Davis v. Sanseverino

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Davis v. Sanseverino

2016 NY Slip Op 8321, 145 A.D.3d 519, 43 N.Y.S.3d 317

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 13, 2016

Docket2442

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 2016 NY Slip Op 8321 (Davis v. Sanseverino) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Davis v. Sanseverino, 2016 NY Slip Op 8321, 145 A.D.3d 519, 43 N.Y.S.3d 317 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2016).

Pincite

Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mary Ann Brigantti, J.), entered June 4, 2015, which denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

This personal injury action stems from a motor vehicle accident in which plaintiffs car was struck by defendants’ car as defendants’ car was backing out of a driveway. Lauren Sanseverino previously commenced a timely action in Queens County against Davis, who served an answer in which he asserted an affirmative defense of comparative negligence. That action has been settled. After the applicable three-year statute *520 of limitations had elapsed (CPLR 214 [5]), Davis commenced this action against the Sanseverinos.

Plaintiffs attempt to rely on the relation back doctrine to render this independent action timely is improper, since he is not seeking to amend a pleading in a timely-commenced action (see CPLR 203 [f]; Buran v Coupal, 87 NY2d 173, 177-178 [1995]). Plaintiff would have the instant complaint relate back to the date of Lauren’s complaint filed against him in a prior action or, alternatively, to the date of the answer filed by him in that prior action, which did not itself assert any counterclaims. Plaintiff cites no authority supporting such an expansion of the relation back doctrine.

Even if the relation back doctrine did apply, relation back would not be proper because his delay in bringing suit was not due to any “mistake” with respect to defendants’ identities, which were known to plaintiff at all relevant times (see Royce v DIG EH Hotels, LLC, 139 AD3d 567, 569 [1st Dept 2016]; Crawford v City of New York, 129 AD3d 554 [1st Dept 2015]; Meralla v Goldenberg, 89 AD3d 645 [1st Dept 2011]).

Concur— Tom, J.P., Friedman, Saxe, Feinman and Kahn, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mary Ann Brigantti, J.), entered June 4, 2015, which denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

This personal injury action stems from a motor vehicle accident in which plaintiffs car was struck by defendants’ car as defendants’ car was backing out of a driveway. Lauren Sanseverino previously commenced a timely action in Queens County against Davis, who served an answer in which he asserted an affirmative defense of comparative negligence. That action has been settled. After the applicable three-year statute *520 of limitations had elapsed (CPLR 214 [5]), Davis commenced this action against the Sanseverinos.

Plaintiffs attempt to rely on the relation back doctrine to render this independent action timely is improper, since he is not seeking to amend a pleading in a timely-commenced action (see CPLR 203 [f]; Buran v Coupal, 87 NY2d 173, 177-178 [1995]). Plaintiff would have the instant complaint relate back to the date of Lauren’s complaint filed against him in a prior action or, alternatively, to the date of the answer filed by him in that prior action, which did not itself assert any counterclaims. Plaintiff cites no authority supporting such an expansion of the relation back doctrine.

Even if the relation back doctrine did apply, relation back would not be proper because his delay in bringing suit was not due to any “mistake” with respect to defendants’ identities, which were known to plaintiff at all relevant times (see Royce v DIG EH Hotels, LLC, 139 AD3d 567, 569 [1st Dept 2016]; Crawford v City of New York, 129 AD3d 554 [1st Dept 2015]; Meralla v Goldenberg, 89 AD3d 645 [1st Dept 2011]).

Concur— Tom, J.P., Friedman, Saxe, Feinman and Kahn, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

2016 NY Slip Op 8321, 145 A.D.3d 519, 43 N.Y.S.3d 317, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-v-sanseverino-nyappdiv-2016.

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