Justice PARRISH,
opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
T1 On certiorari, we must determine whether D.B., who was charged as a principal for theft and eriminal trespass, received adequate Sixth Amendment notice that he may be adjudicated delinquent as an accomplice for both charges.
12 The State of Utah filed a petition that charged D.B. as a principal with theft and criminal trespass for entering a construction site and removing a pair of bolt cutters. The juvenile court adjudicated D.B. delinquent as an accomplice on both counts. The court of appeals affirmed, and we accepted D.B.'s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. We hold that D.B. received constitutionally adequate notice through trial testimony that he faced accomplice liability for theft. But D.B. did not learn he faced accomplice liability for criminal trespass until the juvenile court announced its decision adjudicating him delinquent under that theory. And D.B. may challenge the criminal trespass judgment for the first time on appeal because he had no opportunity to object before the close of evidence and no obligation to raise his objection in a postjudgment motion. Because the juvenile court adjudicated D.B. delinquent as an accomplice for criminal trespass without notice, we reverse the delinquency adjudication on the criminal trespass charge, but affirm it on the theft charge.
BACKGROUND
1 3 On the morning of April 14, 2008, Jason Sessions called police to report that two persons were attempting to enter a fenced construction site. Two officers were dispatched to the site and, upon arrival, found two juveniles. D.B. was outside the fence and J.M. was inside. A pair of bolt cutters lay on the ground outside the fence.
4 The State filed a petition alleging that D.B. had committed theft and eriminal trespass.1 The charges were tried in a bench trial before the juvenile court. Four witnesses testified at trial. The first, Jason Sessions, testified that he observed D.B. and J.M. as they approached the fenced construction site. According to Mr. Sessions, one juvenile climbed the fence, entered the site, and tried to break into a trailer. Mr. Sessions identified D.B. as the juvenile who entered the site. He testified that the other juvenile remained outside the fence and that he "[alppeared to be nervous" and acted as a "watch-out."
15 The second witness was J.M. He testified that he and D.B. climbed the fence and entered the site together. According to J.M., onee they were inside, D.B. saw a pair of bolt cutters, threw them to J.M., and instructed J.M. to throw them over the fence. J.M. complied. J.M. testified that the juveniles then decided to exit the site. According to J.M., D.B. exited first and the police officers arrived before J.M. could exit.
T6 The third witness was former officer Marco Mihailovich. Officer Mikhailovich de-seribed that, when he arrived at the construction site, he found D.B. outside the fence and J.M. still inside of it. Officer Mihailovich also observed bolt cutters on the ground outside the fence. The fourth witness, Officer Steven Gowans, corroborated Officer Mihailovieh's testimony.
[463]*463T7 After the close of evidence, the State presented a simple closing argument, rooted in principal liability. The prosecutor argued that both juveniles climbed the fence and participated in removing the bolt cutters from the site.
T8 D.B.'s counsel also presented closing argument. He began by emphasizing Mr. Sessions's testimony that only one juvenile entered the site. Then he referenced the officers' testimony that, when they arrived at the site, D.B. was outside the fence and J.M. was inside of it,. D.B.'s counsel argued that D.B. never entered the site and asserted that the State had failed to present evidence that D.B. was ever in possession of the bolt cutters. D.B.'s counsel referenced and then dismissed as "pure speculation" Mr. Sessions's testimony that the juvenile standing outside the fence acted as a "watch-out."
T9 In rebuttal, the prosecution suggested for the first time that D.B. should be adjudicated delinquent as an accomplice. Specifically, the prosecutor adopted D.B.'s argument that he never entered the site and argued that "[nlo matter where [D.B.] was, it was clear, [Mr.] Sessions says he was a lookout." The prosecutor then contended that D.B. is "just as responsible for what his [clo-defendant does as if he committed that crime."
10 Following closing arguments, the juvenile court took the case under advisement. It announced a decision from the bench several weeks later, adjudicating D.B. delinquent as an accomplice to both theft and criminal trespass. D.B. did not object to the court's ruling or file any postjudgment motions challenging the judgment. Instead, he appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. The court of appeals heard D.B.'s appeal and issued a split opinion, with each member of the three-judge panel writing separately. D.B. v. State (State ex rel. D.B.), 2010 UT App 111, 231 P.3d 819. Judge Thorne authored the lead opinion. While he did not specifically articulate "the type of notice the [State) must give at trial," he did conclude that the trial in this case "included testimony that would support both principal and accomplice liability theories." Id. 118-9. Judge Thorne further concluded that D.B. failed to preserve his claim that he lacked adequate notice of the accomplice liability theory by objecting either during the State's closing argument, at the hearing where the juvenile court issued its decision, or through a post-judgment motion. Id. 119-10.
