RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NOS. A-2680-23 A-2681-23
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
M.M. and A.C., III,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
L.C.,
Defendant. ____________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF F.A.C., A.M.C., L.M., and L.M., minors. ____________________________
Submitted September 23, 2025 – Decided October 21, 2025
Before Judges Gilson, Perez Friscia, and Vinci. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, Docket No. FG-04-0018-24.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant M.M. (Catherine Wilkes, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant A.C., III (Daniel A. DiLella, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Alicia Y. Bergman, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor F.A.C. (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Noel C. Devlin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors A.M.C., L.M., and L.M. (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Todd Wilson, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
M.M. (Myra) and A.C., III (Arthur) appeal from an April 17, 2024
judgment terminating their parental rights to four children.1 The judgment gave
1 We use initials and fictitious names to protect the privacy interests and confidentiality of the record. See R. 1:38-3(d)(12). A-2680-23 2 guardianship of the children to the Division of Child Protection and Permanency
(the Division) with the plan that the children be adopted. Myra focuses her
arguments on two of the children, contending that the Division failed to prove
three of the prongs of the child's best-interests test necessary for the termination
of her parental rights. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). Arthur challenges the
judgment as to one of the children, asserting that the Division failed to prove
each of the four prongs of the child's best-interests test. Having reviewed the
record in light of the parties' contentions, we affirm because the trial court's
findings of facts are supported by substantial credible evidence and it correctly
applied the well-established law.
I.
We summarize the facts from the record, including the evidence presented
at a two-day guardianship trial.
Myra is the mother of six children: N.V.M. (Noah), born in November
2005; I.A.C. (Iris), born in November 2008; F.A.C. (Fay), born in January 2011;
A.M.C. (Adam), born in June 2013; L.L.M. (Logan), born in April 2020; and
L.I.M. (Luna), born in June 2021. Noah and Iris are both over the age of
eighteen and were not part of the judgment.
A-2680-23 3 Arthur is the father of Iris, Fay, and Adam. Arthur also had a child with
another woman, but that child tragically died in December 2023.
Fay was originally part of the judgment but in March 2025, Fay's
permanency plan changed when her resource parent decided not to proceed with
the adoption. The Division then moved to remand this matter concerning Fay,
which we granted. On remand, the trial court vacated the judgment as to Fay.
Accordingly, this appeal now involves challenges to the termination of
parental rights concerning Adam, Logan, and Luna. Myra focuses her
arguments on Logan and Luna. The biological father of Logan and Luna
surrendered his parental rights, and he is not appealing the judgment. Arthur is
appealing the judgment as it concerns Adam, but not as to Logan and Luna, who
are not his biological children.
The Division has a long history of involvement with Myra, Arthur , and
their children. Since 2009, the Division has received referrals and investigated
allegations of neglect, domestic violence, and physical abuse of the children .
Myra has mental health and substance abuse issues. A psychologist
diagnosed her as exhibiting "borderline intelligent functioning" and suffering
from "persistent depression disorder." Arthur has struggled with substance
abuse disorders and has been incarcerated for various criminal convictions.
A-2680-23 4 Both Myra and Arthur have been substantiated for physical abuse of the children
in the form of corporal punishment.
In May 2017, following a referral concerning physical abuse of Myra's
oldest child, the Division obtained custody of Noah, Iris, Fay, and Adam. In
2018, Arthur refused services from the Division and shortly after was sentenced
to probation for distribution of illegal substances. The Division provided
services to Myra, and she regained custody of the children in May and June of
2019. The Division, however, maintained care and supervision of the children.
In 2020, Arthur was convicted of several new drug offenses and was found to
have violated his probation, resulting again in his incarceration.
In December 2021, the Division again removed the children from Myra's
care after she was arrested for physically assaulting Noah. That same month,
the family court granted the Division custody of Iris, Fay, Adam, Logan, and
Luna. The Division was also granted care and supervision of Noah, and he
returned to living with his paternal grandmother.
Since December 2021, Logan and Luna have been in the care of Y.G.
(Yara). Adam has various behavioral challenges, and he has been diagnosed
with oppositional defiant disorder and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder.
He has received care in several treatment homes and, since January 2023, he has
A-2680-23 5 been living with M.F. (Mable), a non-family caregiver. While Noah has been
with Mable, there have been significant improvements in his behavioral
conditions.
