USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 1 of 28
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-1854
D.C., by his parents and guardians, Trevor Chaplick and Vivian Chaplick; TREVOR CHAPLICK; VIVIAN CHAPLICK; HEAR OUR VOICES, INC., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated; JAMES BINGHAM; M.B., by his parents and guardians, James Bingham and Sheila Bingham; SHEILA BINGHAM,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
FAIRFAX COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD; VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; DR. MICHELLE REID, Superintendent of Fairfax County Public Schools, in her official capacity; LISA COONS,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Michael Stefan Nachmanoff, District Judge. (1:22-cv-01070-MSN-IDD)
Argued: May 9, 2024 Decided: March 19, 2026
Before KING, GREGORY, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the opinion, in which Judge King joined. Judge Gregory wrote a dissenting opinion.
ARGUED: William Randolph Merrill, SUSMAN GODFREY LLP, Houston, Texas, for Appellants. Brian David Schmalzbach, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Richmond, Virginia; Julia Bougie Judkins, FAIRFAX COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Falls Church, Virginia, USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 2 of 28
for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Alan M. Grimaldi, Oral D. Pottinger, Eric A. White, MAYER BROWN LLP, Washington, D.C.; Aderson Francois, Civil Rights Law Clinic, GEORGETOWN LAW, Washington, D.C.; Michael Adamson, SUSMAN GODFREY LLP, Houston, Texas; Craig T. Merritt, R. Braxton, MERRITTHILL, PLLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Jeanne-Marie Burke, FAIRFAX COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Falls Church, Virginia, for Appellees Fairfax County School Board and Dr. Michelle Reid. Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, Andrew N. Ferguson, Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia; Jackie Lynn White, II, Tysons, Virginia, Farnaz Farkish Thompson, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees Virginia Department of Education and Lisa Coons.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 3 of 28
RUSHING, Circuit Judge:
Two students, their parents, and a nonprofit organization sued the Virginia
Department of Education and the Fairfax County School Board, alleging those entities
systemically violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 84 Stat. 175,
as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. The district court dismissed their complaint after
finding that one student and his parents failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, the
other student and his parents had a duplicative suit pending, and the nonprofit organization
lacked standing to sue. We affirm.
I.
The IDEA offers States federal funds to assist in educating children with certain
disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1412; see also id. § 1401(3)(A)(i). In exchange for those funds,
a State commits to provide a “[f]ree appropriate public education” (FAPE) to eligible
children. Id. § 1412(a)(1). A FAPE consists of “‘special education and related services’
. . . tailored to meet a child’s ‘unique needs.’” Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154,
158 (2017) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9), (26), (29)). The primary mechanism for
providing a FAPE to each child is an “individualized education program” (IEP). 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1412(a)(4), 1414(d). An IEP is a comprehensive document prepared by teachers, school
officials, and parents that “spells out a personalized plan to meet all of the child’s
‘educational needs.’” Fry, 580 U.S. at 158 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A), (B)).
Although the IDEA envisions a cooperative process between parents and educators,
the statute anticipates that they “will not always agree.” Bouabid v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Schs. Bd. of Educ., 62 F.4th 851, 856 (4th Cir. 2023); see Schaffer ex rel.
3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 4 of 28
Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005). Parents who oppose the content of their child’s
IEP may exercise several procedural rights, such as requesting an independent educational
evaluation and pursuing informal dispute resolution procedures. See Bouabid, 62 F.4th at
856; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1), (e). If disagreements remain, parents may seek a due
process hearing in the appropriate state administrative forum. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). “There,
an impartial hearing officer determines ‘whether the child received a free appropriate
public education’ and orders appropriate relief as necessary.” Sanchez v. Arlington Cnty.
Sch. Bd., 58 F.4th 130, 133 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i)). Any
party aggrieved by the hearing officer’s determination can then file a civil suit in state or
federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). The court may receive additional evidence and
“grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate.” Id. § 1415(i)(2)(C); see Sch. Comm.
of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369–370 (1985).
Plaintiffs are two Fairfax County students who qualify for special education, their
parents, and an advocacy organization. Student D.C. has received special education
services from Fairfax County Public Schools (FCPS) since 2008. His parents, the
Chaplicks, requested a due process hearing in 2015 to challenge FCPS’s refusal to pay for
D.C. to be educated in a private residential facility. The hearing officer ruled that D.C.’s
public school placement constituted a FAPE. After the hearing, however, FCPS agreed to
provide financial support for D.C. to attend the day program at a private institution rather
than receive his education in a public-school setting. Eventually, the Chaplicks moved
D.C. into a residential placement at a different facility. FCPS declined to pay for that
residential facility or conduct a new IEP meeting but agreed to pay for D.C. to attend the
4 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 5 of 28
day program at his previous institution. The Chaplicks did not pursue a due process hearing
to challenge that decision.
