Davon Nathaniel Jones v. State of Indiana

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 11, 2025
• Docket: 24A-CR-02588
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Aug 11 2025, 9:26 am Davon Nathaniel Jones, CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals and Tax Court

v.

State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 11, 2025

Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-CR-2588

Appeal from the Lake Superior Court

The Honorable Natalie Bokota, Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 45G02-2207-MR-24

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2588 | August 11, 2025 Page 1 of 11 Opinion by Senior Judge Crone Chief Judge Altice and Judge Bailey concur.

Crone, Senior Judge.

Statement of the Case [1] A jury determined Davon Nathaniel Jones robbed Amarion Holmes and fatally

shot him. Jones appeals his convictions of murder and armed robbery. He

argues the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence and by instructing the

jury on accomplice liability. Concluding the trial court did not err, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] On April 9, 2022, Jones and a friend named Jay used Facebook’s messaging

app to chat. Jones was at his home in Hammond, Indiana. Jones and Jay used

slang terms to discuss robbing people. They also discussed firearms and shared

photos of handguns.

[3] At 3:19 p.m., Jones, using an alias, contacted Amarion Holmes through the

same messaging app. Holmes sold marijuana, and Jones asked Holmes, still

using slang terms, if he could buy some. As they negotiated the amount, price,

and location of the sale, Jones separately messaged Jay to tell him he “got

stain[sic][.]” Tr. Ex. Vol., p. 161. “Stain” is a slang term for robbery.

[4] Holmes agreed to drive to Hammond from a nearby town, saying he was

twenty-five minutes away. He drove a white Hyundai sedan. Jones directed

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2588 | August 11, 2025 Page 2 of 11 Holmes to meet him at 817 Drackert Street. Holmes and Jay both lived

separately in the neighborhood, several blocks from that address.

[5] During this time, Jones and Jay continued chatting. Jones reacted with a laugh

emoji to this statement: “25 min [sic] drive just to get took [sic][.]” Id. at 163.

Jones also emphasized this statement: “Imma [sic] warn yu [sic] now if he

don’t give it up Imma [sic] do what I gotta do[.]” Id.

[6] Andrea Varela lived in a house at 817 Drackert Street, having moved in several

months before April 9. On that day, she was sitting on her front porch with her

brother, Luis Varela. They both saw a white car drive up and park in front of

her house for several minutes.

[7] At 4:21 p.m., Holmes sent Jones a message stating he was outside. At 4:24,

Jones messaged Holmes, telling him to “slide it in the back my neighbors be

snitching[.]” Id. at 99. Holmes agreed.

[8] Andrea and Luis watched the white car drive off. Luis saw it turn in the

direction of the alley behind the house. Next, Holmes messaged Jones, saying

“I’m here[.]” Id.

[9] Fifteen to thirty seconds after the car drove off, Andrea and Luis heard a

gunshot from the alley. Andrea went inside to ensure her back door was

locked. Next, Andrea and Luis looked out a window and saw a man walking

quickly along the side of the house, leaving the back yard and heading toward

the street. He was wearing all black clothing and a black ski mask. The man

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2588 | August 11, 2025 Page 3 of 11 turned toward Andrea, and they made eye contact. Luis noted the man’s

hoodie had a Nike logo. After he left, Andrea went into the backyard to secure

her gate to the alley. She saw the white car that had been parked briefly in front

of her house.

[10] At around 4:30, Jones unfriended Holmes’ Facebook account. At the same

time, police officers and paramedics were dispatched to the alley behind 817

Drackert to investigate several reports of shots fired. They found Holmes in his

white Hyundai, slumped down in the driver’s seat, with a wound on the left

side of his head. The car was still in drive, and his foot was on the brake.

[11] Paramedics removed Holmes from the car. As they took him to the ambulance,

an officer saw an empty handgun holster tucked inside the waistband of his

pants. In addition, paramedics discovered a shell casing in Holmes’ clothing

and gave it to an officer. Holmes did not have a wallet or identification card.

He was later pronounced dead at a hospital.

