RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2969-22
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
K.F.-B.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
T.P.,
Defendant. __________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF J.P., a minor. __________________________
Argued April 3, 2025 – Decided April 14, 2025
Before Judges Natali, Walcott-Henderson, and Vinci. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, Docket No. FG-09-0121-20.
Meghan K. Gulczynski, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Meghan K. Gulczynski, of counsel and on the briefs).
Mary L. Harpster, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mary L. Harpster, on the brief).
Julie E. Goldstein, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for minor J.P. (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Julie E. Goldstein, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant K.F.-B.1 is the biological parent of J.P. Defendant appeals
from the court's May 12, 2023 order terminating her parental rights to her
daughter J.P. She contends the court erred in finding that it was in her daughter's
best interests to be adopted by her paternal aunt and uncle, M.H. and R.H., with
1 We use initials to identify the parties and child to protect the child's privacy and because records relating to Division proceedings held pursuant to Rule 5:12 are excluded from public access under Rule 1:38-3(d)(12). A-2969-22 2 whom J.P. has resided since 2018. The Law Guardian supports the termination
on appeal as it did before the court. 2
Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied the
evidence in favor of the guardianship petition supports the court's decision to
terminate defendant's parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm substantially for
the reasons set forth by the court in its thorough oral decision rendered on April
26 and May 12, 2023.
We will not recite in detail the history of the Division of Child Protection
and Permanency's (Division) interactions with defendant and J.P. Instead, we
incorporate by reference the factual findings and legal conclusions contained in
the court's decision.
The guardianship petition was tried before the court on various dates
between September 13, 2022, and January 19, 2023. The Division presented
overwhelming evidence that established, by clear and convincing evidence, all
four statutory prongs outlined in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). In its thorough
decision, the court concluded termination of defendant's parental rights was in
J.P.'s best interests and fully explained the basis for each of its determinations.
2 J.P.'s biological father, T.P., executed an identified surrender of his parental rights and has not participated in this appeal. A-2969-22 3 Our review of a court's decision to terminate parental rights is limited.
N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012). "A
Family Part's decision to terminate parental rights will not be disturbed when
there is substantial credible evidence in the record to support the court's
findings." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. K.T.D., 439 N.J. Super.
363, 368 (App. Div. 2015) (citing F.M., 211 N.J. at 448). Our Supreme Court
has noted in respect to termination of parental rights cases, "a trial court's factual
findings 'should not be disturbed unless they are so wholly unsupportable as to
result in a denial of justice.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J.
494, 511 (2004) (quoting In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472
(2002)).
"We accord deference to factfindings of the family court because it has
the superior ability to gauge the credibility of the witnesses who testify before
it and because it possesses special expertise in matters related to the family. "
F.M., 211 N.J. at 448. This enhanced deference is particularly appropriate where
the court's findings are founded upon the credibility of the witnesses' testimony.
N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. H.B., 375 N.J. Super. 148, 172 (App. Div.
2005) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484
(1974)).
A-2969-22 4 "Only when the trial court's conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide
of the mark' should an appellate court intervene and make its own findings to
ensure that there is not a denial of justice." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.
E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L.,
191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007)). No deference is given to the court's "interpretation
of the law," which we review de novo. D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245-46
(2012).
Viewed through this prism, we affirm the court's decision to terminate
defendant's parental rights. As we have noted, we do so for the cogent reasons
extensively set forth in the court's oral decision. We add additional comments
by way of amplification.
The record clearly supports the judge's findings on prongs one and two of
the statutory criteria. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1) and (2). Contrary to
defendant's representations, the record was replete with evidence that she had
made specious allegations of sexual abuse against T.P.; coached J.P. to make
further allegations which experts recognized as rehearsed; and attempted to stop
visitation between T.P. and J.P. Notably, in so doing, defendant was not merely
the victim of her anxiety and acting out of understandable protectiveness
towards J.P., but proactively sought to undermine J.P.'s relationship with T.P.
A-2969-22 5 until in 2016, when she needed a place to live and turned to T.P. During that
time, she managed to cease making allegations against him for an entire year.
Moreover, the record reflects that, notwithstanding years of therapy with
multiple professionals, defendant had not gained any insight into the
harmfulness of her behavior. Rather, despite the amelioration of her anxiety,
and despite all evidence to the contrary, she continued to harbor the belief that
T.P. had abused J.P. Because of this, defendant still posed a risk of harm to J.P.,
and none of the experts in this case, save one whom the court justifiably deemed
incredible, recommended reunification at this time or in the foreseeable future.
The record also does not bear out defendant's claim that J.P.'s documented
stress and anxiety actually arose, not from defendant's actions, but from her
separation from defendant. Numerous professionals linked J.P.'s mental health
struggles to defendant's coercive actions and determined that J.P. did not see
defendant as her protector. J.P.
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RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2969-22
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
K.F.-B.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
T.P.,
Defendant. __________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF J.P., a minor. __________________________
Argued April 3, 2025 – Decided April 14, 2025
Before Judges Natali, Walcott-Henderson, and Vinci. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, Docket No. FG-09-0121-20.
