Davy v. County Board of Arlington

171 S.E.2d 176, 210 Va. 332
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedDecember 1, 1969
DocketRecord Nos. 6917, 6918, 6919, 6920, 6921 and 6922
StatusPublished

This text of 171 S.E.2d 176 (Davy v. County Board of Arlington) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davy v. County Board of Arlington, 171 S.E.2d 176, 210 Va. 332 (Va. 1969).

Opinion

Carrico, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

J. A. Stone is the owner of two tracts of land and Myron Davy, N. E. Supply Co., Inc., J. A. Watson, Jr., and S. K. Carter each is the owner of an individual tract in the same block of Jefferson Davis Highway (U. S. Route 1) in Arlington County. On November 3, 1966, a separate application covering each tract was filed by the owner [333]*333thereof seeking a refund of taxes for an allegedly erroneous assessment (Code § 58-1145).

The County Board of Arlington County and Colin C. MacPherson, County Treasurer, filed answers. The six applications were consolidated for trial, and the matter was heard by the court. The applications were dismissed, and the applicants were granted writs of error.

The refunds of taxes sought were for the year 1966. On January 1 of that year, a general reassessment by the Arlington County General Reassessment Board became effective. As the result of the Board’s action, the square foot valuation for tax purposes of the applicants’ land was changed as follows:

Owner From T o

Myron Davy $2.25 $6.00

N. E. Supply Co., Inc. 2.15 6.00

J. A. Stone 2.00 6.00

J. A. Stone 2.25 6.00
J. A. Watson, Jr. 2.08 6.00
S. K. Carter 2.25 6.00

The applicants do not claim that their parcels were appraised in excess of their market value, but rather that the valuations lacked uniformity when compared with those placed on like properties in the immediate area. They contend that they showed that their tracts were of like or similar nature to certain other parcels in the area which were valued for tax purposes at substantially less than theirs. Thus, they say, they carried their burden of proving lack of uniformity and were entitled to have the valuations placed upon their land reduced to the level of those placed on the other parcels.

The applicants’ property is located a short distance south of Washington, D. C., near the Pentagon Building. The tracts occupy most of a city block bounded on the east by Jefferson Davis Highway, on the west by Eads Street, on the north by Army-Navy Drive, and on the south by 15th Street.1 All except the Carter parcel have frontage on and access to both Jefferson Davis Highway and Eads Street. The Carter tract fronts on and has access to Jefferson Davis Highway. It does not front on but has access to Eads Street.

The parcels owned by the applicants are presently devoted to industrial and commercial uses. However, they are in an area which,

[334]*334

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

City of Norfolk v. Snyder
170 S.E. 721 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1933)
City of Roanoke v. Gibson
170 S.E. 723 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1933)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
171 S.E.2d 176, 210 Va. 332, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davy-v-county-board-of-arlington-va-1969.