WAGNER, Chief Judge:
Appellant, Robert V. Davis, was convicted of second degree murder while armed and related weapons offenses in connection with the death of Benjamin Holley.1 He argues for reversal on the principal ground that the trial court erred in admitting his videotaped confession. Specifically, he contends that his videotaped confession, although given after an informed waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination, was inadmissible because the police deliberately failed to administer Miranda warnings in obtaining from him an earlier custodial, incriminating statement.2 The trial court found that the first statement [1165] was not coerced, but voluntarily given and that Davis voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights before making the subsequent statements. In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), the Supreme Court held that an accused’s voluntary post-Miranda statement is admissible, notwithstanding that the police obtained from him a pre-Miranda statement, provided that the unwarned statement was not coerced. 470 U.S. at 318, 105 S.Ct. 1285. We find no clear error in the trial court’s factual findings, and its ruling is consistent with the holding in Elstad. Our independent review of the record leads us to conclude, under the totality of the circumstances, that Davis’ unwarned statements were voluntary. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). Finding no grounds for reversal based upon Davis’ other claims of improper exclusion of evidence and failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, we affirm.
I. The Suppression HeaHng
A. The Evidence
Benjamin Holley was shot and killed on November 25, 1994, in the 5100 block of Astor Place, S.E., Washington, D.C. According to the evidence at the suppression hearing, Davis was arrested for the crime at about 4:00 p.m. on January 14, 1995, pursuant to an arrest warrant. Davis testified that he was taken to an office at the Police Department between fifteen to thirty minutes after he was stopped. Detective Gregory Sullivan, who had been investigating the case, arrived at the homicide office about 5:00 p.m. Sullivan and his partner, Detective Benjamin Collins, first spoke with Davis there about 5:30 p.m. and informed him he was under arrest for the murder of Benjamin Holley in the 5100 block of Astor Place. The detectives left the room for fifteen to twenty minutes to prepare paperwork, and they observed Davis through a video monitor during that time. Detective Sullivan testified that he knew that Davis had not been given his Miranda warnings, but he made the decision not to read them to him when he returned to the interview room. When the detectives returned to the room around 6:00 p.m., the detectives told Davis that they had learned that he and Angela Daniels (Peanut) shot Holley and that the police had recovered the weapons used. Detective Sullivan told Davis that he could get thirty-five years to life for the offense. About 6:20 p.m., the detectives told Davis that they had spoken to “Peanut,” which was not true, and that they “understood that Peanut had the nine millimeter and that Mi-. Davis had the AK.” Davis blurted out that “Peanut had the AK, I had the nine.” Shortly thereafter, Davis asked Detective Sullivan to leave the room, and Sullivan complied. Davis testified that the reason he asked Sullivan to leave the room was because Sullivan seemed aggravated with his answers, and he did not like Sullivan’s hostile attitude, although Sullivan said nothing.
After Detective Sullivan left the room, Detective Collins interviewed Davis until about 6:45 p.m., and Detective Sullivan observed them on the video monitor. Davis told Detective Collins that he had shot Holley with the nine millimeter weapon and that Daniels shot Holley with the AK-47. At one point, Davis said that he knew that this day was coming. Sometime after admitting his involvement in the murder, Davis mentioned that he had a sister who was a police officer. Collins said that he knew her and had a “pretty close working relationship” with her. After Davis made the inculpatory admissions, Detective Collins told him that this day would change his life and that he should “stand up and be a man and accept whatever comes down the road.”
About twenty-five minutes later, at about 7:00 p.m., Detective Collins advised Davis of his Miranda rights, and Davis signed a PD-47 rights card indicating that he wanted to waive his rights. Davis gave a videotaped statement at 7:11 p.m. At the beginning of the videotape, Davis confirmed the rights that Detective Collins had read to him. Davis also acknowledged that he had waived these rights in writing on the back of the rights card where he signed his signature.3 [1166] Davis then gave substantially the same statements that he had made previously. After the taped statement, Davis telephoned his sister and told her that he shot someone.4 The videotape of the statement was played for the court during the suppression hearing.5
During the time that Davis was in the interview room, he was seated in a chair with his left arm handcuffed to a bolt which was affixed to the floor. Sullivan testified that they made no threats or promises to Davis and that Davis was not reluctant to talk. Sullivan said that they did not become angry at Davis, express disgust or engage in any different role playing (e.g., good cop/bad cop) for purposes of the interrogation. The detectives did not take their weapons into the interview room. Detective Sullivan said that Davis requested cigarettes and a drink before 6:30 p.m., and they provided both. Sullivan also testified that Davis did not appear to be uncomfortable or under the influence of drugs or other intoxicants during the interview.
