Dcpp v. E.K. and C.D., in the Matter of the Guardianship of K.L.D.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: April 16, 2024
• Docket: A-3437-22
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3437-22

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

E.K.,

Defendant,

and

C.D.,

Defendant-Appellant. __________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF K.L.D., a minor. __________________________

Submitted April 9, 2024 – Decided April 16, 2024

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Haas. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket No. FG-15-0014-22.

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Louis W. Skinner, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Sara M. Gregory, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Lisa J. Rusciano, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Melissa R. Vance, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant C.D.1 is the biological father of K.L.D., born in June 2020.

Defendant appeals from the June 22, 2023 judgment of guardianship terminating

his parental rights to the child. 2 Defendant contends the Division of Child

Protection and Permanency (Division) failed to prove each prong of N.J.S.A.

1 We refer to the parties and the child by initials to protect their privacy. R. 1:38-3(d)(12). 2 E.K., who is K.L.D.'s biological mother, voluntarily surrendered her parental rights to K.L.D. to the child's resource parent on February 1, 2023. A-3437-22 2 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence. The Law Guardian supports

the termination on appeal as it did before the trial court.

Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied that

the evidence in favor of the guardianship petition overwhelmingly supports the

decision to terminate defendant's parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm

substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Deborah Hanlon-Schron in her

thorough oral decision rendered on June 22, 2023.

We will not recite in detail the history of the Division's interactions with

defendant and K.L.D. Instead, we incorporate by reference the factual findings

and legal conclusions contained in Judge Hanlon-Schron's decision. We add the

following brief comments.

The guardianship petition was tried before Judge Hanlon-Schron over the

course of four days. The Division presented overwhelming evidence of

defendant's parental unfitness and established, by clear and convincing

evidence, all four statutory prongs outlined in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). In her

thoughtful opinion, Judge Hanlon-Schron concluded that termination of

defendant's parental rights was in the child's best interests, and fully explained

the basis for each of her determinations. In this appeal, our review of the judge's

decision is limited. We defer to her expertise as a Family Court judge, Cesare

A-3437-22 3 v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998), and we are bound by her factual findings

so long as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth

& Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (citing In re Guardianship of

J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993)).

Applying these principles, we conclude that Judge Hanlon-Schron's

factual findings are fully supported by the record and, in light of those facts, her

legal conclusions are unassailable. We have duly considered, and reject,

defendant's arguments that his parental rights were terminated because of his

poverty and other inappropriate factors, and that the Division failed to offer him

reasonable services or consider kinship legal guardianship as an alternative. To

the contrary, the trial judge relied on appropriate considerations, including the

Division's repeated efforts to provide services and K.L.D.'s need for

permanency.

David Brandwein, Psy.D., an expert psychologist, diagnosed defendant

with an unspecified bipolar and related disorder, a moderate cannabis use

disorder, and adult antisocial behavior.3 Brandwein opined that these

conditions, coupled with defendant's refusal to engage in services, prevented

3 Defendant did not call any experts to rebut Brandwein's testimony. A-3437-22 4 defendant from serving as an independent caregiver for K.L.D. Brandwein

explained:

[Defendant] is a poor candidate to provide his child permanency in the foreseeable future. The Division has provided services to [defendant], which [defendant] has not fully complied with and has not fully benefitted from. And . . . I don't see that changing [for six] months, [twelve] months, [eighteen] months, [twenty- four] months, I don't see that changing.

Unfortunately, you know, for [K.L.D.], his understanding of time is not our understanding of time. [Seventeen] or [eighteen] months probably isn't a long time for us, but for a child, it's glacial time. So, you know, to keep [K.L.D.] in limbo when there's already a pattern of behavior that's been observed and documented, that's not best for [K.L.D.]

Children are entitled to a permanent, safe and secure home. We

acknowledge "the need for permanency of placements by placing limits on the

time for a birth parent to correct conditions in anticipation of reuniting with the

child." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super. 76, 111 (App.

Div. 2004). As public policy increasingly focuses on a child's need for

permanency, the emphasis has "shifted from protracted efforts for reunification

with a birth parent to an expeditious, permanent placement to promote the child's

well-being." Ibid. (citing N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.1). That is because "[a] child

cannot be held prisoner of the rights of others, even those of his or her parents.

A-3437-22 5 Children have their own rights, including the right to a permanent, safe and

stable placement." Ibid.

The question then is "whether the parent can become fit in time to meet

the needs of the children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 375 N.J.

Super. 235, 263 (App. Div. 2005); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.

P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 512 (2004) (indicating that even if a parent is trying to

change, a child cannot wait indefinitely). After carefully considering the

evidence, Judge Hanlon-Schron reasonably determined that defendant was

unable to parent K.L.D. and would not be able to do so for the foreseeable future.

Under those circumstances, we agree with the judge that any further delay of

permanent placement would not be in the child's best interests.

Affirmed.

A-3437-22 6