances, the nature of J.G.'s
offense, coupled with Jesse's psychological problems and the expert opinion of
Dr. Miller, amply support termination of J.G.'s parental rights.
A-2698-18T3 25 To the extent we have not specifically addressed any remaining arguments
raised by J.G., we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-2698-18T3 26