[12] Back at the scene of the shooting, officers discovered another shell casing on the

ground near the car. Inside the car, they found Holmes’ phone but no firearms

or controlled substances. The officers also noticed a hole in the inside of the

front passenger door. During a later, more detailed search of the car at another

location, officers found a spent round inside the front passenger door.

[13] Meanwhile, Jones left Indiana for Wisconsin, where his mother lived. He did

not use his phone for twenty-four hours, which was a departure from his

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2588 | August 11, 2025 Page 4 of 11 previous pattern of frequently using his phone throughout the day. Jones later

returned to Hammond.

[14] A forensic pathologist determined Holmes had been shot three times: once in

the left side of his head, exiting on the right side; once on the left side of his

face, with a spent round recovered from inside his head; and once in his left

shoulder, exiting his left arm. Testing revealed the spent rounds recovered from

Holmes’ body and the car door had been fired from the same gun, and the shell

casings recovered from Holmes’ clothing and from the ground near his car were

also fired from the same gun.

[15] On July 19, 2022, several Hammond police officers stopped Jones’ car and

arrested him. They found his phone in one of his pockets. Subsequent

examination of the calling and messaging history of Jones’ phone revealed that

it had been near the site of the shooting when it occurred.

[16] Officers also searched Jones’ home. They found a black face mask in his

bedroom and black sweat pants in the laundry area.

[17] Further investigation revealed that on June 15, 2021, Officer Daniel Percak of

the Hammond Police Department had encountered Jones sitting in a car

outside of 817 Drackert Street. Jones told the officer he was visiting a friend.

The friend exited the house and spoke with the officer. Officer Percak was

wearing a body camera, which recorded the encounter.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2588 | August 11, 2025 Page 5 of 11 [18] In August 2022, the State charged Jones with felony murder (killing Holmes

while committing robbery); murder, a felony; Level 2 felony robbery resulting

in serious bodily injury; Level 3 felony armed robbery; and Level 5 felony

robbery. The State further alleged Jones was eligible for a firearm sentencing

enhancement.

[19] On July 8, 2024, officers showed Andrea a photo of Jones wearing all black

clothing, but with his face exposed. She said Jones was the person who had

walked through her yard shortly after she heard the gunshot. The officers also

showed the photo to Luis, and he said Jones’ outfit was identical to the clothes

that had been worn by the person who walked by Andrea’s house, including the

Nike logo.

[20] At trial, Officer Percak testified about his June 2021 encounter with Jones, and

the trial court admitted into evidence a still photograph of Jones that had been

taken from the officer’s body camera recordings. After the State rested its case,

the prosecutor asked the court to instruct the jury on accomplice liability. The

court granted that request, over Jones’ objection.

[21] The jury determined Jones was guilty of murder and all three robbery charges.

The jurors could not reach a verdict on the felony murder charge and the

firearm sentencing enhancement.

[22] At sentencing, the trial court entered a judgment of conviction for the murder

charge and the Level 3 felony robbery charge. The court sentenced Jones on

those two convictions, and this appeal followed.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2588 | August 11, 2025 Page 6 of 11 Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Evidence – Evidence of Other Acts and Statements [23] Jones argues the trial court should not have admitted evidence related to his

June 2021 encounter with Officer Percak at 817 Drackert or his chat history

with Jay on the day of the murder about handguns and committing robberies.

He claims the evidence was unfairly prejudicial, and the prejudice outweighed

any probative value.

[24] “The admission and exclusion of evidence rests within the sound discretion of

the trial court.” Carr v. State, 255 N.E.3d 519, 526 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans.

denied. “We reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic and

effect of the facts and circumstances.” Redding v. State, 244 N.E.3d 477, 484

(Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[25] In criminal cases, it is a longstanding principle that “‘the State, relying upon

evidence of uncharged misconduct, may not punish a person for his character.’”

Lee v. State, 689 N.E.2d 435, 439 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Wickizer v. State, 626

N.E.2d 795, 797 (Ind. 1993)). As a result, Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b)(1)

provides: “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a

person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person

acted in accordance with the character.” But evidence of a prior crime, wrong,

or other act may be admissible to prove a purpose other than propensity to

commit present misconduct, such as “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2588 | August 11, 2025 Page 7 of 11 plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Ind. Evid.

