Day v. Geico Casualty Company

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 9, 2025
• Docket: 24-2201
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 9 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JESSICA DAY, individually and on behalf No. 24-2201 of all others similarly situated, D.C. No. 5:21-cv-02103-BLF Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY; GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY; GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Beth Labson Freeman, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 7, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: H.A. THOMAS and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, District Judge.***

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. Jessica Day appeals the district court’s order granting GEICO Casualty

Company, GEICO Indemnity Company, and GEICO General Insurance

Company’s (“Defendants”) renewed motion for summary judgment on Day’s

claim that Defendants violated California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal.

Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We “review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, and may affirm

on any basis supported by the record.” Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040,

1047 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

“When specific legislation provides a ‘safe harbor,’ plaintiffs may not use

the general unfair competition law to assault that harbor.” Cel-Tech Commc’ns,

Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 541 (Cal. 1999). The California

Insurance Code (“Insurance Code”) establishes a “prior approval system,” whereby

insurance companies are required to submit their proposed rates to the

Commissioner of California’s Department of Insurance (“Commissioner”) for

approval before formally changing them. Cal. Ins. Code § 1861.01(c); State Farm

Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lara, 71 Cal. App. 5th 148, 160 (2021). “No act done” or “action

taken” pursuant to the authority conferred by Chapter 9 of the Insurance Code,

which includes the “prior approval system” for insurance rates, “shall constitute a

violation of or grounds for prosecution or civil proceedings under any other law of

this State.” Cal. Ins. Code § 1860.1. Section 1860.1 thus bars a UCL claim that

2 24-2201 challenges an insurance rate previously approved by the Commissioner. See

MacKay v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1427, 1442–43 (2010); Krumme v.

Mercury Ins. Co., 123 Cal. App. 4th 924, 936 (2004) (stating that the Insurance

Code “displace[s] the UCL” for “activities related to rate setting”) (cleaned up).

Here, Day’s amended complaint challenged the amount of Defendants’

premium refunds in light of the “dramatic reduction” in Defendants’ exposure to

risk, but did not seek to change the overall amount of her coverage. Day sought,

inter alia, “disgorgement” of Defendants’ profit and a return on her premium

refund under the UCL in order to, in essence, lower her premium rate during the

COVID-19 pandemic. Defendants presented undisputed evidence, however, that

the Commissioner previously approved the premium rate applied to Day’s policy,

and Day failed to show that the approved rate plan required Defendants to

retroactively reduce her premium if their exposure to risk decreased. Because the

rate that Defendants charged her had been previously approved by the

Commissioner, Section 1860.1 of the Insurance Code provides a “safe harbor”

against Day’s UCL claim. Cal. Ins. Code §§ 1860.1, 1861.01(c); Cel-Tech

Commc’ns, Inc., 973 P.2d at 541; see Walker v. Allstate Indem. Co., 77 Cal. App.

4th 750, 752–54, 756 (2000) (holding that Section 1860.1 of the Insurance Code

bars suits “seeking damages or disgorgement of allegedly excessive premiums”

and seeking “redetermination of the premium rates”).

3 24-2201 AFFIRMED.

4 24-2201