Davis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedFebruary 13, 2017
Docket15-716
StatusUnpublished

This text of Davis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (Davis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, (uscfc 2017).

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 15-716V Filed: January 18, 2017

************************* J.L.D., a minor, by his mother * Not for Publication KATIE DAVIS, * * Petitioner, * v. * Attorney’s Fees and Costs; * Respondent Did Not Object. SECRETARY OF HEALTH * AND HUMAN SERVICES, * * Respondent. * ************************* Michael G. McLaren, Black McLaren, et al., P.C., Memphis, TN, for petitioner. Heather Pearlman, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

DECISION GRANTING ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS1 IN PART

Roth, Special Master:

On July 9, 2015, Katie Davis (“Ms. Davis” or “petitioner”) filed a petition for compensation on behalf of her minor child, J.L.D., under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10, et seq.2 [the “Vaccine Act” or “Program”]. Petitioner alleged that J.L.D. developed cerebellitis, cerebellar ataxia, torticollis, developmental regression, and/or other neurologic or physical impairments as a result of receiving diphtheria- tetanus-acellular pertussis (“DTaP”), inactivated polio virus (“IPV”), hepatitis B, rotavirus, haemophilus influenza type B (“Hib”), and pneumococcal conjugate (“PCV7”) vaccines on July 3, 2013, and measles-mumps-rubella (“MMR”) and varicella vaccines on January 30, 2014. See generally Petition (“Pet.”), ECF No. 1. Petitioner and respondent agreed to a settlement in this

1 Because this unpublished decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, it will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, in accordance with the E- Government Act of 2002 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012)). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to delete medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will delete such material from public access. 2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (1986). Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2012). matter; respondent filed a stipulation of settlement on September 22, 2016. Stipulation for Award (“Stipulation”), ECF No. 28. The undersigned issued a decision approving the settlement on September 22, 2016. Decision, ECF No. 29. Petitioner now seeks an award of attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $38,609.98, pursuant to Section 15(e) of the Vaccine Act. Motion for Attorney’s Fees (“Motion for Fees”) at 1, ECF No. 34. After careful consideration, the undersigned has determined to grant the request in part for the reasons set forth below.

I. Procedural History.

Petitioner filed her petition on July 9, 2015. ECF No. 1. This case was initially assigned to now-Chief Special Master Dorsey. ECF No. 4. Petitioner filed medical records on July 10, 2015, and on August 28, 2015. Pet. Ex. 1-12, Pet. Ex. 13 ECF No. 5-6, 10.

This case was reassigned to me on October 21, 2015. ECF No. 12. Respondent filed a Rule 4(c) Report on February 8, 2016, indicating that J.L.D.’s alleged injury was not appropriate for compensation. Nevertheless, the party agreed to settle this matter. On June 15, 2016, respondent contacted the Court, indicating that the parties had reached a tentative agreement in this matter. Accordingly, I issued a 15-Week Stipulation Order on June 16, 2016. ECF No. 25. Respondent filed a “Stipulation for Award” (“Stipulation”) on September 22, 2016. Stipulation, ECF No. 28. I issued a decision approving the settlement on September 22, 2016. Decision, ECF No. 29.

Petitioner filed a motion for attorney’s fees on January 5, 2017. Motion for Attorney’s Fees (“Motion for Fees”), ECF No. 34. Petitioner requested fees and costs for representation from Black McLaren Jones Ryland & Griffee, P.C. (“the McLaren firm”) in the amount of $34,971.50 in attorneys’ fees and $3,234.98 in expenses, for a total of $38,609.98. Motion for Fees at 1. In accordance with General Order #9, petitioner filed a signed statement indicating that she incurred $403.50 in out of pocket expenses. Notice, ECF No. 34-3.

Respondent filed a response to petitioner’s motion for fees on January 17, 2017. Response to Motion for Attorney’s Fees (“Response”), ECF No. 35. Respondent made no specific objections to petitioner’s fee application, and stated that respondent was “satisfied the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs” have been met. Response at 2.

This matter is now ripe for decision.

II. Applicable Law.

The Vaccine Act allows Special Masters to award attorney’s fees and costs to a petitioner if the claim was brought in good faith and with “reasonable basis.” § 15(e). Special masters have “wide discretion in determining the reasonableness” of attorneys’ fees and costs. Perreira v. Sec’y of HHS, 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (1992), aff’d, 33 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Saxton ex rel. Saxton v. Sec’y of HHS, 3 F.3d 1517, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Vaccine program special masters are also entitled to use their prior experience in reviewing fee applications.”).

2 When considering motions for attorney fees and costs, the Court employs the lodestar method to determine the amount of attorney compensation. Schueman v. Sec’y of HHS, No. 04- 693V, 2010 WL 3421956, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 11, 2010); see also Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94 (1989) (“The initial estimate of a reasonable attorney’s fee is properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.”) (internal citations omitted). That said, a special master is not required to conduct a “line-by-line” analysis of a fee request. Broekelschen v. Sec’y of HHS, 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 729 (2011). While respondent does have the opportunity to object to a fee request, if no justification or specific objection is proffered, her “representation carries very little weight.” Reyes v. Sec’y of HHS, No. 14-953V, 2016 WL 2979785, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 27, 2016) (specifically when the attorneys of record supply detailed time sheets and present a complete case).

The McCulloch decision provides a framework for consideration of appropriate ranges for attorney’s fees based on the experience of a practicing attorney. McCulloch v. Sec’y of HHS, No. 09-293V, 2015 WL 5634323, at *19 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015) motion for recons. denied, 2015 WL 6181910 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 21, 2015). According to McCulloch, if an attorney has been practicing for 20 or more years, an appropriate range is approximately $350 to $425 per hour. Id. If an attorney has 11 to 19 years of experience, $300 to $375 is proper. Id. An appropriate range for an attorney with 8 to 10 years of experience would be $275 to $350. Id. For 4 to 7 years of experience, $225 to $300 is sufficient. Id. If an attorney has fewer than 4 years of experience, he/she should receive between $150 and $225. Id.

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