Following the children's removal in December 2021, the Division spent
several years providing various services to Myra and Arthur. During that time,
both Myra and Arthur underwent several evaluations, including psychological
evaluations. Myra was given psychiatric and psychotherapy consultation, which
included cognitive and behavioral therapy, parenting skills, and anger
management. She was allowed to visit the children, but during those visits she
exhibited poor parenting skills, resulting in unsafe conditions. Due to Myra's
inability to maintain control of the children, her visits eventually had to be
conducted virtually. After Arthur was released from prison in December 2021,
he entered an intensive outpatient drug treatment program, and the Division
provided him with additional services, including parenting classes and housing
assistance.
By mid-2023, however, the Division believed that neither Myra nor
Arthur had developed the skills to allow them to parent any of their children.
Consequently, the Division filed for guardianship in October 2023.
A-2680-23 6 A guardianship trial was conducted on April 2 and 3, 2024. The Division
presented testimony from Jacquline Cassidy, a Division adoption case worker,
Dr. Melanie A. Freedman, Ph.D., an expert witness, and three resource
caregivers: Mable, Yara, and Susan (who had cared for Iris). The Division also
submitted numerous exhibits into evidence. Myra was present at trial and
testified on her own behalf. Arthur did not appear at trial, nor did he call any
witnesses or submit any evidence.
Dr. Freedman was qualified as an expert in clinical and forensic
psychology. Her testimony included summarizing the psychological and
bonding evaluation she had conducted. Dr. Freedman explained that Myra had
made little progress in developing the skills to parent the children during the
more than two-year period she was provided with services. She also testified to
her conversation with Myra regarding reunification, and Myra agreed she
needed in-home help to take care of the children. Dr. Freedman noted that Myra
had no real plan of reunification because she had not taken steps to obtain
outside help.
Dr. Freedman diagnosed Myra with borderline intellectual functioning
and explained that it affected her ability to learn from experience and implement
solutions that would enable her to care for her children. She explained that Myra
A-2680-23 7 was unable to appreciate when she placed the children in harmful situations. Dr.
Freedman also diagnosed Myra with persistent depressive disorder and
explained that disorder affected her ability to address the children's needs
because she would often simply shut down emotionally. Based on those
diagnoses, the doctor expressed concerns regarding Myra's ability to parent her
children, most of whom had emotional or behavioral issues.
Concerning Arthur, Dr. Freedman summarized various evaluations which
Arthur had undergone. She explained that during one of her evaluations, Arthur
had acknowledged his substance abuse problems and that following completion
of an Intensive Supervision Program he "spiraled out of control." Dr. Freedman
diagnosed Arthur with multiple substance abuse disorders and a bereavement
condition. Dr. Freedman also explained that Arthur, like Myra, did not have a
reunification plan. She opined that it would be harmful for Adam to reunite with
Arthur because Arthur had made little progress in finding stable housing and
employment and addressing his anger control problems.
Summarizing her overall conclusions, Dr. Freedman opined that neither
Myra nor Arthur could safely parent their children despite the various services
they had received. She also testified that they had little prospect of gaining the
skills needed to be adequate parents at any time in the foreseeable future.
A-2680-23 8 Dr. Freedman then described the bonding evaluation she conducted
between Arthur and Adam. She noted that in "no way was he patient, loving, or
caring to his son," and he used threatening language, which was "troubling."
From this encounter, Dr. Freedman concluded "the risk of engaging in [the]
types of behaviors that led to these removals is still very much present," and his
actions show "[he] is not as committed or interested in a parenting role."
Concerning Logan and Luna, Dr. Freedman found that they had positive
but weak bonds with Myra. Dr. Freedman explained that neither Logan nor
Luna saw Myra as their primary caregiver. Dr. Freedman also explained that
Adam had a neutral and "weakened" bond with Myra.
In comparison, Dr. Freedman stated that the bonding evaluation between
Logan, Luna, and Yara showed that the children had a positive and strong
attachment to Yara. Dr. Freedman noted that Logan exhibited certain behavioral
issues and Yara was effectively dealing with those issues by giving the children
consistent support. Dr. Freedman opined that Logan's and Luna's best chance
of finding permanency was to remain in the care of Yara. Regarding Adam, Dr.
Freedman found that he seemed "relaxed and engaged" with Mable, which was
in stark contrast with how he seemed with Arthur, whom Adam feared.
A-2680-23 9 Overall, Dr. Freedman testified that she supported terminating Myra's and
Arthur's parental rights to all the children. She explained that the children's best
chance for positive and permanent homes was adoption by their respective
resource caregivers.