111 Judge Bench concurred in the result reached by Judge Thorne. He assumed, without deciding, that D.B. did not have fair notice of accomplice liability. Id. 118 (Bench, J., concurring). But he concluded that "absent a postjudgment motion requesting that the trial court determine whether D.B. had adequate notice of the accomplice liability theory," D.B. had failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Id. 117.
T 12 Judge Davis dissented. He criticized the lead opinion's characterization of the facts and determined that "[the evidence ... simply did not signal that the State was pursuing an accomplice liability theory of guilt." Id. 121 (Davis, J., dissenting). Because he concluded that D.B. was never on notice of the State's accomplice liability theory, Judge Davis reasoned that D.B. was under no obligation to raise an objection during closing or to object when the juvenile court issued its opinion some three weeks later. Id. 1129, 32. Finally, Judge Davis argued that a postjudgment motion is not generally necessary to preserve an issue for appeal. Id. 186. At the end of the day, the only holding that garnered a majority in the court of appeals was that the preservation rule required D.B. to file a postjudgment motion to preserve his claim that he lacked sufficient notice of the State's accomplice lability theory. Id. 1% 11, 17.
113 D.B. filed a Petition for Writ of Cer-tiorari with this court. We granted the petition to consider "(whether a majority of the panel of the court of appeals erred in affirming the juvenile court's judgment." We have jurisdiction pursuant to sections 78A-3-102(8)(a) and 78A-3-102(5) of the Utah Code.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{ 14 "On certiorari, we review [the] decision of the court of appeals for correctness. The correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court accurately [464]*464reviewed the [juvenile] court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." State v. Harding, 2011 UT 78, ¶ 7, 282 P.3d 31 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The appropriate standard of review for the Sixth Amendment issue raised in this case is correctness. See J.S. v. P.K. (In re I.K.), 2009 UT 70, ¶ 7, 220 P.3d 464.
ANALYSIS
1 15 On appeal, D.B. raises a constitutional claim that he lacked adequate notice that he may be held liable as an accomplice for theft and criminal trespass. D.B.'s appeal raises the preliminary issue of whether D.B. preserved his lack of notice claim for either theft or criminal trespass. We note that the notice and preservation claims are intertwined because D.B. would have no obligation to preserve a claim of which he received no notice. We turn first to the preservation issue.
I. D.B. MAY RAISE HIS LACK OF NOTICE CLAIM FOR CRIMINAL TRESPASS BECAUSE THAT ISSUE FIRST AROSE IN THE JUVENILE COURTS JUDGMENT, BUT HE FAILED TO PRESERVE A SIMILAR CLAIM FOR THEFT
T 16 D.B. argues that the preservation rule does not apply to his claim that he lacked notice of accomplice liability for theft or criminal trespass because "there was no issue to preserve during trial" and a post-judgment motion is insufficient to preserve an alleged error for appeal. The State responds that D.B. had several opportunities to preserve his lack of notice claim during and after trial In particular, the State claims that D.B. should have raised his notice claim either during the State's closing argument or several weeks later, when the juvenile court rendered its decision. Additionally, the State contends that D.B. could have preserved his notice claim by filing a post-judgment motion pursuant to rule 48(a) of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure.
117 Generally, "[aln issue is preserved for appeal when it has been presented to the [juvenile] court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on [it]." Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 12, 266 P.3d 828 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). To provide the court with this opportunity, "the issue must be specifically raised [by the party asserting error}, in a timely manner, and must be supported by evidence and relevant legal authority." - Donjuan v. McDermott, 2011 UT 72, ¶ 20, 266 P.3d 839. The general preservation rule yields to two exceptions.2 We have considered "matters not raised below under exeeptional cireumstances, or when plain error has occurred."3 } Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 13, 266 P.3d 828 (internal quotation marks omitted).
