Dayton Truck v. Crowe

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 20, 2026
• Docket: 25CA6
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Dayton Truck v. Crowe, 2026-Ohio-1948.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ROSS COUNTY

DAYTON TRUCK REPAIR AND : Case No. 25CA6 SERVICE, INC., : : Plaintiff-Appellee, : : v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT : ENTRY JOHN CROWE, et al., : : Defendants-Appellants. : RELEASED: 05/20/2026

________________________________________________________________ APPEARANCES:

Aaron M. McHenry, Chillicothe, Ohio for appellants.

Nadeem Quraishi, West Chester, Ohio, for appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Wilkin, J.

{¶1} This is an appeal by defendant-appellants John Crowe and Tonya

Coleman (“appellants”) from a Ross County Court of Common Pleas judgment

granting plaintiff-appellee Dayton Truck Repair and Service, Inc., (DTRS) a

default judgment. Appellants raise one assignment of error that asserts that the

trial court erred in granting default judgment as a discovery sanction.

{¶2} After our review of the record, the applicable law, and the parties’

briefs, we find that the trial court did not err in granting default judgment in favor

of DTRS. Accordingly, we overrule appellants’ sole assignment of error and

affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of DTSR.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Ross App. No. 25CA6 2

{¶3} On January 1, 2022, DTRS filed a 12-count complaint against four

defendants that included appellants alleging breach of contract, conversion,

unjust enrichment, usurpation of a business opportunity, breach of fiduciary duty,

fraud, and civil conspiracy. Defendants filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss

due DTRS’s failure to attach a copy of the signed contract underlining its action

to its complaint. The court granted DTRS leave to amend its complaint. On May

2, 2022, DTRS filed an amended complaint, which included the same four

defendants and 12 counts, along with a copy of the signed contract at issue.

{¶4} On October 3, 2022, defendants filed an answer and a counterclaim.

On October 12, 2022, the court issued a scheduling order that required discovery

to be completed by January 5, 2023. On that same day the case was sent to

mediation. Mediation was unsuccessful, but the parties did agree to complete

discovery by December 5, 2022.

{¶5} On December 21, 2022, DTRS filed a motion to compel discovery.

DTRS alleged that on November 7, 2022, it served discovery requests on

Defendants, including interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and

requests for admissions, with responses due December 5, 2022, but none were

timely received. DTSR argued that the discovery was relevant to claims,

damages, counterclaims, and defenses, and defendants’ nonproduction is

unreasonable and prejudices case preparation. DTRS further asserted that

appellants’ admissions were deemed admitted under Civ.R. 36(A)(1) because

more than 28 days elapsed without responses. Ross App. No. 25CA6 3

{¶6} On January 3, 2023, the trial court issued an entry granting DTRS’s

motion to compel discovery and DTSR’s motion to deem their requests for

admissions as admitted.

{¶7} On January 27, 2023, DTRS filed a motion for sanctions, which

included a request for default judgment against appellants. DTRS alleged that

aside from a few records, appellants had failed to comply with any of DTRS’s

other discovery requests.

{¶8} On March 10, 2023, the trial court granted DTRS’s motion for

sanctions and rendered a default judgment against appellants. The court found

that appellants “have completely ignored [DTSR’s] Requests for Discovery (with

the exception of some very limited financial documents by [appellant] Crowe.”

{¶9} On May 9, 2023, appellants filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from

the default judgment. In part, the motion alleged that the trial court erred in

granting DTRS a default judgment without giving appellants proper notice as

required by the Ohio Civil Rules of Procedure.

{¶10} On June 30, 2023, the trial court granted appellants relief from the

default judgment. The court reasoned that because defendants had made an

appearance in this case, the law required the court to give them notice before

entering the default judgment. The court then set a hearing for October 20,

2023, to consider sanctions against the appellants due to their failure to comply

with DTRS’s discovery requests.

{¶11} At the October hearing, counsel for DTRS reviewed the timeline of

the case, including appellants’ failure to provide discovery through the date of the Ross App. No. 25CA6 4

hearing. Counsel maintained that appellants had raised no meritorious defense

to DTRS’s claims. He also asserted that appellants have provided no

explanation for their failure to respond to DTRS’s discovery requests and that

rises to the level of excusable neglect. He claimed that appellants did not act in

good faith by failing to respond to DTRS’s discovery requests.

{¶12} Counsel for appellants stated: “we’re [ ] not here to make excuses.

It just – it didn’t get done in a timely fashion. It just didn’t get done.” Given the

amount of damages DTRS is seeking, counsel argued that deeming DTRS’s

requests for admission admitted is a more appropriate sanction than a default

judgment.

