Davis v. State

773 S.W.2d 592, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 1046, 1989 WL 41875
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedApril 27, 1989
Docket11-88-047-CR
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 773 S.W.2d 592 (Davis v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis v. State, 773 S.W.2d 592, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 1046, 1989 WL 41875 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).

Opinion

OPINION

DICKENSON, Justice.

The jury convicted Grady Allen Davis of aggravated kidnapping 1 and assessed his punishment at confinement for 25 years. 2 We reverse and remand.

There is no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant has briefed four points of error. Points one, three, and four become immaterial and will not be discussed in view of our ruling on point two. Appellant contends in point two that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting “prior trial testimony of Larry Beard” because it was hearsay which did not satisfy the requirements of TEX.R. CRIM.EVID. 804(b)(1). We agree.

The complaining witness, Lafayette Griffin, testified that on the evening of October 27, 1987, he was abducted by Davis [appellant], Larry Beard, 3 and Randy Locknane. 4 Complainant had earlier refused to go with them to find complainant’s uncle. The uncle had taken Locknane’s money [$60] to buy drugs [a gram of cocaine], and Locknane wanted his money back or delivery of the cocaine. Later the three men came back to get complainant. While complainant was talking to Beard, Locknane showed him a gun and told him to get into their car. Complainant got into the backseat beside Davis. Locknane got into the driver’s seat and handed the gun to Davis. Beard got into the front passenger’s seat, and the four of them began their search for complainant’s uncle. Davis kept threatening to shoot complainant and leave him to bleed to death if they did not get the money or the drugs. After they got most of their money, they released complainant alive and in a safe place. Complainant’s testimony was corroborated in part by one of his friends; however, both of them had prior criminal records and were vigorously cross-examined by appellant’s trial counsel, and we are unable to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in admitting the “prior trial testimony of Larry Beard” made no contribution to the conviction. See TEX.R.APP.P. 81(b)(2).

Beard was called as a witness by the State, and he refused to testify. The district judge explained to Beard that he had waived his fifth amendment rights by testifying in his own defense when he was tried in the companion case. See Chavez v. State, 508 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Tex:Cr.App. 1974). Nonetheless, Beard persisted in his refusal to testify even after he had been held in contempt. Consequently, Beard clearly falls within the definition of a de-clarant who is unavailable as a witness under TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. 804(a)(2), but his prior testimony is not admissible under Rule 804(b)(1) because the party against whom that testimony is now offered did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the time that testimony was originally given.

The prior testimony is not admissible under TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. 801(e)(1) because his prior testimony is not inconsistent with his refusal to testify. For the same reason, it is not admissible under TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. 612. A refusal to testify is not an inconsistent statement. 5

*594 After Beard refused to testify, portions of his testimony were read into evidence over appellant’s timely objections based upon TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. 804. That prior trial testimony reads in part as shown:

Q: How did you meet him [Lafayette Griffin]?
A: Well, he was on parole, too. I had seen him several times, visiting our parole officer ... and I’ve also seen him at AA meetings on occasions.
Q: Okay. Have you been around him any other time?
A: Yes, sir, down at “The Flats” at the bootleggers, drinking beer with him some.
* * * * * *
Q: Okay. So after you all got in [the car], what happened next?
A: Randy [Locknane] passed the gun back to Grady [appellant].
******
Q: Okay. What did Grady [appellant] do when he got the gun?
A: [He] started talking a lot of profanity and “nigger” this and “nigger” that. “I’ll take you out to the country and shoot you.”
Q: Talking to Lafayette [complainant]?
A: Yes, sir.

The State argues that this prior testimony was admissible under TEX.R.CRIM. EVID. 612(a) as a “prior inconsistent statement” and also argues that it is admissible under Rule 801(e)(1) as a statement which is “inconsistent with his testimony.” The State cites these cases in support of its contention: United States ¶. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490 (8th Cir.1976), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 918, 97 S.Ct. 2182, 53 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977); United States v. Payne, 492 F.2d 449 (4th Cir.1974), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 876, 95 S.Ct. 138, 139, 42 L.Ed.2d 115, 116 (1974); United States v. Collins, 478 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.1973), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 1010, 94 S.Ct. 373, 38 L.Ed.2d 248 (1973); and United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165 (2nd Cir.1970), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 841, 91 S.Ct. 83, 27 L.Ed.2d 76 (1970). We will discuss each of these cases.

Insana dealt with “a recalcitrant witness who has testified to one or more relevant facts” and then pleads a desire “not to hurt anyone.” In this case Beard had not testified to any relevant facts, and his limited testimony was given outside the presence of the jury. We note that Insana states, 423 F.2d at 1169:

The general theory of admitting a prior inconsistent statement is the cancellation of an adverse answer by which a party is surprised; however, where a witness gives no testimony injurious to the party calling him ... there is no reason or basis for impeachment under the rule.

Collins involved the retrial of two defendants. The witness had testified against them in their first trial, but he refused to testify against them in the second trial. The witness claimed an inability to recall the matters about which he had previously testified for the dual purpose of avoiding a contempt of court charge and of avoiding any harm to the defense of his close friends and allies. The Court noted that defendants “were represented by the same counsel at the prior trial at which time they fully cross-examined” the witness. Not so in the case before us.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
773 S.W.2d 592, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 1046, 1989 WL 41875, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-v-state-texapp-1989.