Davis v. United States

16 Cust. Ct. 163, 1946 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 34
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedMay 20, 1946
DocketC. D. 1005
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 16 Cust. Ct. 163 (Davis v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis v. United States, 16 Cust. Ct. 163, 1946 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 34 (cusc 1946).

Opinions

Mollison, Judge:

Section 3424 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code (title 26, U. S. Code) imposes an excise tax on the importation of rough, planed, or dressed lumber at the rate of $3 per thousand feet, board measure, which rate, by virtue of the Canadian Trade Agreement, T. D. 49752, was reduced to $1.50 per thousand feet, board measure. In the said subsection it is also provided that—

* * * The tax imposed by this subsection shall not apply to lumber of Northern white pine (pinus strobus), Norway pine (pinus resinosa), and Western white spruce.

Plaintiff imported into the United States certain spruce lumber designated on the invoices as “Western White Spruce,” and entered the same as exempt from the tax imposed under section 3424 (a), supra. Upon liquidation, however, the collector assessed duty thereon under the said subsection, whereupon this protest was filed, claiming exemption under the above-quoted provision.

It may be said that another claim was made in the protest with respect to the board measurement of the lumber covered by the entries, but no proof was offered in support of such claim, and it is therefore overruled.

The spruce lumber at bar came from trees grown in the western part of the Province of Ontario, Canada. It is the plaintiff’s contention that the merchandise is lumber of Western white spruce within the meaning of the term as used in the statute, the principal reasons assigned being that it is white spruce lumber which comes from the western part of Canada, and that it is exactly the same class and kind as the white spruce lumber which comes from the adjoining Province of Manitoba which, it is claimed, is known as Western white spruce.

It is the defendant’s contention that only the specific kind of lumber known at the time of passage of the Revenue Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 447, from which the Internal Revenue Code provision here involved was derived) by the individual name. “Western white spruce” is entitled to the exemption from tax.

It is not disputed that there is a species of tree which grows from the Atlantic to the Pacific coasts of Canada (as well as in certain [165]*165portions of the United States) known botanically as 'picea glauca or white spruce. Testimony was offered on behalf of the defendant to the effect that the wood from picea glauca varies in density, the lighter wood coming from the white spruce grown in the western part of Canada, particularly the so-called “Prairie Provinces” of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, while the heavier wood comes from the trees grown in the eastern portion of Canada. The difference in density is said to be caused by different rates of growth. The theory underlying this is that the faster growth, and consequently the lighter wood, is obtained in the west, probably due to dissimilarity in soil and climate from the east.

Whether Western white spruce is a distinct variety of white spruce is a question on which it seems that botanists are not in agreement. At least two, namely, Nathaniel L. Britton, Director in Chief, New York Botanical Gardens, in his work “North American Trees” (1908); and George B. Sudworth, Dendrologist, U. S. Department of Agriculture, in his “Check List of the Forest Trees of the United States, Their Names and Ranges” (1927), Miscellaneous Circular No. 92 of that Department, recognize picea glauca variety albertiana as Western white spruce. ' Dr. Louis W. Rees, Assistant Professor of Forestry, University of Minnesota, who testified on behalf of the plaintiff at the trial of the issue, does not recognize Western white spruce as a separate botanical variety of white spruce. Many of the publications relating to North American forestry consulted by the court do not list Western white spruce at all, although they all list picea glauca or white spruce.

However, it is not the contention of either party herein that Western white spruce is a variety of white spruce separate and distinct botanically from other white spruce. As shown by the record, the classification of the collector was based upon a Treasury Department ruling that for the purpose of section 3424 (a), supra, Western white spruce is limited to such spruce growing in Manitoba and' the other more westerly provinces of Canada, and does not grow in Ontario.

A glance at a map of Canada is sufficient to reveal (1) that that portion of the Province of Ontario from which the wood at bar came is located about the central part of Canada, and (2) that the boundary between Ontario and its adjoining province on the west, Manitoba, is an imaginary line and not what might be termed a natural line such as would affect the soil and climate on one side as distinguished from the other, and, consequently, the density of picea glauca grown on either side of the boundary. Hence it may be said to be logical, and, indeed, there is evidence in the record before us that it is a fact, that the picea glauca grown in the western part of Ontario (the locality in which the lumber at bar originated) and that grown in the eastern [166]*166part of Manitoba are identical in all respects, physically, structurally, and in use.

If the foregoing be true, then it would seem to be incongruous to classify lumber of picea glauca coming from one side of the imaginary line as Western white spruce, and lumber coming from the other side, identical in character and use, as something else. Defendant’s reply to this is that such nomenclature is founded upon the trade usage and practice in effect at the time of the passage of the revenue act of 1938. Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains that the term “Western white spruce” had no general significance at that time. Under the circumstances, we think an investigation of what Congress did mean by the use of the term is in order.

In Union Brokerage Co. v. United States, 9 Cust. Ct. 1, C. D. 649, the question was whether lumber .of a species of spruce known as “Engelmann spruce” was embraced by the term “Western white spruce.” We there found that the term as used in the revenue act was ambiguous and that resort to the history of the provision in which it was found was warranted. In that case it plainly appeared upon examination of the legislative history that it was the intent of Congress to exclude Engelmann spruce from the exemption provided in the section, and it was not necessary therein otherwise to define the scope of the term “Western white spruce.”

As has been said, the situation in this case requires a determination of the legislative intent in the use of the term, and we find that the subject has been exhaustively treated by counsel for both sides in the briefs filed in the case. The following may be said to be a summary of such history, with detail given only as to those portions we deem pertinent.

During the first session of the 75th Congress, four bills were introduced, one in the Senate and three in the House, for the purpose of amending section 601 (c) (6) of the Eevenue Act of 1932, which originally imposed an excise tax on lumber. Two of these bills (S. 2628 and H. E. 7518) were companion bills and provided for the exemption from the said tax of “lumber of * * * Western white spruce (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta),” while a third (H. E. 7045) provided such exemption for “lumber of * * * Western white spruce.” The fourth bill dealt with a different subject.

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Bluebook (online)
16 Cust. Ct. 163, 1946 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 34, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-v-united-states-cusc-1946.