Meghan K. Gulczynski, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Meghan K. Gulczynski, of counsel and on the briefs).
Mary L. Harpster, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mary L. Harpster, on the brief).
Julie E. Goldstein, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for minor J.P. (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Julie E. Goldstein, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant K.F.-B.1 is the biological parent of J.P. Defendant appeals
from the court's May 12, 2023 order terminating her parental rights to her
daughter J.P. She contends the court erred in finding that it was in her daughter's
best interests to be adopted by her paternal aunt and uncle, M.H. and R.H., with
1 We use initials to identify the parties and child to protect the child's privacy and because records relating to Division proceedings held pursuant to Rule 5:12 are excluded from public access under Rule 1:38-3(d)(12). A-2969-22 2 whom J.P. has resided since 2018. The Law Guardian supports the termination
on appeal as it did before the court. 2
Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied the
evidence in favor of the guardianship petition supports the court's decision to
terminate defendant's parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm substantially for
the reasons set forth by the court in its thorough oral decision rendered on April
26 and May 12, 2023.
We will not recite in detail the history of the Division of Child Protection
and Permanency's (Division) interactions with defendant and J.P. Instead, we
incorporate by reference the factual findings and legal conclusions contained in
the court's decision.
The guardianship petition was tried before the court on various dates
between September 13, 2022, and January 19, 2023. The Division presented
overwhelming evidence that established, by clear and convincing evidence, all
four statutory prongs outlined in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). In its thorough
decision, the court concluded termination of defendant's parental rights was in
J.P.'s best interests and fully explained the basis for each of its determinations.
2 J.P.'s biological father, T.P., executed an identified surrender of his parental rights and has not participated in this appeal. A-2969-22 3 Our review of a court's decision to terminate parental rights is limited.
N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012). "A
Family Part's decision to terminate parental rights will not be disturbed when
there is substantial credible evidence in the record to support the court's
findings." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. K.T.D., 439 N.J. Super.
363, 368 (App. Div. 2015) (citing F.M., 211 N.J. at 448). Our Supreme Court
has noted in respect to termination of parental rights cases, "a trial court's factual
findings 'should not be disturbed unless they are so wholly unsupportable as to
result in a denial of justice.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J.
494, 511 (2004) (quoting In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472
(2002)).
"We accord deference to factfindings of the family court because it has
the superior ability to gauge the credibility of the witnesses who testify before
it and because it possesses special expertise in matters related to the family. "
F.M., 211 N.J. at 448. This enhanced deference is particularly appropriate where
the court's findings are founded upon the credibility of the witnesses' testimony.
N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. H.B., 375 N.J. Super. 148, 172 (App. Div.
2005) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484
(1974)).
A-2969-22 4 "Only when the trial court's conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide
of the mark' should an appellate court intervene and make its own findings to
ensure that there is not a denial of justice." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.
E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L.,
191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007)). No deference is given to the court's "interpretation
of the law," which we review de novo. D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245-46
(2012).
Viewed through this prism, we affirm the court's decision to terminate
defendant's parental rights. As we have noted, we do so for the cogent reasons
extensively set forth in the court's oral decision. We add additional comments
by way of amplification.
The record clearly supports the judge's findings on prongs one and two of
the statutory criteria. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1) and (2). Contrary to
defendant's representations, the record was replete with evidence that she had
made specious allegations of sexual abuse against T.P.; coached J.P. to make
further allegations which experts recognized as rehearsed; and attempted to stop
visitation between T.P. and J.P. Notably, in so doing, defendant was not merely
the victim of her anxiety and acting out of understandable protectiveness
towards J.P., but proactively sought to undermine J.P.'s relationship with T.P.
A-2969-22 5 until in 2016, when she needed a place to live and turned to T.P. During that
time, she managed to cease making allegations against him for an entire year.
Moreover, the record reflects that, notwithstanding years of therapy with
multiple professionals, defendant had not gained any insight into the
harmfulness of her behavior. Rather, despite the amelioration of her anxiety,
and despite all evidence to the contrary, she continued to harbor the belief that
T.P. had abused J.P. Because of this, defendant still posed a risk of harm to J.P.,
and none of the experts in this case, save one whom the court justifiably deemed
incredible, recommended reunification at this time or in the foreseeable future.
The record also does not bear out defendant's claim that J.P.'s documented
stress and anxiety actually arose, not from defendant's actions, but from her
separation from defendant. Numerous professionals linked J.P.'s mental health
struggles to defendant's coercive actions and determined that J.P. did not see
defendant as her protector. J.P. believed she had gotten both of her parents in
trouble, blamed herself for the present situation, and, as one testifying expert
put it, continued to "suffer inwardly." Nonetheless, J.P. has thrived, physically
and mentally, since being placed with her paternal aunt and uncle.
