Dayal v. County of Kern

District Court, E.D. California·Decided June 11, 2025·No. 1:24-cv-00039·Unknown

Opinion

NISHI DAYAL, Case No. 1:24-cv-00039-JLT-CDB

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART v. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL

COUNTY OF KERN, et al., (Docs. 64, 65)

Defendants. 14-Day Deadline

Pending before the Court is the motion brought pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by Defendant County of Kern to compel Plaintiff Nishi Dayal to provide “further responses” to three of Defendant Kern County District Attorney’s Office’s requests for production of documents. (Docs 64, 65).1 Plaintiff filed an opposition on June 6, 2025. (Doc. 66). Background Plaintiff, formerly employed as a Deputy District Attorney by Defendant Kern County District Attorney’s Office (“DA’s Office”) between January 6, 2020, and December 9, 2022,

1 Although counsel filing the motion presently represents only Defendant County of Kern, she asserts that the motion is brought also by, in one instance, the Kern County District Attorney’s Office (see Doc. 64-1 at 1), and in another instance, all other Defendants (see Doc. 64 at 2 & n.1). Regardless, the only subject of the present motion to compel is certain of the requests for production of documents propounded by Defendant Kern County District Attorney’s Office. initiated this action with the filing of a complaint on January 8, 2024. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 33). In addition to the DA’s Office, Plaintiff names as defendants the County of Kern, four supervisory attorneys employed by the DA’s Office during Plaintiff’s tenure, and unnamed Doe defendants. Plaintiff asserts claims based on disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), including related claims of failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in a good faith interactive process, and disparate treatment discrimination. She also asserts claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and FEHA for religious discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, and related claims for hostile work environment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff alleges that she is disabled under the ADA “as a result of fibromyalgia which causes her chronic conditions including extreme back pain which limits her mobility, pain with prolonged sitting related to driving long distances, and difficulty getting up in the morning.” (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 34, 58). She alleges that her disability “requires work/activity restrictions whereas she is unable to wear constructive leg wear such as stockings or footwear such as heels that cause flare ups in her medical conditions.” Id. Plaintiff alleges she “became a target for Defendants” following an incident in June 2020 when certain of Defendants criticized her for her social media posts in which she expressed opinions opposed by Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions reflect that she was a target for discrimination because Defendants allowed other employees to fundraise at work by selling “blue lives matter” flags. Id. ¶ 38. Plaintiff alleges that she initially was granted accommodations for her disability, to include being excused from wearing pantihose and permitted to wear accommodating footwear, but that over time, Defendants criticized her and ultimately relocated her worksite to a more distant office in retaliation for her accommodations. Id. ¶ 39, 41-42, 44, 59. Plaintiff alleges that, upon her office transfer, she raised concerns to her supervisors that the transfer would double her commute time and thereby aggravate her medical condition because of the long periods of time in her car. Id. ¶ 44. She thereafter “continued to verbally request accommodations for her medical disability that was exacerbated by the longer commute and earlier start time,” but that certain of Defendants “ignored the requests and repeatedly reprimanded her for being late.” Id. ¶ 46. Separately, Plaintiff alleges that certain Defendants retaliated and discriminated against her when she appeared at work with Mehndi on her palms as an expression of her Hindu faith. Id. ¶ 40. Plaintiff asserts these Defendants intimidated and embarrassed her because of the Mehndi on her palms and prevented her from doing her job. Id. ¶¶ 80-82, 93-95, 185-87. Ultimately, Plaintiff resigned from the DA’s Office and sought to pursue a conditional job offer from the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office. Id. ¶ 48. Plaintiff alleges that the DA’s Office unlawfully changed her status to “paid administrative leave” “in furtherance of a continued retaliation, discrimination and harassment experienced by Ms. Dayal due to her religion, race and disability, and since her complaints to Kern County DA related to her disability and requested accommodations, in an intentional effort to cause Ms. Dayal shame, embarrassment, and great emotional distress.” Id. ¶¶ 48-50. Plaintiff alleges that the conditional job offer was rescinded after Defendants contacted the Riverside County District Attorney’s office “and issued disparaging statements concerning Ms. Dayal’s employment, intentionally trying to sabotage and interfere with her future employment.” Id. ¶ 52. Governing Legal Standard Rule 26 provides that a party “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Information need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. See, e.g., Ford v. Unknown, No. 2:21-cv-00088-DMG-MAR, 2023 WL 6194282, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2023). “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Although relevance is broadly defined, it does have “ultimate and necessary boundaries.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1978). Relevant here, if a party responding to a Rule 34 request for production of documents fails to comply with the request, the propounding party may seek relief from court through a motion to compel pursuant to Rule 37. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iv). “[T]he party moving to compel bears the burden of demonstrating why the [responding party’s] objections are not justified.” Harris v. Quillen, No. 1:17-cv-01370-DAD-SAB (PC), 2020 WL 4251069, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2020) (citing cases). “This requires the moving party to inform the Court which discovery requests are the subject of the motion to compel, and, for each disputed response, why the information sought is relevant and why the responding party’s objections are not meritorious.” Id. “The party who resists discovery has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objection.” Jadwin v. Cnty. Of Kern, No. 1:07-cv-0026-OWW-TAG, 2008 WL 2025093, *1 (E.D. Cal. May 9, 2008) (quotation and citations omitted). Discussion Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s responses to three of Defendants’ requests for

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