Davis testified that he was eighteen years old at the time of his arrest in this case and went to the tenth grade, although he did not complete the grade. He acknowledged arrests while a juvenile for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and simple assault and a traffic arrest four days before his arrest in this ease. However, Davis could not recall whether he had ever been advised of his Miranda rights. Consistent with the detectives’ testimony, Davis admitted that the detectives did not threaten him or make him any promises. He also testified that he did not believe the detectives had spoken to Peanut, as they said, because the detective showed him a paper purporting to show that Peanut had been locked up three days earlier, and Davis had seen Peanut just two days ago. Davis stated that he thought that he had telephoned his sister before he filled out the rights card. He admitted that he told her that he had been arrested for murder and that “there is no use in not talking, I already talked to him and I did it.”
B. The Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court found that Davis’ pre-Mi-randa statement was made voluntarily and without coercion and that Davis’ second statement was preceded by full Miranda warnings of rights, which Davis knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived. In reaching the voluntariness determination, the trial court considered the totality of the circumstances. Specifically, the court took into account: (1) Davis’ age, prior arrests, and the absence of any police promises, threats, mistreatment or the display of weapons; (2) that Davis was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, confused or upset; (3) that he answered questions directly and appeared to understand what was transpiring;6 (4) that while uncomfortable, Davis appeared to be in no pain, and handcuffing was routine procedure in a murder case; and (5) that the detectives’ falsehood about the gun was designed to elicit a truthful statement, not an untruthful one. Assuming, without deciding, that Detective Sullivan was annoyed by Davis’ responses and told him that they would be there all day, the trial court found “that this had very little impact upon [Davis’] [1167] decision to provide information to the police.” The court found that the circumstances showed that Davis was not compelled to talk, and it appeared, therefore, that he had acted out of moral compulsion. Having found the pr e-Miranda statement to be voluntary, the court determined that the post-Miranda videotaped statement was admissible under Elstad, supra. The court also found that Davis made the statement to his sister after Miranda warnings, and therefore, ruled it admissible.
II. Analysis
Davis argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the post-Miranda videotaped statement was admissible under Elstad, supra. He advances two reasons for the trial court’s error, specifically that: (1) contrary to the court’s findings, the statement was not voluntary; and (2) Elstad is inapplicable where the police deliberately decide to forego Miranda warnings until after interrogation which results in a confession.
In Elstad, supra, the Supreme Court held that the accused’s pre-Miranda statement does not necessarily render inadmissible a subsequent statement made after Miranda warnings. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314, 105 S.Ct. 1285; Cowan v. United States, 547 A.2d 1011, 1015 (D.C.1988). Where the police question a suspect without administering the required Miranda warnings of rights, there is a presumption of compulsion, rendering the statement excludable from evidence in the government’s case in chief, even if otherwise voluntary in the context of the Fifth Amendment. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307, 105 S.Ct. 1285. “Despite the fact that patently voluntary statements taken in violation of Miranda must be excluded from the prosecution’s case, the presumption of coercion does not bar their use for impeachment purposes on cross-examination.” Id. (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971)).
Under Elstad, supra, a voluntary statement given after Miranda warnings is admissible even if the accused has given a prior unwarned statement, provided such pri- or statement was not coerced. 470 U.S. at 318, 105 S.Ct. 1285; United States v. Gale, 293 U.S.App.D.C. 218, 223, 952 F.2d 1412, 1417 (1992). The focus of the admissibility determination is whether the second statement was in fact voluntary. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318, 105 S.Ct. 1285. The Supreme Court explained further that
[i]t is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period. Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made
Id. at 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285.
A. Voluntariness
Davis argues that the totality of the circumstances, including particularly the manipulative tactics of the police and their deliberate failure to apprise him of his Miranda rights, demonstrate that his statements were involuntary. It is also Davis’ position that the police questioning should be viewed as one continuous interrogation, although he claims that the coercion occurred before, rather than after, the Miranda warnings. Put another way, Davis does not contend that “additional coercion occurred during the waiver of the Miranda rights or during the videotaped statement.”