[18 We must evaluate whether D.B. preserved his claim that he lacked notice that he was facing the possibility of accomplice liability for both theft and criminal trespass. To do so, we analyze whether D.B. was obligated to preserve his claim either (A) during trial, (B) during closing arguments, (C) several weeks later when the juvenile court rendered its judgment, or (D) through a postjudgment motion.
119 We hold that J.M.'s trial testimony provided D.B. with notice that he faced accomplice liability for theft, but D.B. failed to object and preserve this issue. We also hold that because D.B. did not receive notice of the potential for accomplice liability for criminal trespass until issuance of the juvenile court's judgment, he had no opportunity or obligation to object, and he may appeal the [465]*465issue without first filing a postjudgment motion.
A. During Trial, D.B. Received Notice that He Faced Accomplice Liability For Theft and Failed to Object; He Did not, However, Receive Notice that He Faced Accomplice Liability For Criminal Trespass
20 The State charged D.B. as a principal with theft and criminal trespass. D.B. may, however, have learned that he also faced accomplice liability through the presentation of evidence at trial. Infro 145. A person is criminally liable as an accomplice if he "act[s] with the mental state required for the commission of an offense" and "solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense." Utan Cope § 76-2-202. We separately evaluate whether D.B. learned at trial that he faced accomplice liability for either theft or criminal trespass.
{21 The theft charge against D.B. stemmed from a pair of bolt cutters found outside the construction site. At trial, J.M. testified that D.B. found a pair of bolt cutters inside the site and told J.M. "[tlhrow these over the fence." J.M. resisted at first, and D.B. told him again, "[Jlust throw them over." J.M. testified that he followed D.B.'s instructions and threw the bolt cutters over the fence. J.M.'s testimony emphasized that it was D.B.'s idea to steal the bolt cutters. And J.M.'s testimony portrays D.B. as "request[ing]," "command[ing]," or "encour-agling]" J.M. to commit the offense of theft.4 See id. J.M.'s trial testimony thus alerted D.B. that he may face accomplice liability for theft, but D.B. failed to object and preserve his lack of notice claim for appeal.
1 22 The State's petition charged D.B. with eriminal trespass as a principal for entering the construction site. Mr. Sessions's testimony supported this theory of liability. He stated that D.B. entered the construction site while J.M. remained outside and acted as a "watch-out." J.M.'s testimony contradicted Mr. Sessions's, but still supported a theory of principal liability inasmuch as J.M. recounted that both he and D.B. entered the construction site. Testimony of the police officers did not contradiet the theory of principal liability. While the officers testified that they found D.B. outside the fence and J.M. inside it, they did not suggest that D.B. acted as an accomplice to J.M.'s criminal trespass. Indeed, the officers' testimony comports with J.M.'s testimony that D.B. was the first of the two juveniles to exit the site. In short, no evidence or testimony implicated D.B. as an accomplice for the criminal trespass charge..
4 23 A person is liable as a principal if he acts with the requisite mental state and "directly commits [an] offense." Urax Copz § 76-2-202. In contrast, a person is liable as an accomplice if he "solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense." Id. Mr. Sessions's testimony indicates that both juveniles "directly commit[ted an] offense." His testimony is not sufficient, however, to show that the juveniles "encourage[d]" and "intentionally aid[ed]" each other. While the dissent contends otherwise, we find the dissent's theory unworkable because it would dictate that a perpetrator who commits an offense with another would necessarily be liable as both a principal and an accomplice.5 But section 76-2-202 of the Utah Code requires conduct different from direct commission of an offense before a defendant incurs accomplice liability.
124 The juvenile court adjudicated D.B. delinquent as an accomplice for criminal trespass by discounting J.M.'s testimony as not credible and assuming that Mr. Sessions [466]*466transposed J.M.'s and D.B.'s roles in the trespass. This reconciled Mr. Sessions's testimony with the officers' testimony. But a party does not have an opportunity to raise and preserve an issue if he must first speculate that the trier of fact will disbelieve a witness's actual testimony and conclude that another witness meant something entirely different from what he said. Because no evidence implicated him as an accomplice for criminal trespass, D.B. had no opportunity to preserve his claim that he lacked notice of the theory.6
$25 In summary, D.B. had an opportunity, based on J.M.'s testimony, to object and preserve a claim that he lacked notice of accomplice liability for theft. D.B. failed to do so. He did not, however, have an opportunity to object and preserve a lack of notice claim with respect to the criminal trespass change because none of the testimony presented at trial suggested such a theory. Thus, we now consider whether D.B. was required to preserve his claim that he lacked notice of accomplice liability for criminal trespass during closing argument, when the juvenile court issued its judgment, or through a postjudgment motion.
