Dayton Coal & Iron Co. v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co.

239 U.S. 446, 36 S. Ct. 137, 60 L. Ed. 375, 1915 U.S. LEXIS 1436
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedDecember 20, 1915
Docket81
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 239 U.S. 446 (Dayton Coal & Iron Co. v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dayton Coal & Iron Co. v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co., 239 U.S. 446, 36 S. Ct. 137, 60 L. Ed. 375, 1915 U.S. LEXIS 1436 (1915).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Day

delivered the opinion of the court.

The Dáyton Coal and Iron Company, Limited, hereinafter called the Dayton Company, filed its bill in the Chancery Court at Chattanooga, Tennessee, seeking to enjoin the Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company, generally known as, and hereinafter called, the Southern Railway, from prosecuting a certain suit in the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of Ohio, brought by the Southern Railway against the Dayton Company tcf recover upon certain shipments of iron ore which it was alleged had been shipped, at a tariff of 70 cents per ton, being 10 cents more per ton than the Dayton Company contended was the true rate on such shipments. The difference amounted to $4,933.08, for which sum the Federal suit was brought.

The shipments of iron ore were made from Cartersville,. and other points in Georgia, to Dayton, Tennessee, the Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway Company, operating the Western and Atlantic Railroad Company, being the initial carrier. The bill averred that the Dayton Company had a defense against the action in the Federal Court, partly legal and partly equitable, and that the *448 Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Company and the.Western and Atlantic Railroad Company were necessary and proper parties to the determination of the controversy and were not within the jurisdiction of the Federal court. It was further charged that t,he freight contract was binding upon all the parties for 60 cents per ton, and that each and all of the defendants were bound by that rate.

The Southern Railway answered, setting up, among other things, that, according to the requirements of the Federal Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended in 1906, the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway duly filed and published a schedule known as “Tariff I. C. C. # 1351A,” showing the joint rate for the transportation of iron ore from Gartersville, Georgia, and nearby points, to Dayton, Tennessee, to be 70 cents a ton, and that that tariff became effective on March 5,. 1907; that the Southern Railway was named as one of the parties to this joint tariff, and it and the other defendants were bound by it and prohibited by law from charging more or less than the tariff named and filed; that after the tariff went into effect on March 5, 1907, the Southern Railway billed to the Dayton Company iron ore shipped from Carters-ville, Georgia, and from Emerson and Rogers, Georgia, to Dayton, Tennessee, covered by the through tariff rate, filed as aforesaid, at the rate of 70 cents per ton, and insisted and still insists upon the payment of that rate; that the Dayton Company, insisting that the rate was 10 cents over the legal rate, had settled its freight bills monthly, making a deduction of 10 cents by an arrangement with the Southern Company; that the Dayton Company refused to pay this difference, and therefore the suit was brought in the United States' Circuit Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and that before answering in that suit complainant had filed the present bill, though the suit in the United States Court was still pending and *449 undetermined. The other railroad companies defendants also filed an answer, making like allegations as to the making and filing of the 70-cent rate, effective March 5, 1907.

The Southern Railway filed a cross-bill, in which it again set up the alleged legal effect of the filing of the 70-cent rate to take effect on March 5, 1907, averring that it had paid the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Company its proportion of said rate, and that the difference between the 60- and 70-cent, rate -was due to it from the Dayton Company, and asked that'it be given judgment upon its - cross-bill against that company on that account for the sum of $4,933.08, or, if it should be determined that it was not entitled thereto, because of the illegality of the published rate, made and insisted upon by the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Company, that it have judgment for that amount against its co-defendant, the Nashville; Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Company. Answers were filed to this cross-bill.

Upon hearing, the Chancery Court determined the case in favor of the complainant, holding that the 70-cent rate was illegal, inequitable, and unenforceable, and that the complainant was entitled to the 60-cent rate, as contended for by it; and enjoined the Southern Railway from prosecuting its suit in the Federal court except for certain items not included in the controversy about the rates, and held that upon the cross-bill the Southern Railway was entitled to recover from the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Company the 10 cents per ton which the latter company had received because of ore shipped by complainant from Cartersville and other southern points to Dayton, Tennessee, under color and by reason of the 70-cent rate. Upon appeal the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the decree of the Chancery Court, and held that the 70-cent rate was *450 the legál rate in forcé from and after March 5, 1907, and that if it had jurisdiction to determine the case it would so decide. For reasons set forth in its opinion, however, it reached the conclusion that, because of the acts of Congress concerning the Interstate Commerce. Commission, there was no jurisdiction to entertain the original bill, and that it and the cross-bill must be dismissed. It is to reverse this decision that the writ of error in this case was sued out.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee is, of course, the ultimate judge of the extent of its jurisdiction, and unless a denial of Federal rights is involved, its decision upon that subject is final and conclusive. From what we have already said, however, it is apparent that the real Federal question involved in this controversy concerns the right of the Southern Railway to enforce the 70-cent rate on the shipments of iron ore from Cartersville and other points in Georgia to Dayton, Tennessee. Upon this point the Supreme Court reached the conclusion that the 70-cent rate was the only legal rate in force at the time of the shipments; that it was filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission on February 2, 1907, to take effect on March 5, 1907; that it was thus filed by the Nashville, Chattanooga & St: Louis Railway Company ' and- duly received and stamped by the Southern Railway as the connecting carrier; and that the last-named railroad concurred in the tariff by receiving freight under that schedule and making settlements under it. This made the rate a joint one, in accordance with the rulings of the Interstate Commerce Commission at that time, and under the Interstate Commerce Act there could be no departure from this published rate.

Our examination of. the record satisfies us, Kansas Southern Ry. v. Albers, 223 U. S. 573, that upon this question of the legal effect of the filed tariffs and the consequent • establishment of the 70-cent rate the Supreme *451 Court of Tennessee was clearly right. It appears tha,t the 70-cent rate was duly filed 'by the Nashville, Chattanooga & St.

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239 U.S. 446, 36 S. Ct. 137, 60 L. Ed. 375, 1915 U.S. LEXIS 1436, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dayton-coal-iron-co-v-cincinnati-new-orleans-texas-pacific-railway-scotus-1915.