Student M.B. has received special education services from FCPS since 2013. In
2021, his parents, the Binghams, placed M.B. at a private day school. The Binghams then
requested a due process hearing to challenge M.B.’s IEP, which provided for his education
in a public school and denied funding for private school. The hearing officer agreed with
FCPS that a public-school setting constituted a FAPE for M.B. M.B. and the Binghams
sued in federal district court to contest the hearing officer’s determination, and that suit
remained pending when the present lawsuit was filed.
The final Plaintiff is Hear Our Voices, Inc. (HOV). HOV is a “private, non-profit
member organization” established “to protect and advocate for the rights of persons with
disabilities and to safeguard the rights of individuals with developmental disabilities.” J.A.
25. “HOV’s members include” the Chaplicks, the Binghams, and “other residents of
Virginia and Fairfax County.” J.A. 25.
Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint in this purported class action in 2023.
They alleged that the Fairfax County School Board, the Virginia Department of Education,
and their respective superintendents systemically violated the IDEA, depriving D.C., M.B.,
and similarly situated students of a FAPE. In six counts, the complaint alleged that
Defendants failed to provide a FAPE; violated the IDEA by not providing “appropriate
procedural safeguards” including “a fair and impartial due process hearing before a
qualified and impartial hearing officer,” J.A. 111–113; and deprived Plaintiffs of due
process and equal protection of the laws by interfering with “their property and liberty
5 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 6 of 28
interest in [a] FAPE, their property interest in an adequate IEP, and their liberty interest in
an Impartial Due Process Hearing,” J.A. 108.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, and after a hearing the district court
granted the motion. The court reasoned that D.C. and the Chaplicks could not pursue this
lawsuit because they had failed to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative remedies before filing
suit; M.B. and the Binghams must be dismissed from the case because they had previously
filed a separate federal lawsuit raising duplicative claims that remained pending before a
different judge; and HOV lacked standing to sue on behalf of itself or its identified
members. Plaintiffs appealed all three rulings.
II.
We begin with the Chaplicks and administrative exhaustion. “Whether a plaintiff
has properly exhausted all administrative remedies is a pure question of law that we review
de novo.” E.L. ex rel. Lorsson v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. of Educ., 773 F.3d 509, 514
(4th Cir. 2014).
“‘[W]e have consistently held that a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative
remedies before bringing . . . an action’” under the IDEA’s judicial review provision. K.I.
v. Durham Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 54 F.4th 779, 788 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting E.L., 773
F.3d at 513–514); see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), (B). The statute also requires a plaintiff
to “exhaust[]” the IDEA’s administrative processes “before . . . filing . . . a civil action
under [other] laws seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA].” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(l); see Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 143 S. Ct. 859, 863 (2023). If a plaintiff
seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE and a remedy the IDEA provides, he must exhaust the
6 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 7 of 28
statute’s administrative processes regardless of the law on which he bases his claim. Luna
Perez, 143 S. Ct. at 865; Fry, 580 U.S. at 165. We determine whether a suit seeks relief
for the denial of a FAPE by looking to “the substance, or gravamen,” of the complaint.
Fry, 580 U.S. at 165.
The IDEA’s exhaustion requirement applies to every claim in Plaintiffs’ complaint.
Counts III, IV, V, and VI allege that Defendants failed to “comply with the IDEA” by
failing “to ensure that all children with disabilities residing in [the jurisdiction] receive a
free appropriate public education.” J.A. 111, 112, 115, 116. These counts assert claims
under the IDEA itself, so they necessarily invoke the statute’s exhaustion requirement. Cf.
Fry, 580 U.S. at 170 (“[Section] 1415(l)’s premise is that the plaintiff is suing under a
statute other than the IDEA.”).
While Counts I and II assert constitutional due process and equal protection
violations, in substance they seek relief for the denial of a FAPE. Specifically, Counts I
and II allege Defendants interfered with or deprived Plaintiffs of “their property and liberty
interest in [a] FAPE, their property interest in an adequate IEP, and their liberty interest in
an Impartial Due Process Hearing” under the IDEA. J.A. 108; see J.A. 110 (alleging
deprivation of “neutral procedures applied by an impartial and unbiased decision maker”
in IDEA due process hearings and “denial of [their] right to a free public education”). The
gravamen of these counts is that Defendants have failed to comply with the IDEA’s various
procedural requirements, with the result that D.C., M.B., and other unnamed children have
been denied a FAPE. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and injunctions requiring
Defendants “to comply with” the IDEA in various ways. J.A. 119, 121, 122, 124, 127.
7 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 8 of 28
Both are “form[s] of relief” traditionally available under the IDEA. Luna Perez, 143 S. Ct.
at 864; see Sch. Comm. of Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370.
Plaintiffs were therefore required to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative processes
before filing this action. The Chaplicks concede they did not do so because they did not
pursue a due process hearing to challenge FCPS’s decisions declining to conduct a new
IEP meeting, refusing to pay for D.C.’s residential facility, and concluding that the private
institution day program was sufficient to provide a FAPE to D.C.—the very decisions about
which they complain in this lawsuit. Instead, they assert three grounds for an exception to
the exhaustion requirement. We find none persuasive.