Cassidy testified about the Division's involvement with the family. She
detailed the history of the referrals and investigations the Division had
conducted. She also summarized her observation of the children in their
respective placements.
In their testimony, Yara and Mable explained the care they had given to
Adam, Logan, and Luna. Both Yara and Mable explained how they had worked
to address the children's behavioral issues and had worked to provide emotional
stability. Mable and Yara also testified that the Division worker discussed the
differences between adoption and Kinship Legal Guardianship (KLG),
they understood the differences, and they preferred adoption over KLG.
On April 17, 2022, the trial court entered a judgment terminating Myra's
and Arthur's parental rights to the children and granting guardianship to the
Division. That same day, Judge Francine I. Axelrad, who was the trial judge,
rendered a thorough oral decision, making detailed findings of facts and
conclusions of law.
A-2680-23 10 Judge Axelrad found that the Division had proven by clear and convincing
evidence the four prongs of the child's best-interests test. In making that finding,
the judge credited the testimony of both Dr. Freedman and Cassidy.
Addressing the first and second prongs, Judge Axelrad found that both
Myra and Arthur had neglected their children by withholding parental attention
and care and failing to remedy those deficiencies in the more than two years that
the children were removed from their custody. The judge found that Myra's
mental health contributed to her "significant" and "serious" parenting
deficiencies and her inability to learn from services.
Concerning Arthur, the judge found that his incarceration and housing
issues impacted both prongs one and two and those problems were compounded
by his substance abuse issues. The judge also relied on Arthur's adverse
interactions with his son during his supervised visits. The judge concluded that
neither parent was able nor willing to provide a safe and stable home for any of
the children now or in the future.
Turning to prong three, the judge found that the Division had made
substantial and reasonable efforts to provide "every service possible" to each
parent. Thus, the judge found that the Division satisfied the first part of prong
three.
A-2680-23 11 Evaluating the second part of prong three, the court credited the expert
testimony of Dr. Freedman that it was in the children's best interests to have safe
and secure permanent homes with the resource caregivers who had taken care of
those children for years. In making that finding, the court noted that stability
was critical for the children.
Regarding the resource caregivers, Judge Axelrad found that they each
understood the difference between adoption and KLG and expressed an
informed decision to adopt. Acknowledging that KLG and adoption were to be
treated equally in terms of permanency plans, Judge Axelrad found that adoption
was in the children's best interests based on all the testimony and evidence
presented at trial.
Judge Axelrad rejected Myra's position that she should be reunited with
Logan and Luna. In that regard, the judge relied on the expert testimony of Dr.
Freedman and noted that Myra's demeanor at trial supported Dr. Freedman's
opinion that she would shut down and not be able to address the children's needs.
Concerning prong four, Judge Axelrad found that termination of Myra's
and Arthur's parental rights will not do more harm than good. Relying on th e
unrebutted testimony of Dr. Freedman, the judge found that there was no
evidence that the children would suffer significant harm from termination of
A-2680-23 12 their ties with Myra and Arthur. The judge also found that the children's need
for permanency and stability was "best served" by adoption by their respective
Myra and Arthur each filed separate appeals from the judgment. Those
appeals were then consolidated.
II.
Myra challenges the judgment by contending that (1) she had not
endangered Logan's or Luna's health or development; (2) there was no clear and
convincing evidence that the Division made reasonable efforts to reunite her
with Logan and Luna; (3) there was no clear and convincing evidence that the
trial court did not consider alternatives to the termination of her parental rights;
and (4) the trial court erred in concluding that the termination of her parental
rights will not do more harm than good, particularly because that conclusion was
not based on an individual evaluation of each child.
In his appeal, Arthur challenges the trial judge's findings concerning each
of the four prongs of the child's best-interests test. He argues that his troubles
with addiction, housing instability, and incarceration did not establish harm
under prongs one and two. Like Myra, Arthur also argues that the trial judge
did not follow the law regarding an evaluation of alternatives to the termination
A-2680-23 13 of his parental rights. Finally, he asserts that he should have been given more
time to "heal" his relationship with Adam and, therefore, it was an error for the
trial judge to find that termination of his parental rights will not do more harm
than good.
The record and law do not support Myra's or Arthur's challenges to the
judgment. Instead, we affirm the judgment because Judge Axelrad's findings
concerning the four prongs are supported by substantial credible evidence .
Judge Axelrad also correctly applied her findings to the well-established law.
A. Our Standard of Review.
An appellate court's review of a trial court's decision to terminate parental
rights is limited. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. C.J.R., 452 N.J.