B. The State Did not Raise Accomplice IAiability in Its Closing Rebuttal Argument
126 The State claims that its closing rebuttal argument put D.B. on notice that it was pursuing an accomplice liability theory of guilt,. D.B. replies that the State's rebuttal failed to provide notice that the State intended to pursue accomplice liability in addition to principal liability,. We hold that the State's vague allusion to accomplice liability in its rebuttal did not put D.B. on notice that it was pursuing accomplice liability on the criminal trespass charge.
1 27 When presenting its closing argument, the State offered a theory of guilt rooted in principal liability. The State recounted J.M.'s testimony that both he and D.B. entered the construction site. It then incorrectly stated that Mr. Sessions, the eyewitness, observed both D.B. and J.M. enter the construction site. In fact, Mr. Sessions had testified that only D.B. had entered the construction site.
128 D.B.'s counsel replied and offered his own interpretation of the testimony. He correctly noted that Mr. Sessions had seen only one of the juveniles enter the site. But he then argued that it was J.M., not D.B., who entered the site. To make this argument, D.B.'s counsel had to ignore both Mr. Sessions's and J.M.'s testimony that D.B. entered the construction site. D.B.'s counsel next addressed Mr. Sessions's testimony that the juvenile who remained outside the site appeared to be nervous and acted as a lookout. He argued that Mr. Sessions's testimony was "pure speculation" and that the juvenile who remained outside the fence may have been looking around and acting nervous due to discomfort with his friend's misdeeds, not because he was acting as a lookout.7
129 In its rebuttal, the State apologized for mischaracterizing Mr. Sessions's testimony. But instead of offering a correct statement of Mr. Sessions's testimony, the State argued "[nlo matter where [D.B.] was, it was [467]*467clear, [Mr.] Sessions says he was a lookout.... [Mr. Sessions] thought [D.B.] was a lookout, he was watching things, and so he's just as responsible for what his [clo-defen-dant does as if he committed that crime." The State did not specify which of J.M.'s charges D.B. was "just as responsible for." And the State's rebuttal directly contradicted Mr. Sessions's and J.M.'s trial testimony that D.B. entered the construction site.
€30 Because the State offered absolutely no evidence that D.B. acted as an accomplice to criminal trespass, its passing allusion in rebuttal argument to the notion that D.B. was "just as responsible for what his [clo-defendant does as if he committed that crime" did not provide D.B. with notice that he may be held liable as an accomplice to criminal trespass. Indeed, the State's presentation of evidence had focused only on principal lability for criminal trespass. Su-pro 1 28. Two of the four witnesses implicated D.B. as a principal, and testimony from the remaining two witnesses was inconclusive with respect to D.B.'s role as a principal or an accomplice.8 Supra 123. Based on this evidence, the State pursued a theory of principal Hability in its closing argument. It was not until rebuttal that the State, based on a mischaracterization of Mr. Sessions's testimony, hinted that D.B. should be generally liable as an accomplice. And the State's hint did not even specify for which charge D.B. may have acted as an accomplice. Where the State's trial evidence and its closing argument focused on principal liability for criminal trespass, the State's hint at accomplice liability generally in its rebuttal was insufficient to put D.B. on notice that the State intended to pursue accomplice liability on the criminal trespass charge.9 Because the State did not raise accomplice liability for criminal trespass during trial, D.B. had no opportunity to object to the theory.
31 Statements made by D.B.'s counsel at oral argument confirm that D.B. was not on notice of the State's accomplice liability theory for criminal trespass. At oral argument, D.B.'s counsel responded to a lengthy line of questioning that focused on the narrow issue of whether the State's rebuttal provided D.B. with notice of accomplice liability. In total, D.B.'s counsel responded to fifteen statements over the course of eight and one-half minutes.10 During the colloquy, D.B.'s counsel consistently and repeatedly maintained that he did not think the State intended to raise accomplice liability generally in its rebuttal. For instance, in response to the first question, he stated, "I don't think the prosecutor himself ... meant to argue accomplice liability." Then, near the end of his opening argument, D.B.'s counsel explained "I was not absolutely sure ... the prosecutor was arguing [accomplice liability]." And again, on rebuttal, he affirmed that "I was not absolutely sure that [the prosecutor] was going to argue or was arguing accomplice liability."11 D.B.'s counsel's comments do not [468]*468suggest that he knew the State was pursuing accomplice liability on the eriminal trespass charge.