{¶13} On October 23, 2023, the court issued an entry finding that

appellants failed to respond to discovery, ignored the court’s entry ordering

appellants to comply, and provided no adequate excuse at the sanctions hearing.

Even after the trial court vacated the earlier default judgment for lack of proper

notice, the appellants still provided no discovery in the ensuing four months.

Thus, the trial court found the appellants willfully and in bad faith failed to comply

with the discovery orders. The court ordered the factual allegations in DTSR’s

amended complaint as established for purposes of this action and further

rendered a default judgment against appellants

{¶14} On November 8, 2024, the court held a damages hearing. DTRS

presented a single witness, who was the treasurer for DTRS, as well as several

exhibits. The witness testified to various vehicles that were purported to be part

of a business deal in support of its damages claim. Ross App. No. 25CA6 5

{¶15} On January 16, 2025, the court issued a final judgment accepting

DTRS’s proposed vehicle valuation, holding Crowe liable to DTRS for $254,750

and Crowe and Coleman jointly and severally liable to DTRS for $140,043. It is

this judgment that appellants appeal.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

{¶16} Appellants contend the trial court erred in granting the DTRS's

motion for default judgment. The appellants argue that the trial court should have

considered less severe sanctions for discovery violations because default

judgment is a harsh sanction that should be reserved for cases of willfulness or

bad faith. Appellants maintain that their conduct did not demonstrate a total

disregard for the judicial system or bad faith, as they were actively involved in the

case and made efforts to comply with discovery requests. Appellants point out

that DTRS’s discovery requests were “voluminous[,]” that they provided some

documents to DTRS, that they were “continuing to collect the additional

documentation when the trial court granted default judgment[,]” and that they

“later accumulated much of the requested information.”

{¶17} Additionally, appellants argue that the trial court should have

considered the proportionality of the sanctions and the amount of money at issue

before granting default judgment.

{¶18} Therefore, appellants assert that because there is no evidence

appellants acted in bad faith in responding to DTRS’s discovery requests and

because the judgment involved a substantial sum of money, this court should find Ross App. No. 25CA6 6

that the trial court abused its discretion in granting judgment to DTRS and

reverse the judgment.

{¶19} DTRS argues that under Civ.R. 37(D), a trial court has discretion to

impose sanctions for discovery violations, including default judgment, if a party

fails to respond to discovery requests. Appellants neither objected to DTRS’s

discovery requests nor provided responses by the court-imposed deadline, nor

did they request an extension. Even after the court granted DTRS’s motion to

compel discovery and up and until the damages hearing, appellants still failed to

object, provide discovery or request an extension. DTRS maintains that these

sustained failures support that appellants’ actions were willful or in bad faith.

{¶20} Because appellants’ discovery failures were willful and in bad faith,

DTRS asserts that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting default

judgment in its favor. Therefore, DTRS maintains this court should overrule

appellants’ assignment of error.

A. Law

{¶21} Civ.R. 37(B)(1)(f) permits a court to issue a default judgment against

a party who fails to provide discovery. “It is the general rule that the imposition of

sanctions under Civ.R. 37(B) is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial

court and will not be set aside absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.” Hall

v. Mainous, 2000 WL 1206609, *2 (4th Dist. Aug. 18, 2000), citing Ward v.

Hester, 32 Ohio App.2d 121 (3rd Dist. 1972). An “[a]buse of discretion” suggests

unreasonableness, arbitrariness, or unconscionability. State v. Grate, 2020-

Ohio-5584, ¶ 187. “ ‘It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to grant a default Ross App. No. 25CA6 7

judgment for failing to respond to discovery requests when the record does not

show willfulness or bad faith on the part of the responding party.’ ” State ex rel.

Dispatch Printing Co. v. Johnson, 2005-Ohio-4384, ¶ 49, quoting Toney v.

Berkemer, 6 Ohio St.3d 455, syllabus (1983). “Review for an abuse of discretion,

therefore, does not permit a superior court to substitute its judgment for the trial

court's.” Davis v. McGuffey, 2022-Ohio-2163, ¶ 12.

