Dawson v. Industrial Commission

660 P.2d 924, 1983 Colo. App. LEXIS 809
CourtColorado Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 10, 1983
DocketNo. 82CA1057
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 660 P.2d 924 (Dawson v. Industrial Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Colorado Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dawson v. Industrial Commission, 660 P.2d 924, 1983 Colo. App. LEXIS 809 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinion

VAN CISE, Judge.

Petitioner, Carla L. Dawson (claimant), seeks review of a final order of the Industrial Commission denying her unemployment benefits. We affirm.

Claimant was employed as a part-time bakery clerk in one of the grocery stores of respondent Albertson’s, Inc. Her employment was terminated in March 1981.

She filed a claim for unemployment benefits. The Commission found that claimant was at fault in not performing according to job standards and that the incident which precipitated the discharge was only the last in a series of similar failures after warnings. It determined that § 8-73-108(9)(a)(XX), C.R.S.1973 (now 1982 Cum. [925]*925Supp.) applied and, pursuant thereto, denied claimant all benefits attributable to Albertson’s, Inc., or 25 times the weekly benefit amount, whichever is the lesser.

Contrary to claimant’s contention, the Commission’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. The evidence showed she was fully capable of performing her assigned tasks. Therefore, the findings are conclusive on review. Pierce v. Industrial Commission, 195 Colo. 10, 576 P.2d 1012 (1978); § 8-73-108, C.R.S.1973 (1982 Cum.Supp.).

The section of the statute determined by the Commission to apply to the facts of this case, § 8-73-108(9)(a)(XX), C.R.S.1973 (1982 Cum.Supp.), allows the Commission to deny unemployment benefits attributable to this employment if the separation occurred for reasons “including, but not limited to ... failure to meet established job performance or other defined standards.” Claimant contends that this statute is void for vagueness. We disagree.

There is no unconstitutional vagueness here. “Failure to meet established job performance or other defined standards” as applicable here means that claimant did not do the job for which she was hired and in which she knew what was expected of her.

The other contention of claimant is without merit.

Order affirmed.

KELLY and KIRSHBAUM, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Pabst v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office
833 P.2d 64 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 1992)
Parker v. Daniels Motors, Inc.
738 P.2d 68 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 1987)
Jefferson County School District No. R-1 v. Industrial Commission
698 P.2d 1350 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 1984)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
660 P.2d 924, 1983 Colo. App. LEXIS 809, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dawson-v-industrial-commission-coloctapp-1983.