Additionally, contrary to defendant's representations, her refusal to accept
J.P.'s retraction of the sexual abuse allegations did not reflect a prioritization of
A-2969-22 6 J.P.'s safety. Rather, as another testifying expert noted, by choosing to maintain
her belief in J.P.'s allegations, defendant was essentially exonerating herself and
laying all the blame for the removal and litigation on J.P. Defendant's testimony
that she did not blame J.P. for her loss of custody did not change this. Moreover,
defendant's insistence that J.P. told her the truth demonstrates, as the court
noted, that defendant still sees T.P. as a sexual predator and undermines her
claim that she would allow J.P. to see T.P. in the future.
Further, while defendant's apparently immutable personal beliefs and
thoughts regarding T.P. may not have informed her more recent behavior, this
was only because her visitation was largely supervised, and she knew it was in
her interests to refrain from acting on her beliefs when faced with the possible
termination of her parental rights. While defendant insisted at trial that she
would allow J.P. to visit with T.P. if she were reunited with her daughter, she
also admitted that she still did not trust T.P. and if any abuse allegations arose
in the future, she would not consult the Division but would take J.P. and move
away. As the court noted, the threat to J.P.'s cherished bond with T.P. could not
be clearer.
Finally, the Division did not harm J.P. by failing to reunite her with
defendant; rather, it was defendant's inability or unwillingness to overcome her
A-2969-22 7 mental illness and delusions that resulted in J.P.'s prolonged placement with her
resource family, where she is thriving. And, in fact, it was the stability J.P. had
achieved through the support of her resource family that allowed her to develop
better relationships with both of her parents than she otherwise would have had.
Turning to prong three, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3), we concur with the
court that the Division has offered both parents reasonable services, including
programs and visitations. Contrary to defendant's contentions, the Division's
sole goal in providing her with therapy was to assist her in gaining insight as to:
(1) how her anxiety prompted her to make unfounded, delusional accusations of
sexual abuse against T.P. and subsequently coach J.P. into making her own
baseless allegations; and (2) how these numerous allegations had the capacity to
affect J.P.'s development and needlessly destroy her relationship with T.P. After
years of appropriate therapy, however, defendant failed to gain that insight. As
was noted by the court, she was not always forthcoming with her providers.
Additionally, although defendant blames the Division for failing to foster
a relationship between her and M.H. such that kinship legal guardianship (KLG)
might have been more feasible, defendant ignores: (1) M.H. had every reason
to be leery of defendant given the baseless accusations against her brother, T.P.;
(2) M.H. had to deal with the emotional repercussions of defendant's actions
A-2969-22 8 while caring for J.P.; and (3) defendant could have reached out to M.H. on her
own.
Further, while defendant maintains the court should not have relied solely
on M.H.'s preference for adoption in terminating her parental rights, this is not
what occurred. Defendant wanted KLG because it served her interests. The
court determined that adoption was the better path for J.P. because: (1) J.P. had
spent years with and wanted to stay with her resource family; (2) J.P. saw her
resource parents as her psychological parents; (3) the resource parents wanted
to adopt her; (4) remaining with the resource family allowed J.P. to see both her
parents; (5) J.P. needed to move on with her life without Division involvement
to have a sense of security and permanency; and (6) with KLG, there was a risk
that defendant would file motions and perpetuate litigation.
As to prong four, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4), there is abundant evidence
in the record to support the court's conclusion termination would not do J.P.
more harm than good. The court was entitled to rely upon J.P.'s expressed
preference to be adopted by M.H. and R.H., which was consistently expressed
to a variety of evaluators over a number of years. Additionally, numerous
evaluators concurred that termination of defendant's parental rights would not
do more harm than good. These evaluators simply cautioned that J.P. would
A-2969-22 9 suffer harm if she were not permitted to continue visiting with defendant. The
court was entitled to rely upon M.H.'s representations that she had no intention
to keep J.P. from defendant and that she would facilitate continued visitation.
Children like J.P. are entitled to a permanent, safe, and secure home. We
acknowledge "the need for permanency of placements by placing limits on the
time for a birth parent to correct conditions in anticipation of reuniting with the
child." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super. 76, 111 (App.
Div. 2004). As public policy increasingly focuses on a child's need for
permanency, "[t]he emphasis has shifted from protracted efforts for
reunification with a birth parent to an expeditious, permanent placement to
promote the child's well-being." Ibid. That is because "[a] child cannot be held
prisoner of the rights of others, even those of his or her parents. Children have
their own rights, including the right to a permanent, safe and stable placement. "
Ibid.
The question then is "whether the parent can become fit in time to meet
the needs of the children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 375 N.J.
Super. 235, 263 (App. Div. 2005); see also P.P., 180 N.J. at 512 (indicating that
even if a parent is trying to change, a child cannot wait indefinitely). After
carefully considering the evidence, the court reasonably determined that
A-2969-22 10 defendant was unable to parent J.P. and would not be able to do so for the
foreseeable future. Under those circumstances, we agree with the court that any
further delay of permanent placement would not be in J.P.'s best interests.
To the extent we have not expressly addressed any issues raised by
defendant, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-2969-22 11