B. Analysis

{¶22} Our review of the record indicates that from November 7, 2022,

when DTRS served its discovery requests on the appellants, until the court

issued a default judgment in favor of DTRS on October 25, 2023, the appellants,

with few exceptions, failed to provide the requested discovery, did not object to

any requests, and did not seek an extension. During this period, several key

events occurred: (1) an agreed December 12, 2022, discovery deadline passed;

(2) a court-imposed January 5, 2023 discovery deadline passed; (3) the court

issued an order compelling compliance with discovery on January 3, 2023; (4)

the court granted DTRS’s motion for sanctions and issued a default judgment on

March 10, 2023, which was vacated on June 20, 2023; and (5) on October 20,

2023, the trial court held a hearing on DTRS’s motion for sanctions, and on

October 25, 2023, the trial court again granted DTRS’s motion for sanctions and

issued a default judgment against the appellants for their failure to comply with

discovery. Despite the agreed-upon timelines, court-imposed deadlines, their

awareness of the potential for default judgment (which was entered and later Ross App. No. 25CA6 8

vacated), and the additional time given to respond after the vacatur, appellants

still failed to provide discovery responses.

{¶23} Appellants claim that DTRS’s discovery requests were

“voluminous[,]” they (appellants) provided some requested documents, and “later

accumulated much of the requested information.” Appellants further argue that

DTRS failed to meet its burden that appellants acted in bad faith.

{¶24} In Huntington Natl. Bank v. Zeune, the Tenth District Court of

Appeals recognized that a trial court “need not use any particular ‘magic words’

when granting default judgment, as long as the record substantiates willful

inaction or bad faith.” 2009-Ohio-3482, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.), citing Ohio Bar Liability

Ins. Co. v. Silverman, 2006-Ohio-3016, ¶ 15. The appellants essentially argue

that DTRS’s discovery request was too extensive to address in a timely manner.

However, they fail to specify what the “voluminous” discovery request entailed.

Was it 50 documents, 500 documents, or more? Were they difficult to acquire,

and, if so, why? Yet, appellants never sought an extension of the discovery

deadline despite various deadlines passing and a court order compelling

compliance. Under these particular facts, we conclude that the appellants acted

in bad faith and willfully failed to comply with DTRS’s discovery requests.

{¶25} Relying on our decision in Lankford v. Weller, 2023-Ohio-430 (4th

Dist.), appellants also argue that the default judgment issued against them

should be reversed because it involves a large sum of money, so default is

inappropriate. In Lankford, we considered whether the trial court abused its Ross App. No. 25CA6 9

discretion in vacating a default judgment pursuant to the appellant’s Civ.R.

60(B)(1) motion for relief.

{¶26} To prevail on a Civ.R.60(B)(1) motion for relief from a judgment, the

movant must demonstrate (1) a meritorious defense, (2) excusable neglect and

(3) the motion was filed in a reasonable time. Id. at ¶ 26, 31. In Lankford, relying

on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Colley v. Bazell, we recognized that in

determining whether neglect is excusable courts must “ ‘ consider all the facts

and circumstances,’ ” which we found included the amount of the judgment. Id.

at ¶ 60, quoting Colly v. Bazell, 64 Ohio St.2d 243, 249. We further found “that

based on the extremely large amount of the judgment [$2.9 million] . . . and that .

. . [appellant’s] actions were not intentional there is a ‘sound reasoning process’

that would support the trial court's judgment.” (Emphasis added) Id. at ¶ 64. We

continued, “the evidence does not appear to indicate that [appellant’s son]

intentionally threw away the complaint, or otherwise intentionally failed to deliver

it to [appellant], which would have been a ‘complete disregard for the judicial

system,’ making his neglect inexcusable.” Id. at ¶ 65. Thus, essentially relying

on the large amount of the default judgment and that the movant did not act in

bad faith, we concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting

appellant’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from the default judgment levied against

him.

{¶27} While the default judgement in the instant case is certainly

substantial, it is not nearly as large as the $2.9 million default judgment in

Lankford. However, more important to our analysis is that, unlike in Lankford, we Ross App. No. 25CA6 10

found appellants herein acted willfully and in bad faith by not complying with

DTRS’s requests for discovery, showing complete disregard for the judicial

system. In light of this, we find that Lankford’s recognition that default judgment

may not be appropriate when large sums are involved is not persuasive in

demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion in granting DTRS default

C. Conclusion

{¶28} Because the evidence indicates that appellants’ failure to comply

with DTRS’s discovery request was willful and in bad faith, we find that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in granting a default judgment in favor of DTRS

as a sanction for that failure. See Foley v. Nussbaum, 2011-Ohio-6701, ¶ 35 (2d

Dist.) (Held that the trial court’s harsh sanction of dismissing the plaintiff’s

complaint for his failure to comply with defendant’s discovery was not an abuse

of discretion where the plaintiff’s failure was “motivated by his willfulness,

irresponsibility, or bad faith.”). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Ross App. No. 25CA6 11

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that the appellants shall pay the costs.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Abele, J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,

BY: ____________________________ Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.