Rule 404(b)(2).

[26] The State argues that none of the evidence Jones challenges here qualifies as

evidence of another crime, wrong, or other act for purposes of Rule 404(b). We

agree as to the evidence about Jones’ June, 2021 encounter with Officer Percak

at 817 Drackert. The State told the trial court, outside the jury’s presence, that

the officer was investigating a crime and thought Jones might be a suspect, but

the jury was not given that information. Instead, the jury heard only that

Officer Percak encountered Jones at a specific location and saw a picture of

Jones. And the State alleged that the interaction between Jones and the officer

was relevant to show only that Jones was familiar with that house and the area.

As a result, admission of evidence related to the encounter did not violate Rule

404(b)(1) because it did not indicate uncharged misconduct. See, e.g., Rogers v.

State, 897 N.E.2d 955, 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (possession of knife did not

constitute prior bad act under Rule 404(b) because mere possession of knife did

not demonstrate criminal or wrongful behavior), trans. denied.

[27] Turning to Jay and Jones’ chat history about handguns and planning robberies,

we cannot conclude that the history is evidence of other or prior misconduct

under Rule 404(b). Instead, the evidence was relevant to the charged offenses.

The chat history showed Jones was familiar with handguns and had lured

Holmes to Hammond under the guise of a marijuana transaction to ambush

him. The chat record did not suggest a prior, uncharged offense. See Anderson

v. State, 15 N.E.3d 147, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (defendant on home arrest and

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2588 | August 11, 2025 Page 8 of 11 convicted of escape claimed trial court should not have admitted evidence

showing he was outside of residence earlier in day; Court concluded prior

movements were not prior bad act but relevant to charged act of escape). The

trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.

II. Jury Instructions – Accomplice Liability [28] Jones argues the trial court should not have granted the State’s request to

instruct the jury on accomplice liability. We review a trial court’s jury

instruction decisions for an abuse of discretion. Albert v. State, 193 N.E.3d 1040,

1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. “When reviewing the trial court’s

decision, we consider (1) whether the instruction correctly states the law, (2) is

supported by the evidence in the record, and (3) is not covered in substance by

other instructions.” Vaughn v. State, 13 N.E.3d 873, 884 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014),

trans. denied.

[29] Jones’ claim focuses on the second element of the test: he contends there was

insufficient evidence that he acted as an accomplice or had an accomplice when

he committed his offenses, and as a result, the two jury instructions on

accomplice liability were unnecessary. We disagree. The General Assembly

has defined accomplice liability as follows:

A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense, even if the other person:

(1) has not been prosecuted for the offense;

(2) has not been convicted of the offense; or Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2588 | August 11, 2025 Page 9 of 11 (3) has been acquitted of the offense.

Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4 (1977). “In Indiana, there is no distinction between the

responsibility of a principal and an accomplice.” Wise v. State, 719 N.E.2d

1192, 1198 (Ind. 1999). “If there is some evidence that a second party was

involved in the crime, an instruction on accomplice liability is proper.” Id.

[30] Jones’s chat history with Jay on the day of Holmes’ murder indicates that Jay,

who also lived near the location of the murder, was involved in planning the

robbery and may have taken part. Jones reacted with a laugh emoji to the

following message: “25 min [sic] drive just to get took [sic][.]” Tr. Ex. Vol., p.

163. Jones also reacted to this message: “Imma [sic] warn yu [sic] now if he

don’t give it up Imma [sic] do what I gotta do[.]” Id. This is sufficient evidence

to establish that a second person could have been involved in the crime and

supports the trial court’s instructions on accomplice liability. See Wise, 719

N.E.2d at 1198 (record supported instructing jury on accomplice liability; there

was evidence that wife may have helped husband set house fire). The trial court

did not abuse its instructional discretion.

Conclusion [31] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[32] Affirmed.

Altice, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2588 | August 11, 2025 Page 10 of 11 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Kristin A. Mulholland Office of the Lake County Public Defender Crown Point, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana

Andrew M. Sweet Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2588 | August 11, 2025 Page 11 of 11