{32 We thus hold that the State's vague and general allusion to accomplice liability in its rebuttal did not put D.B. on notice that the State was seeking to hold him liable as an accomplice on the criminal trespass charge. Statements made by D.B.'s counsel at oral argument confirm this. Therefore, D.B. did not need to preserve the issue for appeal.
C. D.B. Had no Obligation to Object and Preserve His Lack of Notice Claim When the Juvenile Court Issued Its Judgment
133 The State alternatively argues that D.B. had an obligation to object when the juvenile court issued its judgment adjudicating him delinquent as an accomplice on the criminal trespass charge. We disagree. Because accomplice liability arose for the first time in the juvenile court's judgment, D.B. had no obligation to object that he lacked notice of accomplice liability for criminal trespass to preserve that issue for appeal.
1834 Generally, we "will not consider an issue unless it has been preserved for appeal." Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 12, 266 P.3d 828. The general preservation rule "does not apply, however, when the alleged error first arises in the lower court's final order or judgment and thus, leaves no opportunity for the party to object below or to bring issues to the attention of the trial court." 12 Albores v. Bracamontes, 2006 UT App 204, ¶ 4, 138 P.3d 106; id. ¶¶ 6, 10 (considering the merits of petitioner's standing arguments, which were raised for the first time on appeal, because the district court sua sponte raised standing in its judgment and petitioner "did not have the opportunity to object"); see also Delatore v. Delatore, 680 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1984) (reaching the merits of appellant's attorney fees argument because respondent did not provide a proper evidentiary basis for the award, the trial court made the award in its final ruling, and "[the trial was then over and there was no opportunity for the defendant to object"); Shields v. Harris, 934 P.2d 653, 656 n. 1 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (addressing appellant's unpreserved arguments about the duration of an option contract because the term used by the trial court first appeared in the judgment and appellant "had no opportunity to object in the ordinary course of events"); 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 297 (2012) ("The rule that questions should be raised at the first opportunity, and that contentions must be [469]*469raised below in order to be available on appeal, does not apply where the question did not exist or could not be raised below.").
1 35 Here, D.B. received no notice that the State intended to pursue an accomplice liability theory for criminal trespass during trial or closing arguments. Supra ¶¶ 23-24, 32. Instead, D.B. first became aware of the accomplice liability theory on his criminal trespass charge when the trial court issued its judgment several weeks later and adjudicated him delinquent as an accomplice for both theft and criminal trespass. Because D.B. learned of accomplice liability for the criminal trespass charge for the first time in the juvenile court's judgment, he had no opportunity to object to the theory. Moreover, he had no obligation to preserve his lack of notice claim, and he may raise the claim for the first time on appeal.
D. DB. Did not Need to File a Post-judgment Motion to Preserve His Lack of Notice Claim Because He Became Entitled to an Appeal as of Right When the Juvenile Court Issued Its Final Judgment
136 D.B. asks that we review his lack of notice claim even though he did not file a postjudgment motion raising the claim. He reasons that a postjudgment motion is neither necessary nor sufficient to preserve an issue for appeal. The State disagrees, arguing rule 48(a) of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure permits D.B. to move for a new hearing pursuant to rules 52, 59, and 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The State asserts that, because D.B. could file a postjudgment motion, such as a motion for new trial, he had an obligation to file such a motion to preserve his claim for appeal. We hold that D.B. did not need to file a post-judgment motion as a prerequisite to filing his appeal. Rather, D.B. became entitled to appeal when the juvenile court issued its final judgment adjudicating him delinquent as an accomplice to criminal trespass.