First, the Chaplicks argue that exhaustion would be “futile or inadequate . . . as a
legal matter” because the administrative process cannot resolve their “wide-ranging”
claims and provide commensurate relief. Opening Br. at 27; see Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S.
305, 327 (1988) (suggesting “parents may bypass the administrative process where
exhaustion would be futile or inadequate”); K.I., 54 F.4th at 793 & n.8 (recognizing a
“narrow” futility exception). But see Luna Perez, 143 S. Ct. at 865 (declining to address
“whether IDEA’s exhaustion requirement is susceptible to a judge-made futility
exception”). This argument fails for multiple reasons.
As an initial matter, administrative proceedings would not be futile or inadequate to
resolve the Chaplicks’ complaints about D.C.’s education. Had they pursued a due process
hearing, the hearing officer would have been empowered to agree with their arguments
about D.C.’s placement and award him what the Chaplicks, not FCPS, consider a FAPE.
If the hearing officer awarded D.C. a FAPE, the Chaplicks would have no reason (and no
8 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 9 of 28
standing) to pursue this lawsuit. See E.L., 773 F.3d at 516 (finding exhaustion would not
have been futile “because the review officer clearly could have granted [the student] relief,
had she availed herself of the opportunity to appeal”). Indeed, that’s the purpose of
administrative exhaustion: to give the state and local education agencies an opportunity to
resolve a parent’s concerns in the first instance. See id. at 514 (“The IDEA’s exhaustion
requirement serves the important purpose of allowing states to use their special expertise
to resolve educational disputes.”).
The Chaplicks respond that their complaint alleges systemic violations of the IDEA
beyond those in D.C.’s individual case. As examples, they note allegations that hearing
officers “rely on false testimony from school officials” and “routinely exclude parents’
expert witnesses from testifying,” Reply Br. 11, and allegations that Defendants “denied
parents access to student records that are required by law” and “neglected to properly
implement and oversee student IEPs,” Opening Br. 36–37. Consolidating these individual
claims into one lawsuit, however, does not erase the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement; there
is no class action exception. Unlike in Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1992), on
which the Chaplicks rely, the complaint here does not challenge the legality of a statute or
regulation itself, only the manner in which those standards are implemented in specific
cases. See id. at 159 (finding administrative exhaustion futile when plaintiff alleged that a
state statute and its implementing regulation violated the IDEA). Nor is this case like D.M.
v. New Jersey Department of Education, 801 F.3d 205 (3d. Cir. 2015), where the parent
agreed with the student’s IEP but sued the state department of education to challenge the
State’s regulation of a private school, which regulation prevented implementation of the
9 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 10 of 28
student’s IEP. See id. at 208, 212. Instead, in cases like this one, courts consistently
enforce the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., Roe v. Healey, 78 F.4th 11, 26 (1st
Cir. 2023) (concluding that “plaintiffs have failed to show that they are entitled to a
systemic exception to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement, assuming without deciding that
such an exception is available in this circuit”); Student A ex rel. Parent A v. S.F. Unified
Sch. Dist., 9 F.4th 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 2021) (“To our knowledge, no published opinion
in this circuit has ever found that a challenge was ‘systemic’ and exhaustion not required.”);
Ass’n for Cmty. Living v. Romer, 992 F.2d 1040, 1044–1045 (10th Cir. 1993) (enforcing
exhaustion requirement despite claimed “systemic violation”).
The Chaplicks emphasize that some of their claims challenge the competence and
neutrality of hearing officers who preside over the due process hearings that are one step
in the IDEA’s administrative process. Those allegations do not exempt the Chaplicks from
the statute’s exhaustion requirement. Parents in Virginia can object to a hearing officer’s
appointment to their case. 1 8 Va. Admin. Code § 20-81-210(H)(3). And dissatisfied
parents can raise their arguments about a hearing officer’s competence and neutrality when
they pursue judicial review of the hearing officer’s decision. See, e.g., Sch. Bd. of the City
1 “The Virginia Department of Education uses the impartial hearing officer system that is administered by the Supreme Court of Virginia.” 8 Va. Admin. Code § 20-81- 210(B). The Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia manages the list of eligible hearing officers. Id. § 20-81-210(C). If a hearing officer refuses a parent’s request to recuse himself from a case, the parent “may proceed to file an affidavit with the Executive Secretary.” Id. § 20-81-210(H)(3)(a). If the Executive Secretary determines that the hearing officer should be disqualified, he will assign a new hearing officer. Va. Hr’g Officer Sys. R. of Admin. 4(B). The Executive Secretary also “has the authority to remove hearing officers” from the list of eligible officers on the Secretary’s own initiative or upon the request of a party to an administrative matter. Id. 4(A). 10 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 11 of 28
of Norfolk v. Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d 928, 937 (E.D. Va. 2010) (adjudicating school board’s
argument that hearing officer demonstrated a bias in favor of the student during due process
hearing). The Chaplicks have not shown that administrative exhaustion would be futile or
inadequate as a legal matter.
