Da'vyta Gray v. Town of Ringgold, Bienville Parish Sheriff's Office, The Bienville Parish Police Jury

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: October 1, 2025
• Docket: 56,515-CA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered October 1, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.

No. 56,515-CA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

DA’VYTA GRAY Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

TOWN OF RINGOLD, Defendants-Appellees BIENVILLE PARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE, THE BIENVILLE PARISH POLICE JURY, ET AL

Appealed from the Second Judicial District Court for the Parish of Bienville, Louisiana Trial Court No. 46,729

Honorable William R. “Rick” Warren, Judge

D.F. JACKSON & ASSOCIATES, LLC Counsel for Appellant By: Dorothy F. Jackson

BRITTANY M. YOUNG, ATTORNEYAT LAW, LLC By: Brittany McKeel Young

PETTIETTE, ARMAND, DUNKELMAN, Counsel for Appellee, WOODLEY & CROMWELL, LLP Bienville Parish Police By: C. Cavett Feazel Jury Joseph Woodley

JIMMY WAYNE “JIMBO” YOCOM, JR. Counsel for Appellee, Town of Ringgold COOK, YANCEY, KING & GALLOWAY Counsel for Appellees, By: Jordan B. Bird Bienville Parish Sheriff’s Elizabeth Mendell Carmody Office and Bienville James Ashby Davis Sheriff, John Balance

AYRES, SHELTON, WILLIAMS, BENSON Counsel for Appellees, & PAINE, LLC Kristine Shelton and By: Curtis Ray Shelton William Shelton

Before STONE, STEPHENS, and ELLENDER, JJ. STONE, J.

This appeal arises from the Second Judicial District Court, the

Honorable William “Rick” Warren, presiding. Plaintiff-Appellant, Da’vyta

Gray (“Appellant”), filed suit against defendants for injuries he suffered

after being attacked by a pack of dogs. The appellant now seeks review of

the trial court’s ruling granting the Bienville Parish Police Jury’s exception

of no cause of action.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 27, 2023, the appellant was walking on Pine Street in

Ringgold, Louisiana, when he was viciously attacked and mauled by a pack

of unrestrained dogs.1 The attack lasted for several minutes before the

owners of said dogs came outside to restrain them. The appellant suffered

approximately 130 bites to his legs, arms, and torso as a result of the attack.

He was transported by ambulance to LSU Health Center in Shreveport,

where he underwent at least 5 surgeries to save his life and limbs. The

surgeries included repair of the appellant’s ankle, replacing plates in his legs

that were torn out by the dogs, as well as procedures to remove the dog’s

teeth from his body that remained after the attack.

The appellant filed a petition for damages naming Charlotte and

Shawn Hubbard (the owners of the dogs), William and Kristine Shelton (the

owners of the home where the attack took place), the Town of Ringgold, the

Sheriff’s Department, and the Bienville Parish Police Jury (“BPPJ”), for the

1 The pack consisted of at least 12 dogs. The appellant did not provoke or threaten the dogs. injuries he sustained. The appellant’s petition alleges the following pertinent

facts:

1. At the time of the attack, appellant was simply walking on Pine Street;

2. The BPPJ and local law enforcement knew of the statewide leash law

and, thus, had a duty pursuant to La. R.S. 3:2731 to levy and collect

annual per capita license taxes on all dogs, enact ordinances for the

regulation of dogs running at large, and maintain pounds for the

impounding of dogs but failed to do so, which directly resulted in the

damages suffered by the appellant;

3. All the named defendants breached their collective duties owed to the

appellant;

4. All the named defendants had knowledge of the “stray dog problem”

in Ringgold prior to the attack on the appellant, but failed and/or

refused to enforce the dog laws, due to their failure to create an animal

control department or erect a pound for the purpose of complying with

state law;

5. The issue of vicious dogs and the need to build a shelter was brought

up at various town and parish meetings during the months preceding

the attack on the appellant, putting all defendants on notice of the

problem, but to no avail;

6. The BPPJ received numerous complaints from citizens of Ringgold

specifically regarding the vicious nature of the dogs roaming the

streets and creating a threatening environment prior to the attack on

the appellant;

2 7. The acts of fault, gross and wanton negligence, lack of skill and

flagrant, wanton, and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of the

appellant committed by the BPPJ (and others) resulted in significant

near fatal injuries to the appellant.

In short, the appellant alleges that the defendants knew the dogs were

unaccompanied and roaming the public streets of Ringgold, posing an

unreasonable risk of harm to the public. The appellant propounded

interrogatories on all named defendants.