137 Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure provides that, "[elxeept as otherwise provided by law, an appeal may be taken from the juvenile court to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment, order, or decree by filing a Notice of Appeal ... within 30 days after the entry of the judgment, order, or decree appealed from." Utax R. Juv. P. 52(a). Similarly, rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a party is entitled to an appeal as of right from "all final orders and judgments" of the juvenile court "by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the [juvenile] court within the time allowed by Rule 4 [of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure]." Urax R.App. P. 3(a). Rule 4 provides that, "in a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right{,] ... the notice of appeal ... shall be filed with the clerk of the [Juvenile] court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Id. 4(a). Rule 4 articulates several cireumstances that extend the time allowed for filing a notice of appeal,. Id. 4(b)(1). For instance, the thirty-day period may be extended by filing a motion for new trial pursuant to rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. 4(b)(1)(D). While a party may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal with rule 4, doing so does not affect the party's right to appeal the underlying judgment. See id. 4(b)(2) ("A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but before entry of an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b) ... is effective to appeal only from the underlying judgment." (emphasis added).13
138 In short, to file an appeal as of right, a party must complete two independent steps. First, a party must become entitled to appeal. A party may become entitled to an appeal under several circumstances, including when a juvenile court issues a final judgment. Second, a party must perfect its entitlement to appeal by filing a timely notice of appeal. While the time to complete step two may be extended by filing an elective postjudgment motion, the mere availability of postjudgment motions neither divests a party of its entitlement to appeal under step one, [470]*470nor makes the motions a prerequisite to filing an appeal.
139 Here, the juvenile court adjudicated D.B. delinquent as an accomplice for criminal trespass. The court's judgment provided D.B. with an entitlement to an appeal as of right. D.B. may permissibly raise his lack of notice claim on appeal, without preserving it because the trial court raised accomplice liability for eriminal trespass for the first time in its judgment and D.B. had no prior opportunity to object. Supra 134. To perfect his entitlement to appeal, D.B. only needed to file a timely notice of appeal, and he did so on September 25, 2008. The State fails to identify an exception "otherwise provided by law" that would prevent D.B. from exercising his entitlement. Thus, while D.B. could have tolled the time for filing a notice of appeal by submitting an elective postjudgment motion, he was not required to do so.14 And even if D.B. had filed a postjudgment motion, doing so would not have affected his entitlement to appeal the underlying judgment.
1 40 In summary, the juvenile court adjudicated D.B. delinquent as an accomplice for theft and criminal trespass. D.B. learned of the accomplice liability theory on the theft charge through J.M.'s trial testimony, but he failed to raise an objection and preserve for appeal his claim that he lacked notice of the theory. D.B. did not, however, receive notice either at trial, or through the State's vague comment in rebuttal argument, that he may be held liable as an accomplice on the criminal trespass charge. Instead, D.B. learned of the theory for the first time when the juvenile court adjudicated him delinquent as an accomplice for criminal trespass. He therefore had no obligation to object to the judgment to preserve his claim that he lacked notice of accomplice liability for erimi-nal trespass. Upon entry of judgment, D.B. became entitled to an appeal as of right and he did not need to file an elective post-judgment motion as a prerequisite to his appeal. We now turn to the merits of D.B.'s claim that he lacked constitutionally adequate notice that the State was seeking to hold him liable as an accomplice for criminal trespass.
II. D.B. DID NOT RECEIVE CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE NOTICE THAT HE MAY BE LIABLE AS AN ACCOMPLICE TO CRIMINAL TRESPASS PRIOR TO THE CLOSE OF EVIDENCE
41 D.B. argues that he lacked adequate notice of the State's accomplice liability theory because "the State did not present or pursue an accomplice liability theory during the presentation of the evidence and did not even address it in opening or closing arguments." The State argues that principal and accomplice liability do not represent separate offenses and that its petition alleging principal liability provided D.B. with adequate notice, standing alone, of the potential that he could be adjudicated delinquent under a theory of accomplice liability. The State also argues, in the alternative, that D.B. received [471]*471adequate notice of its accomplice liability theory through inferences from trial testimony and the State's closing rebuttal argument. We hold that D.B. did not receive constitutionally adequate notice of accomplice liability for eriminal trespass prior to the close of evidence.
142 The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "[iJn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." 15 The purpose of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee is to provide criminal defendants with the information necessary to "permit adequate preparation of a defense." Stephens v. Borg, 59 F.3d 982, 934 (9th Cir.1995); see also State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1214-15 (Utah 1987).
148 This case requires us to determine when a defendant charged as a principal has received adequate Sixth Amendment notice that he may be adjudicated delinquent as an accomplice. A person acts as an accomplice if he has "the mental state required for the commission of an offense" and "solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense." 202. "It is well settled that accomplices incur the same liability as principals." State v. Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, ¶ 12, 56 P.3d 969. As a result, "a person charged with a crime [as a principal] has adequate notice of the possibility of accomplice liability being raised at trial." Id. (emphasis added). But the question of what notice is constitutional-Utax Cop® § 76-2-ly sufficient before the State may actually pursue accomplice liability is an issue of first impression for this court.
