Day v. Tenneco, Inc.

696 F. Supp. 233, 103 Oil & Gas Rep. 250, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11271, 1988 WL 103453
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Mississippi
DecidedSeptember 2, 1988
DocketCiv. A. J85-1101(B)
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 696 F. Supp. 233 (Day v. Tenneco, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Day v. Tenneco, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 233, 103 Oil & Gas Rep. 250, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11271, 1988 WL 103453 (S.D. Miss. 1988).

Opinion

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BARBOUR, District Judge.

Clarence Day requests the entry of a partial summary judgment establishing the liability of Tenneco, Inc. and Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company (Tennessee) 1 for breach of seven gas purchase agreements. Tennessee admits that the contracts are in force and that the contracts contain take- or-pay clauses; however, Tennessee raises several affirmative defenses to payment. The question before the Court is whether any of these defenses establishes issues of fact for trial. The Court holds that Tennessee has not established genuine issues of material fact regarding the defenses and that Day is entitled as a matter of law to a finding that the take-or-pay clauses are enforceable.

Day and Tennessee entered into seven separate gas purchase agreements between 1979 and 1984. Under TGP Contract Nos. 863, 940, 1173, 1172 and 1012, Tennessee is obligated to pay for gas at a base price set forth in the contracts with monthly escalations after a specified date. Under TGP Contract Nos. 719 and 1351, Tennessee is obligated to pay for gas at a base price subject to price redetermination made in accordance with the pricing alternatives contained in the terms of the contract.

Tennessee admits that the contracts contain price and take-or-pay provisions. Take-or-pay provisions are standard clauses obligating the pipeline to either take gas or pay for gas tendered for delivery but not taken. The clauses generally grant the pipelines a period of five years to take the gas paid for under the clause. Such clauses have been recognized as common to the gas industry and enforceable:

The purpose of the take-or-pay clause is to apportion the risk of natural gas production and sales between the buyer and seller. The seller bears the risk of production. To compensate seller for that risk, buyer agreed to take, or pay for if not taken, a minimum quantity of gas. The buyer bears the risk of market demand. The take-or-pay clause insures that if the demand for gas goes down, seller will still receive the price for the Contract Quantity delivered each year.
The definition of makeup gas contemplates that the buyer may pay twice for the same gas and that the buyer may never receive gas for which he has already paid.

Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 813 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir.1987).

Tennessee does not question the enforceability of take-or-pay provisions in ordinary circumstances. Tennessee asserts, however, that recent changes in the market for natural gas have been so dramatic and unexpected that the take-or-pay clauses in Day’s contracts should not be enforceable. Tennessee offers voluminous evidence to show that the unexpected collapse in oil and gas prices and certain changes in federal regulations regarding the sale of gas to consumers combine to make the take-or-pay clauses unfair. The facts which Ten *235 nessee offers to prove may be summarized as follows:

During the late 1970’s, there was a severe shortage of natural gas in the United States. The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 was enacted in response to the crisis, to deregulate the gas market, and to encourage new production of gas. It was generally assumed at the time that the demand for and the price of gas would remain constant or rise throughout the century. To satisfy the demand for gas, Tennessee and other pipelines began to compete for the purchase of the deregulated, high-cost gas which was beginning to come onto the market. Since demand remained higher than supply, pipelines had to accept producers’ terms, and producers demanded contracts with take-or-pay clauses and guaranteed prices. Although some contracts negotiated before 1982 contained market-out clauses, most did not. Pipelines accepted the obligation to purchase high-cost gas on the theory that such contracts, when averaged with older contracts for gas bought at lower, regulated prices, would supply the market demand for gas at a competitive cost. In the winter of 1982-83, however, the market for natural gas began to weaken because of an unseasonably warm winter and an unexpected decline in oil prices worldwide. The availability of cheaper fuel oil cut the demand for natural gas. In the summer of 1984 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order 380 which relieved pipeline customers of minimum bill obligations, further reducing demand. After the winter of 1984-85, natural gas customers who had been freed from purchase obligations by Order 380 began changing suppliers to acquire cheaper gas. In 1985 FERC executed Order 436 which required pipelines to transport gas from any source to customers on demand. The combination of a collapse in demand and deregulation rendered unmarketable the high priced gas purchased by Tennessee under its contracts with Day.

Tennessee argues that the combination of dramatic collapse in demand for natural gas and deregulation was a risk which was beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time contracts were entered with Day and that their losses on the contracts stand to be so great that they are unfair. Tennessee argues that its performance under the contracts is excused under one or more of the following theories: (1) force maj-eure, (2) commercial impracticability, (3) mutual mistake, (4) public policy. The Court is of the opinion, however, that none of these defenses is available on the evidence offered by Tennessee and that Day is, accordingly, entitled to partial summary judgment against Tennessee regarding these defenses.

FORCE MAJEURE

Defendants assert that they are entitled to a trial on the issue of force majeure as a defense to the contract. Tennessee bases its defenses on (A) the express language in the contract and (B) Mississippi’s force majeure statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 75-2-617 (1972). The contracts themselves contain force majeure clauses which Defendants argue are broader than the statute. These clauses excuse non-performance caused by, among other things, acts of government “when any such Act of Governments directly or indirectly contributes in either party’s inability to perform its obligations.... ” The Mississippi force majeure statute excuses non-performance caused by “Acts of God, or riots, fire, explosion ... inability to obtain ... transportation ... or any cause beyond the control of such party_” Miss.Code Ann. § 75-2-617. The Court is of the opinion, however, that the market collapse and changes in regulation described by Defendants, which occurred over a period of three years from 1982-1985, are not within the meaning of the force majeure provisions either of the contracts or the Mississippi statutes. 2

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Bluebook (online)
696 F. Supp. 233, 103 Oil & Gas Rep. 250, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11271, 1988 WL 103453, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/day-v-tenneco-inc-mssd-1988.