Day v. Marthakis

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedSeptember 10, 2024
Docket3:22-cv-00728
StatusUnknown

This text of Day v. Marthakis (Day v. Marthakis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Day v. Marthakis, (N.D. Ind. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

COREY DAY,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:22-CV-728-JD

NANCY MARTHAKIS, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER Corey Day, a prisoner without a lawyer, is proceeding in this case on two claims. First, he is proceeding against Warden Ron Neal “in his official capacity for injunctive relief related to his ongoing need for constitutionally adequate medical care for lung problems as required by the Eighth Amendment[.]” ECF 5 at 8. Second, he is proceeding against Dr. Nancy Marthakis, Nurse Sherri Fritter, Nurse Brandy Kirk, Nurse Diane Thews, and Nurse Todd Wilford (the “medical defendants”) “in their personal capacities for damages for deliberate indifference to his need for medical care to address lung problems from December 2021 to the present in violation of the Eighth Amendment[.]” Id. at 9. Warden Neal filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF 80. The medical defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF 89. Day filed a joint response to both summary judgment motions, and the defendants filed replies. ECF 119, ECF 120, ECF 123, ECF 124. The summary judgment motions are now fully briefed and ripe for ruling. Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable [factfinder] could [find] for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Heft v. Moore, 351 F.3d 278, 282 (7th Cir. 2003). A party opposing a properly supported

summary judgment motion may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading but must “marshal and present the court with the evidence she contends will prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To establish liability under the Eighth

Amendment, a prisoner must show: (1) his medical need was objectively serious; and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his medical need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). “Deliberate indifference occupies a space slightly below intent and poses a ‘high hurdle and an exacting standard’ requiring ‘something approaching a total unconcern for the prisoner’s welfare in the face of serious risks.’”

Stockton v. Milwaukee Cty., 44 F.4th 605, 615 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2020)); see also Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th 703, 710 (7th Cir. 2022) (stating that deliberate-indifference claims will fail absent evidence of “callous disregard” for inmate wellbeing). “[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being

harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily done so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005). For a medical professional to be held liable for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs, she must make a decision that represents “such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to

demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). As the Seventh Circuit has explained: [M]edical professionals are not required to provide proper medical treatment to prisoners, but rather they must provide medical treatment that reflects professional judgment, practice, or standards. There is not one proper way to practice medicine in a prison, but rather a range of acceptable courses based on prevailing standards in the field. A medical professional’s treatment decisions will be accorded deference unless no minimally competent professional would have so responded under those circumstances. Id. at 697-698. Negligence, incompetence, or even medical malpractice do not amount to deliberate indifference. Pierson v. Hartley, 391 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, a prisoner is not entitled to demand specific care, nor is he entitled to the “best care possible.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). Where the defendant has provided some level of care for a prisoner’s medical condition, in order to establish deliberate indifference the prisoner must show that “the defendants’ responses to [his condition] were so plainly inappropriate as to permit the inference that the defendants intentionally or recklessly disregarded his needs.” Hayes v. Snyder, 546

F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008). A mere disagreement with medical professionals about the appropriate treatment does not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003). The medical defendants submit affidavits and Day’s medical records, which show the following facts: On December 28, 2021, Day was seen by a non-party nurse for complaints of stabbing pains when he took a deep breath. ECF 91-1 at 17-19; ECF 91-6 at

1. The nurse contacted Dr. Marthakis, who ordered that Day receive a chest x-ray and vital sign checks three times a week for 2 weeks. Id. Based on the physical exam, Dr. Marthakis did not believe an EKG was indicated at that time. Id. Dr. Marthakis reviewed the x-ray results on December 30, 2021, and found his lungs were normal. Id. On January 4, 2022, a non-party nurse contacted Nurse Thews after examining

Day and reported that Day was concerned about a lung infection but his vital signs were within normal limits, his lungs were clear on exam, and his chest x-ray was normal. ECF 91-1 at 22-24; ECF 91-5 at 2. Nurse Thews ordered Tylenol and a series of blood work to rule out infection. Id. On January 6, 2022, Dr. Marthakis first examined Day for his lung issues. ECF 91-

6 at 2; ECF 91-1 at 25-27. Day reported he had a cough three days ago which produced clear phlegm at first and then turned yellowish in color. Id. He also complained of twinges of pain in his sternal area under his left nipple. Id. He denied any wheezing, significant weight changes, or hemoptysis, and his vital signs were within normal limits. Id. Dr.

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Related

Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Goodman v. National Security Agency, Inc.
621 F.3d 651 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Forbes v. Edgar
112 F.3d 262 (Seventh Circuit, 1997)
Herbert L. Board v. Karl Farnham, Jr.
394 F.3d 469 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Hayes v. Snyder
546 F.3d 516 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Jackson v. Kotter
541 F.3d 688 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
James Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
982 F.3d 451 (Seventh Circuit, 2020)
Reed v. Indiana Department of Corrections
30 F. App'x 616 (Seventh Circuit, 2002)
Gail Stockton v. Milwaukee County, Wisconsin
44 F.4th 605 (Seventh Circuit, 2022)

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Day v. Marthakis, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/day-v-marthakis-innd-2024.