Second, the Chaplicks argue that administrative exhaustion would be “futile as a
practical matter” because the hearing officers are so biased against parents that an adverse
ruling is virtually certain. Opening Br. 40. This argument also fails. The Chaplicks
contend that all Virginia hearing officers work under a conflict of interest because they are
compensated by the Virginia Department of Education. Federal regulations implementing
the IDEA, however, expressly recognize that state agencies may compensate their hearing
officers. 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(c)(2). The Chaplicks also present statistics allegedly
showing that hearing officers nearly always rule in favor of schools and against parents.
The statistics do not demonstrate that any hearing officer is actually biased, nor do they
suggest that the Chaplicks can gain nothing from the administrative process, which
includes informal dispute resolution procedures that have generated favorable results for
D.C. in the past. The IDEA’s “model of cooperative federalism” vests States with the
authority to adjudicate parental complaints in the first instance. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 52
(internal quotation marks omitted); see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), (g). And as the district court
explained, hearing officers, like other administrative officers, are entitled to a presumption
of honesty and integrity. D.C. v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 1:22-cv-01070, 2023 WL
4765583, at *6 (E.D. Va. July 25, 2023). Because the complaint’s allegations fail to
11 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 12 of 28
overcome that presumption, the Chaplicks’ practical futility argument cannot excuse their
failure to exhaust.
Third, the Chaplicks argue that they did not need to exhaust their administrative
remedies because this is a class action lawsuit and other plaintiffs, the Binghams, exhausted
their administrative remedies on behalf of the entire class. Even if we were to accept the
Chaplicks’ premise, their argument fails because, as we will explain next, the district court
permissibly dismissed the Binghams from this suit.
In sum, the Chaplicks have not shown that the district court erred in dismissing their
claims for failure to exhaust their administrative remedies as the IDEA requires.
III.
We turn next to M.B. and the Binghams. The district court dismissed their claims
as duplicative of those in another lawsuit then pending in the district court before a different
judge. “‘Trial courts are afforded broad discretion in determining whether to stay or
dismiss litigation in order to avoid duplicating a proceeding already pending in another
federal court,’” and we review the district court’s decision for abuse of that discretion.
Robertson v. Apker, 700 Fed. App. 301, 302 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting I.A. Durbin, Inc. v.
Jefferson Nat’l Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1551–1552 (11th Cir. 1986)).
As a “general rule[,] . . . duplicative litigation [between two federal district courts]
should be avoided.” Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gross, 468 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, a “district court may stay or dismiss a suit that is duplicative of another
federal court suit as part of its general power to administer its docket.” Id. at 207 n.6
(emphasis removed). A suit is duplicative of another if “‘the parties, issues and available
12 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 13 of 28
relief do not significantly differ between the two actions.’” Robertson, 700 Fed. App. at
302 (quoting I.A. Durbin, 793 F.2d at 1551); see also McClary v. Lightsey, 673 Fed. App.
357, 357 (4th Cir. 2017) (same); Cottle v. Bell, 229 F.3d 1142 (Table), 2000 WL 1144623,
at *1 (4th Cir. 2000) (same).
When M.B. and the Binghams joined this lawsuit as plaintiffs in the first amended
complaint, they had their own IDEA case pending in federal district court. See M.B. v.
Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 660 F. Supp. 3d 508, 513 (E.D. Va. 2023). In that suit, M.B. and
the Binghams alleged that FCPS had denied M.B. a FAPE by placing him in public school
and refusing to fund his private school tuition. See id. at 513, 520. They sought to undo
the hearing officer’s determination that M.B.’s IEP satisfied the IDEA and provided him
with a FAPE. Id. at 520.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the Binghams’
claims in the pending suit were “substantially similar to the ones [they] made in this case”
and so dismissed the latter. D.C., 2023 WL 4765583, at *7. “In both cases, the family
ma[de] almost identical factual allegations.” Id. The cases challenged the same decisions
and sought relief for the same injury, FCPS’s alleged denial of a FAPE to M.B. And as
the district court observed, entertaining the Binghams’ claims “would create a risk of
dueling decisions coming from judges in the same courthouse.” Id. The Binghams argue
that this purported class action presents broader claims and seeks broader relief than their
first-filed lawsuit, but the examples they offer demonstrate only that the class action device
consolidates multiple individuals’ similar grievances. They do not refute the district
court’s assessment that the Binghams’ claims here duplicated those of their then-pending
13 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 14 of 28
lawsuit. 2 Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the
claims brought by M.B. and the Binghams as impermissibly duplicative.
IV.
Lastly, we consider HOV’s standing to bring this suit without the Chaplicks or the
Binghams. The district court dismissed HOV after concluding it lacked standing to sue on
behalf of its members or in its own right. We review that decision de novo. See S. Walk
at Broadlands Homeowner’s Assoc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 181
(4th Cir. 2013).
An organizational plaintiff “can assert standing . . . as a representative of its
members.” Id. at 182; see Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of
Harvard Coll., 143 S. Ct. 2141, 2157 (2023). This associational, or representational,
standing permits an organization to “assert the rights of absent third parties”—its
members—and litigate on their behalf. United Food & Com. Workers Union Loc. 751 v.
