Davis v. Slater
This text of 17 Iowa 250 (Davis v. Slater) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This act bears, in its very title, its object, “the suppression of intemperance.” All of its machinery, providing for search, seizure and destruction of liquor owned or held in violation of law, is designed for the purpose of effectuating this object. By it, liquor of the prohibited kind, owned or sold contrary to the provisions of the law, is emphatically contraband. The better to accomplish the end in view, the provisions above quoted are enacted; the effect of which is to deprive the vendor of intoxicating liquor sold in violation of law, of all right to recover for it, and to invest the vendee, if he has paid for it, with the right to recover the amount or value of such payment, and to deprive the illegal vendor of any rights based upon an unlawful sale. Smith v. Grable, 14 Iowa, 429.
It will be seen that its strongest penalties are denounced chiefly against the unlawful vendor of the prohibited liquor. [253]*253"With respect to unlawful sales, or contracts witb reference to Such sales, be bas no rights which can be asserted in the courts of the State. In the case at bar, the plaintiff was the unlawful vendor. The sale to him of the claim upon which he brings suit, was in consideration of intoxicating liquors, sold by him contrary to law. It occurred to us at first, that this would not avail the defendant — that it was a matter which did not concern him. Ordinarily, this would be so. And we think it would be so if the first sentence above quoted (§ 1571) stood alone. But then the next sentence plainly declares that “all sales, transfers, &c., of every hind made for, or oh account of intoxicating liquors sold in violation of this act, shall be utterly null and void against all persons in all cases, and no rights of any kind shall be acquired thereby.” This concludes the question. The plaintiff sues as. an assignee. He must show title in the claim, in order .to recover. He has no written transfer, if it be conceded that this would make a difference. The transfer upon which he does rely, the law declares, in language whose plainness is equaled only by its comprehensiveness, to be “utterly null and void,” not only as against Sterne, but “ against ail persons in all cases.”
No rights of any kind can be acquired thereby ” by the plaintiff. If the transfer of the lease is thus null and void and insusceptible of conferring any rights upon the plaintiff, it follows, as a legal consequence, that he cannot maintain an action which necessarily involves and puts in issue, both his title and the validity of his title to the claim which constitutes the basis of such action. These views are coincident with those of the court below, and they seem to, us clearly correct. They are in entire accord with the letter and spirit of the law, harmonize with its manifest policy, and are calculated to advance its declared end. Eemanded with leave to plaintiff to reply, if so advised. Affirmed.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
17 Iowa 250, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-v-slater-iowa-1864.