The BPPJ — without answering either the petition or interrogatories

from the appellant — filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action,

relying on immunity pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2798.1, arguing that mere

knowledge of complaints concerning dogs roaming at large is insufficient to

overcome the immunity granted to them by statute. The BPPJ argued that

the creation of a pound or animal control board is a discretionary function

grounded in social and economic policy and the decision to enact ordinances

as allowed by the statute was made at the ministerial level, not the

operational level.2 In response to the exception, the appellant filed a memo

in opposition questioning whether immunity exists under the specific facts

and circumstances alleged in the petition for damages. The appellant

asserted that the issue before the trial court was not whether the act of

enacting an ordinance or erecting a pound was discretionary, but instead,

whether that discretion was the type shielded by the statute. Moreover, the

appellant stated that taking the well-plead facts of the petition as true, the

2 La. R.S. 9:2798.1 (B) provides: Liability shall not be imposed on public entities or their officers or employees based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform their policymaking or discretionary acts when such acts are within the course and scope of their lawful powers and duties. 3 law does in fact provide a remedy for the negligence committed by the

BPPJ.

A hearing on the exception was held on December 12, 2024, wherein

the BPPJ argued that it is a governing body — not a law enforcement agency

— and, therefore, it is not mandated to do anything under La. R.S. 3:2774

because the petition fails to allege that the dogs were seized; and a governing

body is only mandated to provide a place of impoundment for seized dogs.3

The trial court inquired as to whether the dogs had attacked anyone in the

past and whether it was brought to the attention of the BPPJ. Both inquiries

were answered in the affirmative.4 Furthermore, the appellant asserted that

his petition sufficiently states a cause of action against the BPPJ and argued

that since sufficient discovery has not taken place, it would be premature to

dismiss the claims against it.

After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court rendered

judgment against the appellant and issued written reasons, finding that the

BPPJ has immunity under La. R.S. 9:2798.1 since the dogs were not first

seized by law enforcement. The court further noted that laws currently exist

to cover situations involving dangerous dogs and agreed with the BPPJ’s

contention that it had no authority to seize or board the dogs, as the

construction of facilities for the impoundment of dogs is “totally

discretionary.” The trial court granted the BPPJ’s exception and dismissed

3 La. R.S. 3:2774 provides that each parish shall provide suitable shelters or facilities for dogs seized under the provisions of this Part. 4 It was approximately one month after the appellant was attacked that the dogs were seized. (The authorities located human remains on Pine Street of a man who was believed to have been attacked, dismembered, and killed by the same dogs on or about September 26, 2023—around the time of the appellant’s attack.) 4 the appellant’s claims against it with prejudice. The appellant brings this

appeal from that judgment.

DISCUSSION

The appellant asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law in

sustaining the BPPJ’s exception of no cause of action, based on its

discretion, pursuant to La. R.S. 3:27735 and La. R.S. 3:2731,6 because the

petition for damages sets forth allegations that the BPPJ had actual

knowledge that the dogs were unaccompanied and roaming the streets of

Ringgold at large, posing an unreasonable risk of harm to the public. The

appellant argues that the trial court failed to consider all allegations of fact

contained in the appellant’s petition as true, except for the fact that the dogs

were not seized.

Consequently, the appellant contends that the trial court prematurely

sustained BPPJ’s exception of no cause of action (and dismissed his claims

with prejudice) on the grounds that the dogs were not seized. Appellant also

argues that the law provides him a remedy because of the BPPJ’s negligence.

5 La. R.S. 3:2773 (B) provides: Any citizen may, or the sheriff, constable, or other police officers of any parish, ward, or municipality shall seize any dog found unaccompanied by its owner or keeper and running at large on any road, street, or other public place, or trespassing on any premises other than the premises of the owner. If the dog is wearing a collar bearing a tag showing the name and address of its owner, it shall be impounded and the citizen or officer so seizing and impounding the dog shall immediately thereafter by written notice notify the owner of the dog, at the address disclosed by the tag on the dog’s collar, that the dog has been seized and impounded by him, and unless the owner or keeper of the dog shall, within seven days from the receipt of the notice, claim the dog and pay the citizen or officer a fee of one dollar for seizing and a fee of twenty-five cents for each day it is impounded, it shall be disposed of in a humane manner. 6 La. R.S. 3:2731 provides: The governing bodies of all parishes and municipalities may adopt ordinances regulating dogs running at large; regulating or prohibiting vicious or dangerous dogs; or to limit the enforcement of said ordinances or the imposition of fees and fines thereunder. In addition, such ordinances may provide for the utilization of the proceeds of dog and cat license fees for the operation of its animal control program or for the effective enforcement of its animal control ordinances. 5 Oppositionally, the BPPJ argues that use of the word “may” under La.

R.S. 3:2731 makes their authority discretionary. They cite Pineville City

Court v. City of Pineville, 22-336 (La. 1/27/23), 355 So. 3d 600, which

provides that when the language of a statute is discretionary, the actions of a

public body with regard to implementation of the statute are entitled to

immunity.