Brown Grp., Inc. (UFCW), 517 U.S. 544, 557 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Associational standing does not expand a third party’s rights but allows an organization to
“rais[e] [the] legal rights” of its members in their stead. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342 (1977)
(“[A]n association may have standing to assert the claims of its members.”).
2 While this appeal was pending, the district court presiding over the Binghams’ first-filed lawsuit granted judgment in favor of FCPS. See M.B., 660 F. Supp. 3d at 529. The parties here dispute the res judicata effect of that decision, but we need not address their arguments because the district court in this case permissibly dismissed the claims as duplicative. 14 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 15 of 28
HOV cannot litigate this action on its members’ behalf because it has not identified
any member of its organization with the right to pursue these claims. See UFCW, 517 U.S.
at 556–557 (acknowledging the prudential nature of the limits on representational
standing). According to the first amended complaint, HOV’s members include the
Chaplicks, the Binghams, and other unidentified individuals. As we have explained, the
Chaplicks cannot bring this suit because they failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies as the IDEA requires. HOV therefore cannot assert any right to sue on behalf of
the Chaplicks. Associational standing does not allow an organization “to escape the
exhaustion requirement for the students they are purportedly representing.” Parent/Prof.
Advoc. League v. City of Springfield, 934 F.3d 13, 34 (1st Cir. 2019). To hold otherwise
would be inconsistent with the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement “and indeed an easy way
to circumvent it.” Id. Similarly, allowing HOV to bring claims on behalf of the Binghams
that they could not bring themselves would contradict the premise of representational
standing. Cf. id.; UFCW, 517 U.S. at 556–557; S. Walk at Broadlands, 713 F.3d at 183–
184. As the district court observed, it also would “not cure the fact that those claims are
duplicative and undercut the interest in judicial efficiency.” D.C., 2023 WL 4765583, at
*3. HOV has not identified any other member on whose behalf it could pursue this lawsuit
in a representational capacity. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 498 (2009)
(emphasizing that an organization must identify the members of whose behalf it is suing).
Organizations can also sue “on their own behalf” by satisfying “the usual standards
for injury in fact, causation, and redressability that apply to individuals.” FDA v. All. for
Hippocratic Med., 144 S. Ct. 1540, 1563 (2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). HOV
15 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 16 of 28
alleges that Defendants’ IDEA violations have caused it “to divert its two principal
resources, time and money, away from several of its core efforts” like legislative analysis
“to address the harm caused by Defendants’ [actions]” by undertaking activities like
“[t]alking to parents,” “[r]eaching out to regulators,” “investigating the special needs
education problems in Virginia,” and “drafting op-eds on the problems with Virginia.” J.A.
25–27.
HOV has failed to allege a cognizable concrete injury caused by Defendants’
actions. The “diversion of resources” it alleges “results not from any actions taken by
[Defendants], but rather from the [organization’s] own budgetary choices,” which cannot
create a cognizable injury. Lane v. Holder, 703 F.3d 668, 675 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see All. for Hippocratic Med., 144 S. Ct. at 1563–1564 (“An
organization cannot manufacture its own standing” by “expending money to gather
information and advocate against the defendant’s action.”).
HOV compares its injury to that of the organization in Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), but the comparison is inapt. “Havens was an unusual case.”
All. for Hippocratic Med., 144 S. Ct. at 1564. There, the defendant’s actions “directly
affected and interfered with [the organization’s] core business activities—not dissimilar to
a retailer who sues a manufacturer for selling defective goods to the retailer.” Id.
Defendants’ alleged IDEA violations “have not imposed any similar impediment to
[HOV’s] advocacy business[].” Id. Rather, as the district court observed, HOV alleges
that Defendants’ actions have compelled it “to do the very thing it was formed to do,”
which is advocate for “‘appropriate and equal education services for students with
16 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 17 of 28
disabilities.’” D.C., 2023 WL 4765583, at *3 (quoting J.A. 25). HOV therefore lacks
standing to sue on its own behalf, and the district court correctly dismissed it from the case.
Having concluded that none of the Plaintiffs could properly bring this suit, the
district court dismissed the complaint. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
17 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 18 of 28
GREGORY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that the Fairfax County Public Schools and
Virginia Department of Education “systematically” violate the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA”) by preventing parents from receiving a fair hearing before IDEA
hearing officers. J.A. 20–21. Among other allegations in the detailed complaint, Plaintiffs
claim that from 2010 to 2021, ten of twelve hearing officers in Northern Virginia (where
Fairfax County is located) ruled in favor of parents a combined zero times. They seek
declaratory and injunctive relief to bring the IDEA due process hearings into compliance
with federal law—in other words, relief that cannot be granted by the hearing officers
themselves. I would join several of our sister circuits in recognizing that a claim of systemic
procedural defects satisfies a futility exception to the IDEA exhaustion requirement, and
therefore I would reverse the district court and remand for further proceedings.