The burden is on the government to prove that the statements of the accused were voluntarily given without police coercion. Martin v. United States, 567 A.2d 896, 907 (D.C.1989) (citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972)) (other citation omitted). Setting aside for a moment Davis’ contention that there was a single interrogation, a review of the record supports the trial court’s determination that Davis’ initial statement was voluntary and not the result of threats, promises or coercion. See Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at 305, 105 [1168] S.Ct. 1285. Generally, the factors for consideration in determining voluntariness include the circumstances surrounding the questioning, the accused’s age, education, and prior experiences with the law, his physical and mental condition at the time the statement was made, other factors showing coercion or trickery, and the delay between the suspect’s arrest and the confession. Beasley v. United States, 512 A.2d 1007, 1013 (D.C.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 907, 107 S.Ct. 2485, 96 L.Ed.2d 377 (1987) (citations omitted). On appeal, deference must be given to the trial court’s findings of fact, however, review of the trial court’s legal conclusions is de novo. Hicks v. United States, 705 A.2d 636, 639 (D.C.1997) (citations omitted); Byrd v. United States, 618 A.2d 596, 599 (D.C.1992) (whether appellant’s confession was voluntary is a question of law that requires independent appellate review) (citing Miller v. Fenton, supra, 474 U.S. at 106, 106 S.Ct. 445).
In this case, the trial court considered all of these factors and made factual findings, based on evidence in the record, which support its conclusion that the initial inculpatory statement was uncoerced and voluntary. Davis, an eighteen year old with an education to the tenth grade, had been arrested on three prior occasions; he was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs and in no pain or unusual discomfort under the circumstances. The court found that the detectives did not engage in coercive tactics or conduct which overbore Davis’ free will. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961). Specifically, they made no threats or promises and complied with his request for Sullivan to leave the room, for cigarettes and a drink, and later to make a telephone call. The testimony of the detectives supports the trial court’s findings in this regard.
Davis contends that the detectives’ use of psychologically manipulative tactics, along with their failure to apprise him of his rights initially, among other factors, resulted in an involuntary statement. He points out that the detective told him a deliberate falsehood about his role in the offense, specifically, that Peanut had informed the detectives that Davis had the AK-47. “Confessions generally are not vitiated when they are obtained by deception or trickery, as long as the means employed are not calculated to produce an untrue statement.” In re D.A.S., 391 A.2d 255, 258 (D.C.1978); accord, Beasley, supra, 512 A.2d at 1015-16. The trial court found specifically, and we agree, that this particular statement was directed toward eliciting a true statement, not a false one. Moreover, Davis testified that he did not believe the detectives’ account about Peanut because it was inconsistent with Davis’ own first-hand knowledge about Peanut’s whereabouts. Under the circumstances, the deception employed by the detectives was insufficient to render the trial court’s finding of voluntariness erroneous.
Davis places great reliance on a statement which he attributes to Sullivan to the effect that they would be there all day if he did not cooperate. Sullivan denied making any such statement. The trial court did not resolve this conflict in the testimony, but assuming arguendo that Davis was correct on this point, the court determined, taking into account Davis’ demeanor, that this statement did not impress Davis or impact on his decision to provide a statement. Davis’ actions toward Sullivan, whom he asked to leave the room at one point, lends support to this conclusion.
B. Applicability of Elstad
Davis argues that Elstad does not apply in this ease because the police intentionally failed to advise him of his Miranda rights before the initial confession. Conceding that this factor standing alone is not dispositive, Davis contends that where combined with the fact that his confession was obtained during extended, custodial interrogation, Miranda’s exclusionary rule should apply. Citing Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion in Elstad, he contends that the ease implies that there are some circumstances which a subsequent waiver of Miradda will not cure .7
[1169] Davis relies primarily on the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368 (8th Cir.1989). In Carter, the court upheld the suppression of the defendant’s post-Mircmda confession where it came “almost directly on the heels of the first [unwarned confession].” Id. at 373. Postal inspectors interrogated Carter for approximately fifty-five minutes about the disappearance of Canadian money, and with Carter’s consent, searched his wallet and found marked money and a check which the inspectors had placed in a mail tray. 884 F.2d at 369. The inspectors confronted Carter with these circumstances, and he in turn made incriminating statements. Id. Only then did the inspectors advise Carter of his rights under Miranda before he provided a written statement confessing his guilt. Id. In upholding the trial court’s suppression order, the court concluded that the oral and written confessions were a part of one continuous process and that the Elstad rule did not permit “this sort of end ran around Miranda.” Id. at 373.