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling sustaining an exception of no cause

of action, the appellate court should conduct a de novo review because the

exception raises a question of law and the trial court’s decision is based

solely on the sufficiency of the petition. Industrial Companies, Inc. v.

Durbin, 02-0665 (La. 1/28/03), 837 So. 2d 1207; Robinson v. Allstate Ins.

Co., 53,940 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/26/21); 322 So. 3d 381, writ denied, 21-00906

(La. 10/19/21), 326 So. 3d 264. The function of the peremptory exception of

no cause of action is to test the legal sufficiency of the petition, which is

done by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged

in the pleading. Ramey v. DeCaire, 03-1299 (La. 3/19/04), 869 So. 2d 114.

All doubts are resolved in favor of the sufficiency of the petition to afford

litigants their day in court. Jackson v. City of New Orleans, 12-2742 (La.

1/28/14), 144 So. 3d 876; Ellis v. Mai, 56,074 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/25), 408

So. 3d 416. An exception of no cause of action is triable on the face of the

petition; and for the purpose of determining the issues raised by the

exception, the well-pleaded facts in the petition must be accepted as true.

Industrial Companies v. Durbin, supra. It should be granted only when it

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of

any claim which would entitle him to relief. Badeaux v. Sw. Computer

6 Bureau, Inc., 05-0612 (La. 3/17/06), 929 So. 2d 121; Robinson v. Allstate

Ins. Co, supra. Thus, dismissal is justified only when the allegations of the

petition itself clearly show that the plaintiff does not have a cause of action,

or when its allegations show the existence of an affirmative defense that

appears clearly on the face of the pleadings. Ellis v. Mai, supra.

Under the immunity statute, the court may only ascertain whether the

acts of the governmental agency were discretionary or policy-making

decisions, and if so, whether they were reasonably related to the government

objective or constituted misconduct on the part of the entity. DuBois v.

McGuire, 579 So. 2d 1025 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1991), writ denied sub nom.

Dubois v. Waterman, 587 So. 2d 696 (La. 1991). Conduct cannot be

discretionary unless it involves an element of judgment or choice. Thus,

discretionary immunity will not apply when a specific course of action is

prescribed. Id.

This case is a clear exhibition of cause and effect, due to the

negligence of all named defendants in the petition — including the BPPJ —

as the dog attacks have only progressed or escalated in severity. The

appellant was almost mauled to death by errant dogs, yet the defendants

knowingly chose to remain inactive and turn a blind eye to an imminent

danger in the community. As a result of the BPPJ’s inaction — although not

exclusively — another man was actually mauled to death by the same pack

of dogs. Pointing the proverbial finger is anticipated with any case where

one may be at fault. However, in the matter sub judice, the BPPJ maintains

their contention that any duty they had in addressing this problem, i.e., to

construct an animal shelter, is discretionary. Alternatively, the BPPJ argues

7 that it had no duty to act until the dogs were seized by a law enforcement

agency.

We find, as a practical matter, that waiting for dogs to be seized to

then erect a shelter is absurd, as there would be no place to house them once

a seizure occurs. Seemingly, a more proactive approach to this particular

problem would have been responsible and in the best interest of the

community that the BPPJ represents. The “cross that bridge when we get

there” mentality is woefully unacceptable. The BPPJ is mandated, under La.

R.S. 3:2774, to provide a suitable shelter or facility for seized dogs and not

at the moment of seizure, but rather in advance to prepare for the anticipated

seizures; otherwise, the mandate is nonsensical. The trial court was

incorrect to presume that a dog must first be seized before the mandatory

duty attaches. When the language of the law is susceptible of different

meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to

the purpose of the law. La. C.C. art. 10. The BPPJ knew these dogs had

dangerous propensities which could foreseeably cause further injury to

others. Furthermore, if there is no place for law enforcement to place

vicious dogs after seizure, it is unlikely seizures of such animals would ever

occur.

A police jury in the state of Louisiana has a fiduciary duty to manage

the affairs of their parish. One of their primary responsibilities is to address

issues and concerns in the community — as well as acting effectively and

efficiently to resolve public concerns. Taking the allegations in the

appellant’s petition as true, the BPPJ chose stagnation when these concerns

8 were brought to the body’s attention and now attempts to hide behind a cloak

of immunity playing semantics with the law.

We believe that the appellant — in his petition — has alleged a cause

of action in which a factfinder at the trial court level may allocate a

percentage of fault. There may be some liability on the part of the BPPJ;

however, discovery is the proper procedure to establish the extent or degree,

if any, to which each party is liable to the appellant. Thus, we find it

premature that the trial court released the BPPJ as a defendant in this

lawsuit.

CONCLUSION

The trial court committed manifest error by granting the Bienville

Parish Police Jury’s exception of no cause of action. Accordingly, we

reverse the trial court’s ruling and remand this matter for further

proceedings. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the Bienville Parish Police

Jury.

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.