States that accept federal funding under the IDEA commit to providing a free
appropriate public education (“FAPE”) to all children with certain disabilities. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(9). A child with a qualifying disability “acquires a substantive right” to a FAPE in
states that accept federal funding under the IDEA. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S.
154, 158 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). States primarily do this by providing
an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”), a bespoke educational plan that accounts for
the child’s disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).
18 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 19 of 28
Anticipating that parents and local educational agencies will not always agree on a
child’s needs, the IDEA requires that states “guarantee[] procedural safeguards with
respect to the provision of a [FAPE].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). Among the mandatory
procedural safeguards that a state must implement is an opportunity to “present a complaint
with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child, or the provision of a [FAPE].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). Whenever
a complaint of this kind is submitted, the parents “shall have an opportunity for an impartial
due process hearing” before an impartial hearing officer. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(f)(1)(A),
1415(f)(3)(A). In Virginia, the state Department of Education operates the system of due
process hearings. See 8 V. Admin. Code § 20-81-210.
Plaintiffs claim that the structure of due process hearings in Virginia, and
particularly in Fairfax County, systematically undermines the IDEA’s guarantee of due
process. The complaint contains allegations concerning illegal and unfair procedures that
are too lengthy and numerous to list in full, so I will discuss some representative examples.
The complaint alleges that hearing officers consistently delay decisions past the 45-
day deadline required by 34 C.F.R. § 300.515 without requests from any party. J.A. 57–
58. For instance, one 2022 case saw a hearing officer backdate a decision by two weeks,
which reduced the timeline for parents to appeal the decision. J.A. 58. Despite an
instruction from the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Special Education Programs
to track timelines for due process complaints, hearing officers frequently delay issuing
decisions past regulatory deadlines. J.A. 57–58. This pattern inhibits parents’ ability to
appeal from adverse decisions.
19 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 20 of 28
The complaint suggests that hearing officers routinely accept fabricated data from
local education agencies that shows students making false progress. J.A. 59–60. In one
hearing, school officials testified that a student could read books and count to 50 even
though they had been present at independent testing that proved the child could do neither.
J.A. 59. In a 2022 case, a teacher testified that school policy prohibited her from giving
grades below 50%, even when a student failed to submit any work. J.A. 60. These false
reports undermine parents’ attempts to obtain adequate IEPs for their children.
The complaint further alleges that VDOE and school officials routinely engage in
improper ex parte communications with hearing officers. J.A. 61–64. One former hearing
officer has reported that these VDOE “monitors” routinely advised him, outside the
presence of parties, to disregard expert testimony offered by parents. J.A. 62. Another
hearing officer asked a local school official to delay requesting a hearing so that this
particular hearing officer could handle the hearing personally. J.A. 62–63. Hearing
officers’ ex parte communications with VDOE and school officials undermine the
impartiality of the due process hearings.
Plaintiffs do not challenge any particular child’s IEP. Instead, they seek injunctions
against Fairfax County and the Virginia Department of Education to require them to cease
these—and several other—purportedly routine unlawful practices. See J.A. 119–27.
At issue here is whether any of the three sets of plaintiffs properly brought a claim
before the district court. The district court dismissed each claim for a different reason; the
20 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 21 of 28
Chaplicks had not exhausted their administrative remedies, the Binghams had brought
similar claims in a different lawsuit, and organizational plaintiff Hear Our Voices, Inc.
(“HOV”) lacked standing to sue. I would reverse the judgment of the district court on each
of these conclusions. I discuss each in turn.
1. The Chaplicks
The first set of plaintiffs, Trevor and Vivian Chaplick, have for years been
embroiled in a dispute with the Fairfax County School Board and the Virginia Department
of Education over the educational opportunities afforded to their son, D.C. D.C. is an
educationally disabled student with myriad challenges, including autism, ADHD,
Tourette’s Syndrome, and an intellectual disability. The complaint indicates that D.C. has
difficulty controlling his aggressive outbursts, which have hospitalized himself and others
on multiple occasions. In 2008, Fairfax County established an IEP for D.C. that placed
him in a public school. On the advice of independent medical professionals, the Chaplicks
requested that Fairfax County reconsider the IEP and place D.C. in a residential education
facility. Fairfax County responded that D.C. was already receiving a FAPE in his current
setting. In 2015, the Chaplicks requested a hearing under the IDEA, and a due process
hearing officer rejected their claims. Fairfax County ultimately agreed to pay for a portion
of what the Chaplicks requested, and the Chaplicks declined to request another hearing for
that decision. At no point in the administrative process did the Chaplicks bring a broad-
scale challenge to hearing officers’ hiring, oversight, or decision making processes.
However, since the Chaplicks never pursued a hearing to consider D.C.’s most recent IEP,
the district court concluded that they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.
21 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 22 of 28
The IDEA authorizes judicial review of a due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i).
Aggrieved parents cannot move directly into court; they must first “exhaust[]” the
administrative processes provided by the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). There is no dispute
that the Chaplicks did not exhaust their administrative remedies. The only question is
whether their failure to exhaust their administrative remedies is excused by an exception
to the exhaustion requirement.
