Davis's Estate

1 Pa. D. & C. 61, 1921 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 31
CourtPennsylvania Orphans' Court, Philadelphia County
DecidedAugust 1, 1921
DocketNo. 460
StatusPublished

This text of 1 Pa. D. & C. 61 (Davis's Estate) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Orphans' Court, Philadelphia County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis's Estate, 1 Pa. D. & C. 61, 1921 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1921).

Opinion

Henderson, J.,

The testator died June 30, 1919, leaving a will duly probated July 15, 1919. . . .

Under paragraph four of his will the testator provided as follows:

“Item. I give, devise and bequeath to my Trustees hereinafter named, all my stocks, bonds and other corporate securities to be transferred to them by my Executors, as soon after my decease as it can conveniently be done.”

And in the next paragraph he further provided:

“Item. After the payment of all my just debts and the foregoing bequests, I give, devise and bequeath to my son, Henry Lamont Davis, and to my daughter, Eleanor Bushnell Cooke, share and share alike, all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, consisting of real estate of whatsoever character and wheresoever situated, mortgages, life insurance, personal notes, cash and other property, excepting only thereout, nevertheless, the stocks, bonds and other corporate securities owned by me, and which I have bequeathed to my Trustees under the preceding items of this my Will.”

The inventory and account shows there was due him by the School Lane Land Company the sum of $133,227.81, of which the land company had a book account, a copy of which is annexed to this adjudication.

The question was submitted to me as to whether this asset belonged to the trustees or should be awarded under the residuary clause. The question is presented by the accountants as if this decedent owned a book account which, under Sloan’s Estate, 2 Del. Co. Reps. 309, and Stark’s Will, 134 N. W. Repr. 389, could be held to be a “security.” In Williams on Executors (11th ed.), 944, it is said: “In re Rayner (1904), 1 Ch. 176, Farwell, J., said that the word ‘securities’ had the well defined primary meaning of ‘money secured on property.’ ”

In Sloan’s Estate the book account existed on the books of a copartnership of which he was a member. Here, the account is on the books of the land company, and, so far as the decedent is concerned, is merely a debt due his estate. In the view I take of this question, it is not necessary to decide if a book account is a “security.”

In the sixth item of the will it is provided:

“Said trustees or a majority of them, and their successors, are authorized and empowered to sell any of the before-mentioned property or securities and to invest and re-invest as in their judgment shall be for the good of this trust; provided, however, that all and every purchase or sale in the execution of this trust herein declared shall require the sanction of the corporate trus[62]*62tee, and at least one other Trustee; they are authorized to buy and hold real estate, to sell and give title to the same without any responsibility upon the purchaser for the application of the proceeds thereof. In their investments it is my desire that they be conservative, but they are not bound to what are known as ‘legal investments’ for trusts.”

And in the last item of the will it is provided:

“The corporate trustee shall be the custodian of the securities and papers belonging to the Estate and Trust, but the other members shall have full and proper access for the examination of all books, accounts, papers and securities.”

The testator has not used the word “securities” in a technical sense. Prom the context I gather that he used this word in the sense of “investments.”

Corporate stocks are not securities in the technical sense: 2 Jarman on Wills (6th ed.), 1303. While the testator has enumerated all the kinds of property owned by him, none of the terms so used fits the indebtedness of the land company, unless the word security in the sense of an investment can be held to do so. When the testator confers the power of sale upon his trustees, he empowers them “to sell any of the before mentioned property or securities” and he then authorizes them “to buy and hold deal estate.” And he then adds: “In their investments it is my desire that they be conservative, but they shall not be bound to what are known as ‘legal investments.’ ” And after giving this broad power as to investments, including the purchase of real estate, he directs that the corporate trustee shall be the custodian of the securities. Here we have the term “securities” used to cover real estate, which, in turn, is authorized as an investment.

In re Rayner (1904), 1 Ch. 176, a will very similar to this one was construed. Therein the decedent, a broker, after giving a trust legacy, declared that “all moneys liable to be invested under this my will may be invested in such securities as my trustees in their absolute discretion shall think fit; and I authorize my trustees to continue or leave any moneys invested at my death in or upon the same securities.” In holding that the context showed the word “securities” to be used in the sense of investments, Lord Justice Vaughan Williams said (page 187):

“The question the court has to decide in this case is, What is the meaning of the word ‘security’ in this will?

“In my judgment, in this will the meaning of that word, or rather of the word ‘securities,’ is determined, for reasons which I will presently discuss, by the context of the will, and it is unnecessary, therefore, to discuss generally what is the meaning of the word ‘security,’ either its common and ordinary meaning at the date of the will, or what is the meaning of the words ‘strict and primary sense’ in Proposition II, in Wigram V.-C.’s Treatise on Extrinsic Evidence; for it is apparent from the context of this will that the testator has not used the word ‘securities’ in what Farwell, J., holds to be its ‘strict and primary’ sense — but in what may be called its ‘popular sense’— which I may observe is a sense in which I am of opinion, without the assistance of either dictionary or the evidence of commercial or other witnesses, it is applied habitually by those who have to deal with property transferable by the assignment of indicia of property, be they commercial men or noncommercial men, lawyers or laymen; and a sense in which it has been used daily in The Times since the year 1886, and in divers Acts of Parliament.

“Now, the reasons why I have formed this conclusion as to the meaning of the word ‘securities’ in this will are these. Take this passage in the will: ‘And I authorize my trustees to continue or leave any moneys invested at my [63]*63death in or upon the same securities.’ I think that in this passage ‘the same securities’ obviously means ‘the same investments;’ and I think that the effect of using the words ‘moneys invested’ and the word ‘securities’ to cover the same subject-matter is not to narrow down or limit the natural sense of the words ‘moneys invested,’ but to extend what Farwell, J., considers to be the ‘strict and primary’ meaning of the word ‘securities,’ so as to cover anything which, according to the strict and primary meaning of the words ‘moneys invested,’ would be covered or connoted by those words; and, in my judgment, property in the shape of railway shares falls within the meaning, both of the words ‘moneys invested’ and of the word ‘securities.’ ”

A similar question arose In re Gent and Eason’s Contract (1905), 1 Ch. 386, 389, wherein Mr. Justice Farwell said:

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1 Pa. D. & C. 61, 1921 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 31, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/daviss-estate-paorphctphilad-1921.