Davis contends that, like Carter, he was subjected to one continuous period of custodial interrogation during which he was not informed of his rights until he had confessed to the crime. Here, both detectives left Davis alone for a fifteen minute period after his initial statement before administering Miranda warnings, and his videotaped statement was made another eleven minutes thereafter. Thus, unlike Carter, supra, some twenty-six minutes elapsed between the end of Davis’ initial statement and the subsequent one.8 In Elstad, supra, the time separation between the initial unwarned statement and the subsequent one given after Miranda warnings was approximately one hour. The Elstad holding did not turn on the time frame between the two confessions. Rather, Elstad seems to eschew rigid rales based upon such a factor. In that regard, the Supreme Court stated:
A handful of courts have, however, applied our precedents relating to confessions obtained under coercive circumstances to situations involving wholly voluntary admissions, requiring a passage of time or break in events before a second, fully warned statement can be deemed voluntary. Far from, establishing a rigid rule, we direct courts to avoid one; there is no warrant for presuming coercive effect inhere the suspect’s initial inculpatory statement, though technically in violation of Miranda, was voluntary. The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made. As in any such inquiry, the finder of fact must examine the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of police conduct with respect to the suspect in evaluating the voluntariness of his statements. The fact that a suspect chooses to speak after being informed of his rights is, of course, highly probative.
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 317-18, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, we are not persuaded by Carter, supra, to hold, particularly on the facts of this case, that what occurred here was one continuous interrogation requiring suppression of the statement obtained after Miranda warnings.9 Further, the Supreme Court has stated that in circumstances involving the admissibility of a properly warned confession which follows an unwarned, but clearly voluntary admission, a break between the two is not essential. Id. at 310, 105 S.Ct. 1285.
In these circumstances, a careful and thorough administration of Miranda warmings serves to cure the condition that rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible. The warning conveys the relevant information and thereafter the suspect’s choice [1170] whether to exercise his privilege to remain silent should ordinarily be viewed as an “act of free will.”
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310-11, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)).
While the police officer’s intentional decision to forego Miranda warnings may be a factor in the totality of the circumstances to be considered by the court in assessing the voluntariness of the confessions, it is not the sole factor. See Bliss v. United States, 445 A.2d 625, 631 (D.C.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117, 103 S.Ct. 756, 74 L.Ed.2d 972 (1983). Voluntariness depends on the surrounding circumstances, including whether there were “police tactics or methods offensive to due process that render the initial admission involuntary and undermine the suspect’s will to invoke his rights once they are read to him.” Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at 317, 105 S.Ct. 1285. Here, the trial court considered the totality of the circumstances and applied Elstad properly to the facts as found from the evidence. Upon review of the record, we are satisfied that Davis’ pre-Miranda statements were voluntary. Therefore, we find no error in the denial of the motion to suppress.
We do not condone, however, the deliberate failure of the police to inform a criminal suspect promptly of his rights under Miranda. In addition to the obvious impropriety of such conduct, it proceeds at some risk to the legitimate interests of the government and the citizens it serves. There is no guarantee that the suspect will provide the second confession once the warnings are given, and the failure to warn may, in some cases, be the factor which tips the scales in favor of exclusion of the confession.
III. Mitigation Defense
We need address only briefly Davis’ remaining claims of error. First, he argues that the trial court erred in denying a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter.10 He also contends that the trial court erred in striking the testimony of defense witness Shawn James concerning decedent’s prior bad acts and convictions. Davis concedes that self-defense was not raised by the evidence, but he contends that the stricken evidence was relevant to the issue of provocation generated by his fear of the decedent and that such evidence of mitigation could negate the element of malice in second degree murder, thereby reducing it to manslaughter.
The trial court rejected the claim of provocation, considering that the evidence showed that “decedent asked for a gun which no one gave him and that he then left and [Davis] went after him and ... sought him out and shot him in the back.” There was evidence that the decedent left and went toward his apartment when he was asked to leave and that Davis said that he should kill him. Davis then left with a companion and shot the victim, and returned to the group and reported what he had done. The court asked if there was any other evidence to support Davis’ position. He offered only that the decedent had stabbed him three and a half years earlier and that James would have testified that the decedent attacked him (James) in a Metro station at some unspecified time in retaliation for James having assisted Davis. There was no evidence of provocation by decedent at or near the time of the shooting in this case.
“If requested, the trial court must give a lesser included offense instruction whenever there is evidence to support it, no matter how weak.” Price, supra, 602 A.2d at 644 (citations omitted). In order to reduce murder to manslaughter, a showing of “heat of passion” is required, and it must derive from sufficient provocation that it “ ‘would cause an ordinary reasonable person to lose his or her self control and act without reflection^]’ ” Id. at 645 (quoting Brown v. United States, 584 A.2d 537, 543 (D.C.1990)). Such evidence is not present here. Id. Therefore, the trial court properly denied the requested instruction. Davis agreed that the [1171] excluded evidence went only to the reasonableness of his fear of the decedent, and therefore, if he was not entitled to an instruction on provocation or mitigation, the excluded evidence would be irrelevant. Accordingly, we do not address the claim further.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of convictions appealed from hereby is
Affirmed.