Several courts, including ours, have recognized exceptions to IDEA’s exhaustion
requirement: “(1) when the administrative process would have been futile; (2) when a
school board failed to give parents proper notification of their administrative rights; [and]
(3) when administrative exhaustion would have worked severe harm upon a disabled
child.” M.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Sch. Dist. Of Greenville Cnty., 303 F.3d 523, 536 (4th Cir.
2002). The administrative process is not futile where “the review officer . . . could have
granted . . . relief.” E.L. ex rel. Lorsson v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. of Educ., 773 F.3d
509, 516 (4th Cir. 2014). “The futility exception is particularly relevant in actions . . . that
allege systemic violations of the procedural rights accorded by IDEA.” Heldman ex rel.
T.H. v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 158–59 (2d Cir. 1992).
Several of our sister circuits have acknowledged that a claim of systemic procedural
failures is an inherently futile one to raise before a due process hearing officer. In Heldman,
the plaintiff alleged that New York’s procedure for selecting hearing officers violated
IDEA’s guarantee of due process. Id. at 152. Noting that none of the officers within the
administrative process had the authority to alter the challenged procedure, the Second
Circuit explained that “it would be an exercise in futility” to require the plaintiff to proceed
22 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 23 of 28
through the administrative channels. Id. at 159. The Second Circuit emphasized that the
policies underlying the exhaustion requirement—to allow agencies to bring its expertise to
bear without court interference—are not implicated when a plaintiff challenges the
structure of the proceedings, rather than an outcome. Id.
The Third Circuit reached the same conclusion. In D.M. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ.,
parents of a disabled child challenged the New Jersey Department of Education’s actions
that prevented the implementation of the child’s IEP. 801 F.3d 205, 209–210 (3d Cir. 2015).
The Third Circuit determined that neither the IDEA nor New Jersey law provided an
administrative process for a parent to challenge the action of the state agency; in other words,
the due process hearing officer would have been helpless to grant relief. Id. at 212. Since
“the administrative process would be unable to grant relief, . . . exhaustion of that process is
unnecessary.” Id.; see also Beth v. ex rel. Yvonne V. v. Carroll, 87 F.3d 80, 89 (3d Cir. 1996)
(“[P]laintiffs may thus be excused from the pursuit of administrative remedies where they
allege systemic legal deficiencies and, correspondingly, request system-wide relief that
cannot be provided (or even addressed) through the administrative process.”).
Our sister circuits are careful to distinguish claims of systemic failure, which need
not be exhausted through the administrative process, from substantive claims regarding
particular programs, which must first be considered through ordinary administrative
channels. For instance, when the purported IDEA violations are limited to a single facility,
these claims typically do “not rise to a truly systemic level in the sense that the IDEA’s
basic goals are threatened on a system-wide basis.” Hoeft v. Tuscon Unified Sch. Dist.,
967 F.2d 1298, 1305 (9th Cir. 1992). The First Circuit has indicated that the futility
23 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 24 of 28
exception applies only when “the challenged violation has the practical effect of denying
the plaintiffs a forum for their grievances, such as those that challenge the administrative
process itself.” Roe v. Healey, 78 F.4th 11, 26 (1st Cir. 2023). The Tenth Circuit has
similarly explained that the futility exception should be confined to cases “where plaintiffs
allege structural or systemic failure” or “assert violations of the IDEA’s due process
provisions.” Ass’n for Cmty. Living in Co. v. Romer, 992 F.2d 1040, 1044 (10th Cir. 1993)
(citing Heldman, 962 F.2d at 159).
In short, though they have formulated it with slight variation, every circuit to
consider the question has indicated that plaintiffs need not exhaust the IDEA procedures
when they allege systemic failure within the procedures themselves, particularly when the
IDEA procedures cannot provide the requested relief. The alternative is to require
plaintiffs to bring a claim of systemic injustice before the system itself, knowing that even
if the system were capable of identifying its own shortcomings, it would be powerless to
change them. But exhaustion does not mandate impotent procedures.
The Supreme Court recently embraced this principle in Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub.
Schs., 598 U.S. 142 (2023), decided after the district court issued its ruling on exhaustion.
There, the school system argued that the plaintiff had to exhaust his administrative
remedies before filing suit for compensatory damages—even though all parties agreed that
the requested damages could not have been granted through administrative processes. Id.
at 145–46. Luna Perez does not control directly; the Supreme Court emphasized that the
plaintiff brought suit under the ADA, not the IDEA, and expressly reserved the question
of whether a futility exception exists for the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. Id. at 151.
24 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 25 of 28
But since we are bound by our own prior recognition of a futility exception, we should
understand that exception in light of the Supreme Court’s conclusion that a plaintiff need
not exhaust the IDEA’s administrative processes “if the remedy a plaintiff seeks is not one
IDEA provides.” Id. at 150.