Super. 454, 468 (App. Div. 2017) (citing N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.
M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 278-79 (2007)). An appellate court will not reverse the
trial court's "termination decision 'when there is substantial credible evidence in
the record to support the court's findings.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth &
Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)). So, "[o]nly when the trial court's
conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark' should an appellate
court intervene and make its own findings to ensure that there is not a denial of
justice." E.P., 196 N.J. at 104 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.
A-2680-23 14 G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007)). No deference is given to the trial court's
interpretations of the law, which are reviewed de novo. D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J.
232, 245-46 (2012) (citing Balsamides v. Protameen Chems., Inc., 160 N.J. 352,
372 (1999)).
B. The Four Prongs for Termination of Parental Rights.
To terminate parental rights, the Division must prove by clear and
convincing evidence each element of the "best interests of the child" test,
codified by N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). M.M., 189 N.J. at 280. That test is
comprised of the following four prongs:
(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm;
(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]
A-2680-23 15 These prongs "are not discrete and separate," but rather "relate to and overlap
with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a child's
best interests." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999).
Effective July 2021, various sections of statutes concerning child
protective services were amended. See L. 2021, c. 154. Those amendments
included a change to prong two of the best-interests test. The Legislature
removed the following sentence: "Such harm may include evidence that
separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and
enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child." L. 2021, c. 154, § 9
(codified at N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2)). Accordingly, any harm a child might
suffer by removing him or her from the resource parent should no longer be
considered by a court under prong two. Nevertheless, a court may still consider
the child's bond with the resource parent, including harm resulting from the
destruction of that bond, under prong four of the best-interests test. N.J. Div. of
Child Prot. & Permanency v. D.C.A., 256 N.J. 4, 26 (2023) (explaining that in
amending N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) in 2021, the Legislature "acted to preclude
trial courts from considering harm resulting from the termination of a child's
relationship with resource parents when they assess parental fitness under the
A-2680-23 16 second prong, but not to generally bar such evidence from any aspect of the trial
court's inquiry").
1. Prongs One and Two.
Judge Axelrad's findings regarding prongs one and two are amply
supported by substantial credible evidence. The record establishes that both
Myra and Arthur endangered the safety and development of their children. The
children's removal in December 2021 was based on Myra's physical abuse of
Noah while Arthur was in prison. Judge Axelrad's finding that Myra caused
harm to Adam, Logan, and Luna was based on her inability to obtain the stability
needed to be an adequate parent. Dr. Freedman's unrebutted testimony
established that Myra suffered from mental health issues that prevented her from
being an effective parent to any child. The doctor's testimony, coupled with the
testimony by Cassidy, demonstrates that Myra was given years of services, but
she was unable to obtain the stability needed to parent any child, much less two
children, one of whom has specific needs.
Arthur argues that his incarceration, drug addiction, and lack of housing
does not satisfy the harm requirement under prongs one and two. Judge Axelrad,
however, did not find that it was his incarceration, addiction, or lack of housing
that caused harm. Instead, she correctly found that his inability and
A-2680-23 17 unwillingness to correct his addiction and find stable housing established that
he could not provide a safe and stable home for Adam, or any other child. See
N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. L.M., 430 N.J. Super. 428, 444 (App. Div.
2013) (explaining that prong one can be met based on ongoing irresponsible
behavior of a drug-addicted parent and the failure to take advantages of services
offered by the Division).
We also reject Arthur's assertion that the Division should have provided
additional time to allow him to address his problems and try to "heal" his
relationship with Adam. It has long been recognized that permanency of a child
is favored over protracted efforts of reunification, particularly when those
efforts have gone on for years and there is no showing of a likelihood of the
parent achieving stability. See, e.g., N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs v. C.S.,
367 N.J. Super. 76, 111 (App. Div. 2004).
2. Prong Three.
Prong three requires the Division to have made "reasonable efforts to
provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the
child's placement outside the home" and to have "considered alternatives to the
termination of parental rights." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). Reasonable efforts
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.
A-2680-23 18 Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 557 (2014) (citing In re Guardianship of D.M.H.,
161 N.J. 365, 387 (1999)).
Myra argues that the Division focused on providing reunification with an
approach of "all the children or none of the children." She contends that the
Division should have made efforts to provide her with services to reunite her
with the two youngest children, Logan and Luna.
