D.B. v. County of Los Angeles
This text of D.B. v. County of Los Angeles (D.B. v. County of Los Angeles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 3 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
D.B. and D.C.B., by and through their No. 22-56065 Guardian ad Litem, Terri Thomas, and as successors in interest to the Estate of Darren D.C. No. Burley, 22-cv-04207-PA-JPR
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 14, 2023 Pasadena, California
Before: TASHIMA, WALLACH,** and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs D.B. and D.C.B. appeal the district court’s order dismissing their
First Amended Complaint (FAC) on the basis of claim preclusion. Because the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Evan J. Wallach, United States Senior Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation. parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Alston v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-
Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.), 958 F.3d 1239, 1252 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’d, 141 S. Ct.
2141 (2021), and we affirm.
1. Plaintiffs’ claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could have been
raised in the prior state court action (Burley I), including their claim asserting
municipal liability pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658 (1978). See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 731 (2009). Although the
Monell claim against the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) would
have likely been dismissed on the merits based on the California Supreme Court’s
ruling classifying sheriffs as state officers, the state court would have had
jurisdiction over this claim. See Pierce v. San Mateo Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 232
Cal. App. 4th 995, 1014–15 (2014). Accordingly, the exception to claim
preclusion based on “limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts”
does not apply here. Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 63 F.3d 863, 869
(9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(c)).
The district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are part
of the same cause of action as the claims asserted in Burley I. Federal courts are
required to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments by applying the state’s
2 preclusion doctrine. See Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 759 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.
1985) (citing Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-82
(1982)). Under California’s primary rights theory, a “claim arises from the harm
suffered, as opposed to the particular theory of the litigant,” so “[e]ven when
multiple legal theories for recovery exist, one injury gives rise to only one claim
for relief.” Id. In Burley I, Plaintiffs brought claims in both their individual
capacities for Darren Burley’s wrongful death, and in their representative
capacities on behalf of Burley’s estate for, inter alia, negligence and battery
suffered by Burley prior to his death. Plaintiffs’ Monell claim against the County
pleads a different theory of liability—the County’s “custom, policy, and practice”
that allegedly permitted the deputies’ unlawful conduct—but is based on these
same injuries. Because the harms suffered by Plaintiffs are the same as those
asserted in Burley I, the Monell claim is asserted under the same primary right and
is part of the same cause of action, and is therefore precluded.
2. The district court did not err in concluding that equitable factors did not
warrant an exception to claim preclusion here. The FAC does not plausibly allege
that Plaintiffs were unable to discover the existence of LASD gangs. To the
contrary, the record demonstrates that Plaintiffs had access to these facts at the
time of Burley I, as evidenced by Plaintiffs’ depositions of Deputy Aviles.
Similarly, Plaintiffs’ difficulty in recovering pre-death pain and suffering damages
3 in Burley I does not prevent the application of claim preclusion. Following this
court’s decision in Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2014),
Plaintiffs could have amended their complaint in Burley I to argue their entitlement
to such damages.
3. Finally, we deny as moot Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice of the
Proposed Judgment on Jury Verdict. The Proposed Judgment is not necessary to
identify the claims raised in Burley I, which the district court summarized in the
order appealed, and which appear in the Burley I complaint included in the
supplemental excerpts of records.
AFFIRMED.
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