The complaint here falls precisely within the futility exception. Plaintiffs allege that
the hearing system, as currently operated, does not provide them a fair opportunity to
vindicate their due process rights under the IDEA, and they seek declaratory and injunctive
relief which would bring the system into compliance. They challenge the adequacy of the
very procedures that the majority would force them into, and they request relief that those
procedures cannot grant. As in Luna Perez, the question is “whether a plaintiff must
exhaust administrative processes under IDEA that cannot supply what he seeks.” Id. at
150. I would take the hint from our sister circuits and the Supreme Court and “answer in
the negative.” Id.
In my view, the majority minimizes and mischaracterizes the complaint. The
majority suggests that the Chaplicks should exhaust their administrative remedies with
respect to D.C.’s IEP, and if they feel that the hearing officer was biased against them, they
may raise that issue on review of the hearing officer’s decision. In the first instance, this
rule would categorically bar class-action lawsuits under the IDEA. See Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700 (1979) (“In the absence of a direct expression by Congress
of its intent to depart from the usual course of trying ‘all suits of a civil nature’ under the
Rules established for that purpose, class relief is appropriate in civil actions brought in
federal court . . . .”). More to the point, this is not the typical case of a parent challenging
25 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 26 of 28
their child’s IEP, or even an aggregation of parents challenging their children’s IEPs. The
gravamen of this complaint is that the fundamental injustices of the system prevent parents
from exercising their rights under the IDEA and dissuade parents from making costly,
doomed attempts to secure adequate education for their children. The claim which
challenges a pattern is fundamentally different from the claim which challenges one
interaction. As all parties seem to agree, the injunctive and declaratory relief sought by
these plaintiffs could not have been granted by any hearing officer.
The plaintiffs in Heldman and D.M. could have taken the path that the majority
prescribes here: tediously wind through hollow administrative proceedings until reaching
a court that had authority to grant the requested relief. But the Second and Third Circuits
acknowledged the absurdity of requiring plaintiffs to waste the hearing officer’s, the
state’s, and their own time in farcical hearings. I would have held that the Chaplicks satisfy
the futility exception to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement.
2. The Binghams
James and Sheila Bingham, parents of M.B., did exhaust their administrative
remedies, but the district court determined that a different federal lawsuit precluded the
Binghams from bringing a claim in this case. The Binghams challenged M.B.’s IEP before
a due process hearing officer, and when their claims were denied, they filed an administrative
appeal in federal district court requesting review of the hearing officer’s decision. While
that case was still active, the Binghams brought the suit that constitutes this case. The district
court below, comparing this case to the Binghams’s administrative appeal, determined that
26 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 27 of 28
“[b]oth cases seek to undo the hearing officer’s determination on M.B.’s IEP request,” and
dismissed the Binghams’s claims in this case as duplicative. J.A. 227.
For the same reasons I discussed above, the district court’s conclusion was incorrect.
If the Binghams were to prevail on their claims in this case, it would not undo M.B.’s IEP;
plaintiffs made clear that they seek only declaratory and injunctive relief for a purported
pattern of unlawful behavior. The Binghams’s other lawsuit, which alleged that M.B.’s
IEP violated his substantive rights under the IDEA, should not preclude their claims here
that the administrative process violated their procedural rights under the IDEA. See I.A.
Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat’l Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1551 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he general
rule is that a suit is duplicative of another suit if the parties, issues and available relief do
not significantly differ between the two actions.”). “[A] court abuses its discretion when
it enjoins a party from proceeding in another suit that is not truly duplicative of the suit
before it.” Smith v. SEC, 129 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 1997). As these suits raise entirely
distinct issues and proffer requests for different relief, I would hold that the district court
abused its discretion by dismissing the claims brought by the Binghams.
3. Hear Our Voices, Inc.
Hear Our Voices, Inc. (“HOV”) was established “to protect and advocate for the
rights of persons with disabilities.” J.A. 25. The Chaplicks, the Binghams, and other
residents of Virginia and Fairfax County are members of HOV. The district court
determined that HOV satisfied all requirements for an organization to bring suit on behalf
of its members, but held that HOV did not have standing as a prudential matter because it
could not identify any class members that were able to bring these claims on their own
27 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1854 Doc: 71 Filed: 03/19/2026 Pg: 28 of 28
behalf. The majority agreed that HOV lacked standing because it could not identify any
members with the right to pursue these claims. Maj. Op. at 15.
Since I concluded that the Chaplicks and the Binghams each had a right to pursue
these claims, I would have further held that HOV had standing to sue on behalf of its
members, which include the Chaplicks and the Binghams.
Plaintiffs’ allegations implicate the heart of the IDEA’s due process guarantees.
Even if an individual hearing officer were sympathetic to claims of systemic procedural
injustice—an impossibility, if the allegations in the complaint are accepted as true—that
hearing officer would have no authority to grant the declaratory and injunctive relief that
plaintiffs seek. Yet the majority holds that this double layer of futility does not qualify
these plaintiffs for the long-recognized “futility” exception to the IDEA’s exhaustion
requirements. I disagree, and therefore I respectfully dissent.