The services provided to Myra were designed to assist her to address her
parenting deficiencies as to any of the children. The record amply demonstrates
that Myra was provided with multiple services over several years, which
included parenting skill classes, counseling, therapy, and regular visitation with
the children. The evidence also demonstrates that Myra could not adequately
address her mental health issues and her own instability. Further, Dr. Freedman
credibly testified that Myra never presented a reasonable plan for reunification
for the two youngest children. Indeed, although Myra testified she had a
reunification plan, due to her own instability, she was unable to follow through
to provide a safe and stable home environment.
Arthur argues that he should have been given more time. As we have
already summarized, he was given years to try to show he could overcome his
addictions, his involvement in criminal activity, and his inability to find stable
A-2680-23 19 housing. He never showed the ability to overcome those problems. That point
was reflected in his failure to appear at trial and to present any testimony
concerning a viable reunification plan with Adam.
As to the second part of prong three, whether the court has considered
alternatives to the termination of parental rights, Judge Axelrad's findings were
also amply supported by substantial credible evidence. The judge found that
reunification with Myra or Arthur was not in the best interests of any of the
children. Moreover, Mable and Yara credibly testified that they had been
informed of KLG, but they wished to adopt the children.
Arthur cites the Title 30 Amendments (2021) to support his argument that
KLG is the best outcome for the children. But these amendments did not elevate
KLG over adoption. Rather, they place both permanency option on equal
footing. Courts are not required to impose KLG when the resource parent has
decided on adoption and when adoption is in the child's best interests. See L.
2021, c. 154, § 4 (removing the requirement that the court find by clear and
convincing evidence that adoption is "neither feasible nor likely," N.J.S.A.
3B:12A-6(d)(3), but preserving the requirement that they prove "[KLG] is in the
child's best interest," N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6(d)(4)); see also N.J. Div. of Child Prot.
& Permanency v. M.M., 459 N.J. Super. 246, 275 (App. Div. 2019) (explaining
A-2680-23 20 that when a resource parent "unequivocally, unambiguously, and
unconditionally" wants to adopt "irrespective of [KLG]" and "termination of
parental rights and adoption is clearly in the child's best interests, the final
judgment to that effect should be reaffirmed").
3. Prong Four.
Prong four requires the court to determine that "[t]ermination of parental
rights will not do more harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). This prong
does not require a showing that no harm will come to the children "as a result of
the severing of biological ties." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 355. Instead, the issue is
"whether a child's interests will best be served by completely terminating the
child's relationship with that parent." E.P., 196 N.J. at 108. "The crux . . . is the
child's need for a permanent and stable home, along with a defined parent-child
relationship." N.J. Div. of Youth and Fam. Servs. v. H.R., 431 N.J. Super. 212,
226 (App. Div. 2013). Prong four may be satisfied by "testimony of a 'well
qualified expert who has had full opportunity to make a comprehensive,
objective, and informed evaluation' of the child's relationship with both the
natural parents and the foster parents." M.M., 189 N.J. at 281 (quoting In re
Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 19 (1992)).
A-2680-23 21 Judge Axelrad relied on all the testimony, including the unrebutted
testimony of Dr. Freedman, in finding that termination of Myra's and Arthur's
parental rights will not do more harm than good. Judge Axelrad appropriately
considered that while Logan and Luna had positive but weak bonds with Myra ,
they had strong bonds with Yara and that she was the most stable and consistent
caregiver over the last three years.
Myra's arguments that her bonds with Logan and Luna were affected by
the virtual visits that she had with them is not persuasive. The record
demonstrates that Myra was inconsistent with her visits with the children, and
she also ignores that when she did have visits there was substantial credible
evidence that she lacked the parenting skills to manage the children.
Arthur argues that he had a strong bond with Adam, but he acknowledged
that he needed more time to heal his relationship. The evidence at trial, however,
demonstrated that Arthur's bond with Adam was weak and Adam had a fear of
his biological father.
Arthur also argues that prong four cannot be met because he had
employment during the litigation. The evidence at trial, however, showed that
Arthur's employment was not consistent and he was unemployed during the trial.
A-2680-23 22 Just as importantly, Arthur does not adequately address Dr. Freedman's
testimony that Arthur could not safely parent Adam, who has specific needs.
III.
A review of all the evidence presented at trial establishes that Judge
Axelrad's findings on each of the four prongs were amply supported by the
record. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012).
Moreover, Judge Axelrad correctly summarized the law and correctly applied
her factual findings to the law. See N.J. Div. of Child Prot. and Permanency v.
P.O., 456 N.J. Super. 399, 407 (App. Div. 2018). We, therefore, affirm the
judgment as to both Myra and Arthur.
Affirmed.
A-2680-23 23