Davis v. True

963 So. 2d 1271, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 574, 2007 WL 2473130
CourtCourt of Appeals of Mississippi
DecidedSeptember 4, 2007
DocketNo. 2006-CA-01011-COA
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 963 So. 2d 1271 (Davis v. True) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis v. True, 963 So. 2d 1271, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 574, 2007 WL 2473130 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

GRIFFIS, J.,

for the Court.

¶ 1. Dorothy Littleton True, John L. True, Patricia Ann True Schmidt, Mary Juanita True Hegwood, James T. True, Janice Elizabeth Davis McGraw, and William Eugene Davis, Jr. (“Billy, Jr.”) brought this action against William Eugene Davis, Sr. (“Bill, Sr.”) after he had the body of his deceased wife exhumed and reburied elsewhere. The chancellor held that Bill, Sr. had unlawfully disinterred his deceased wife’s body and ordered him to rebury it in its original resting place. Bill, Sr. appeals and argues that the chancellor considered incorrect factors in its decision. We find no error and affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2. Bill, Sr. was married to Frances Elizabeth True Davis for over fifty-one years. The couple had three children: Janice, Debra, and Billy, Jr. Frances passed away on November 20, 2004. Besides her husband and children, she was survived by her mother Dorothy and siblings John, Patricia, Mary, and James.

¶ 3. Bill, Sr., his children, and Frances’s family agreed to bury her at the foot of her father’s grave in the True family section of Hopewell Baptist Church Cemetery. Frances’s wish was to be buried as close to her father’s grave as she could be. She was buried there on November 24. To the right of Frances’s grave a space was reserved for Bill, Sr. A double headstone was placed over both sites, bearing Frances’s and Bill, Sr.’s names and statistics.

¶ 4. Bill, Sr. remarried on July 4, 2005. This caused a considerable amount of friction between him, Janice and Billy, Jr. Janice was furious there was another woman in her mother’s house. Janice was concerned that the new wife would get the family homestead instead of Janice, Debra, and Billy, Jr. Janice threatened that if Bill, Sr. remarried, she would not allow him to be buried next to Frances and would remove the double headstone. Bill, Sr. was told that Billy, Jr. threatened to have Bill, Sr. cremated so he could not be buried next to Frances.

¶ 5. Concerned that he would not be buried next to Frances in the True family plot and wanting to be buried next to Frances and his new wife, he approached [1273]*1273the funeral home about having Frances’s grave relocated to the Davis family section of the same cemetery. He was directed to the county coroner who gave him permission for the exhumation and reburial. He had Frances’s body reburied in the Davis family section in November, 2005. The new grave is fifty yards southeast of the original gravesite.

¶ 6. Dorothy, John, Patricia, Mary, James, Janice, and Billy, Jr. sued Bill, Sr. to have Frances’s body moved back. The lower court found the body was unlawfully disinterred and ordered it reinterred in its original grave. Aggrieved, Bill, Sr. appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Russell v. Performance Toyota, Inc., 826 So.2d 719, 721(¶ 5) (Miss.2002).

ANALYSIS

¶ 8. The sole issue that Bill, Sr. raises is whether the chancellor “used incorrect factors in considering whether or not a body may be moved once it has been interred.” Bill, Sr. believes that instead of applying a five factor test, the chancellor was restricted to considering whether there were “compelling reasons” to relocate Frances’s body. Appellees respond the chancellor applied the correct test. We agree.

¶ 9. This question was settled in Hood v. Spratt, 357 So.2d 135 (Miss.1978). The supreme court adopted what it termed as the “compassionate approach of permitting a surviving spouse to remove the body of a deceased spouse to another burial site for compelling reasons and in the absence of a waiver of such right.” Id. at 136-37. To make this determination, the court held that certain factors must be considered where appropriate. Id. at 137. Namely, these include: (1) public interest, (2) wishes of the decedent, (3) rights and feelings of those entitled to be heard by reason of relationship, (4) rights and principles of religious bodies or other organizations which granted interment in the first burial site, (5) and whether consent was given to interment in the first burial site by the one claiming the right of removal. Id.

¶ 10. In weighing the factors, “the surviving spouse ha[s] a paramount right to designate the burial site and, if the parties were living in normal marital relations, a very strong case would be required to justify judicial interference with the survivor’s wish.” Id. (citing Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313, 56 A. 878 (1904)). Further, “to what extent the desires of the decedent should prevail against those of the surviving spouse was left an open question, but as against the remoter connections, such wishes, especially if strongly and recently expressed, would usually prevail.” Id. A decedent’s express testamentary wish to be buried in the original site will be a strong factor against reinterment. Novelli v. Carroll, 278 Pa.Super. 141, 420 A.2d 469, 473 (1980) (discussing Pettigrew and its progeny).1

¶ 11. The chancellor applied these exact factors to the case at bar. Bill, Sr. does not argue that the chancellor incorrectly analyzed or weighed these factors. However, he insists that the sole question is whether he as the surviving spouse has a [1274]*1274compelling reason to relocate Frances’s body. We conclude that the chancellor applied the proper factors and was not in error as a matter of law. Accordingly, we find no error and affirm.

¶ 12. Although it was not included in the precise issue identified by the appellant, the appellant’s brief also seems to argue that the chancellor erred in weighing the Hood factors. Out of an abundance of caution, we will address this issue albeit under a different standard of review. This Court will not disturb the findings of a chancellor when supported by substantial credible evidence unless the chancellor abused his or her discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Sanderson v. Sanderson, 824 So.2d 623, 625-26(¶ 8) (Miss.2002). The chancellor, by [his/] her presence in the courtroom,' is best equipped to listen to the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and determine the credibility of the witnesses and what weight ought to be ascribed to the evidence given by those witnesses. Howard v. Fulcher, 806 So.2d 328, 332(¶ 15) (Miss.Ct.App.2002). “It is necessarily the case that, when conflicting testimony on the same issue is presented, the chancellor sitting as trier of fact must determine which version he finds more credible.” Id.

¶ 13. At the conclusion of trial, the chancellor stated:

The Court finds the facts as follows:

Following a 51-year marriage, [Frances], succumbed to cancer dying on the 20th day of November of 2004. Prior to her death, it is undisputed that her desire was to be buried, first of all, in Hopewell Church located in Yalobusha County, Mississippi, and more specifically, as close to her father, Meshack Turner True, as she could be. All parties acknowledge that they have been advised by the decedent at one time or the other that those were, in fact, her wishes.

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963 So. 2d 1271, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 574, 2007 WL 2473130, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-v-true-missctapp-2007.