$44 We find persuasive the rule adopted in Stephens, 59 F.3d at 934-35 and Commonwealth v. Harper, 442 Pa.Super. 553, 660 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa.Super.Ct.1995). Those courts held that the Sixth Amendment is satisfied when a defendant (1) receives adequate notice that the State is pursuing accomplice liability and (2) the State has not affirmatively misled the defendant.16 Harper, 660 A.2d at 599-600; see also Stephens, 59 F.3d at 934-35.
145 Charging an individual as a principal, standing alone, does not provide adequate notice that the State is actually pursuing an accomplice liability theory. But a defendant may receive constitutionally adequate notice that he is facing accomplice liability in several ways. The simplest way for the State to provide adequate notice is by actually charging the defendant as an accomplice. The state may also notify a defendant of potential accomplice liability through presentation of adequate evidence at any time prior to the close of evidence at trial.17 State v. Mancine, 124 N.J. 232, 590 A.2d 1107, 1120 (1991) (holding that defendant "must have learned of the possibility of a hired-gunman theory through pretrial discovery ... (or] his own testimony" (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Smith, 334 Pa.Super. 145, 482 A.2d 1124, 1127 (1984) (holding that defendant could be found guilty as an accomplice because he was initially scheduled to be tried jointly and he repeatedly "at[472]*472tempted to transfer eriminal responsibility to [his codefendant]" during trial).18 However, development of an accomplice liability theory after the close of evidence eliminates a defendant's ability to prepare his defense and present evidence relating to the accomplice liability theory.19 It therefore fails to provide constitutionally adequate notice.20
146 Here, the State charged D.B. as a principal with criminal trespass for entering the construction site. At trial, the testimony of both Mr. Sessions, the eyewitness, and J.M. supported principal liability. Supre 122. Testimony of the two police officers, the only other trial witnesses, did not suggest whether D.B. acted as a principal or an accomplice. Supra 122. In short, no evidence or testimony presented at trial implicated D.B. as an accomplice to criminal trespass.
1 47 The juvenile court nevertheless adjudicated D.B. delinquent as an accomplice for criminal trespass. It did so by discounting J.M.'s testimony as not credible and assuming that Mr. Sessions transposed J.M.'s and D.B.'s roles in the trespass. This reconciled Mr. Sessions's testimony with the officers' testimony that they found D.B. outside the site and J.M. inside of it. But a defendant does not receive constitutionally adequate notice if he must assume that the finder of fact will disbelieve witness testimony and speculate that the witness actually intended to testify to facts that would support a charge of accomplice liability.
148 The State also argues that D.B. received notice of accomplice liability for criminal trespass through its closing rebuttal argument. But notice provided after the close of evidence is not constitutionally sufficient. Moreover, we have already concluded that the State's passing allusion in its rebuttal did not notify D.B. that he faced accomplice liability for criminal trespass. Supra 132. Because D.B. did not receive constitutionally adequate notice that he may face accomplice liability for criminal trespass pri- or to the close of evidence, the juvenile court erred when it adjudicated him delinquent under that theory.
CONCLUSION
149 The Sixth Amendment requires the State to provide a defendant charged as a principal with adequate notice if the State also plans to pursue an accomplice liability theory. To do so, the State must either charge the defendant as an accomplice or present evidence of accomplice liability prior to the close of evidence at trial. Here, D.B. received notice of the accomplice liability theory on the theft charge through trial testimo[473]*473ny. He failed, however, to object to the accomplice liability theory and thus did not preserve his claim for appeal. In contrast, D.B. did not receive notice that the State was pursuing accomplice liability for the criminal trespass charge prior to the close of evidence. As a result, the juvenile court erred when it adjudicated D.B. delinquent for erim-inal trespass and D.B. was under no obligation to preserve the issue in the juvenile court where the accomplice liability theory first appeared in the court's judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court's judgment adjudicating D.B. delinquent as an accomplice to theft, but we reverse the judgment adjudicating him delinquent as an accomplice to criminal trespass and remand for a new trial on that issue.
Justice LEE filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice DURRANT joined.