Davis v. Pinterest, Inc.

District Court, N.D. California·Decided September 26, 2022·No. 4:19-cv-07650·Unknown

Opinion

HAROLD DAVIS, Case No. 19-cv-07650-HSG

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTIONS TO v. SEAL

PINTEREST, INC., Re: Dkt. Nos. 149, 154, 158, 172, 177, 190 Defendant.

Pending before the Court are the parties’ administrative motions to file under seal portions of documents submitted in connection with the parties’ motions for summary judgment and motions in limine. See Dkt. Nos. 149, 154, 158, 172, 177, 190. For the reasons detailed below, the Court DENIES Dkt. Nos. 177, 190; and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Dkt. Nos. 149, 154, 158, 172. Courts generally apply a “compelling reasons” standard when considering motions to seal documents. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). “This standard derives from the common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178). “[A] strong presumption in favor of access is the starting point.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (quotations omitted). To overcome this strong presumption, the party seeking to seal a judicial record attached to a dispositive motion must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in omitted). “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. at 1179 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). “The mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id. Civil Local Rule 79-5 supplements the “compelling reasons” standard. The party seeking to file under seal must submit “a request that establishes that the document, or portions thereof, are privileged, protectable as a trade secret or otherwise entitled to protection under the law . . . . The request must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material . . . .” Civil L.R. 79- 5(b). Courts have found that “confidential business information” in the form of “license agreements, financial terms, details of confidential licensing negotiations, and business strategies” satisfies the “compelling reasons” standard. See In re Qualcomm Litig., No. 3:17-cv-0108-GPC- MDD, 2017 WL 5176922, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017) (observing that sealing such information “prevent[ed] competitors from gaining insight into the parties’ business model and strategy”); Finisar Corp. v. Nistica, Inc., No. 13-cv-03345-BLF (JSC), 2015 WL 3988132, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2015). Records attached to nondispositive motions must meet the lower “good cause” standard of Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as such records “are often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action.” Id. at 1179–80 (quotations omitted). This requires a “particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the information is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples of articulated reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted). documents is that Defendant or third parties designated information as “confidential.” But a designation of confidentiality is not sufficient to establish that a document is sealable. See Civ. L. R. 79-5(c). “Confidential” is merely the parties’ initial designation of confidentiality to establish coverage under the stipulated protective order. See Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-cv-05501-SI, 2015 WL 5117083, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015) (“But good cause ‘cannot be established simply by showing that the document is subject to a protective order or by stating in general terms that the material is considered to be confidential’”) (quoting Bain v. AstraZeneca LP, No. 09-cv-4147, 2011 WL 482767, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2011)). Thus, in many instances the designating party for the materials did not comply with Civil Local Rule 79- 5(f)(3), because they did not file a declaration within seven days of the motion. The Court therefore finds that sealing is not warranted as to those documents. However, some documents contain proprietary information about Pinterest’s repeat infringer and takedown policies under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which could lead to third-party abuse or competitive harm if disclosed publicly. See, e.g., Adtrader, Inc. v. Google LLC, No. 17-cv-07082-BLF, 2020 WL 6391210, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2020); Bohannon v. Facebook, Inc., No. 12-CV-01894-BLF, 2019 WL 188671, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2019). Other documents contain personal identifiable information, including phone numbers and email addresses, for Pinterest employees and third parties. Such information could harm these individuals’ privacy interests, and the disclosure of this information is unnecessary for the public’s understanding of this litigation. Docket No. Document Portion(s) Sought to be Ruling Public /(Sealed) Sealed Dkt. No. 149 – GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART Dkt. No. 155/ Declaration of Henry Lien Excerpts GRANTED. The (149-5) in Support of Pinterest’s excerpts contain Motion for Summary confidential details Judgment about Pinterest’s repeat infringer policy. See Dkt. No. 149-1. Dkt. No. 155-6/ Exhibit 6 to the Excerpts GRANTED. The in Support of Pinterest’s confidential details Motion for Summary about Pinterest’s Judgment repeat infringer policy. See Dkt. No. 149-1. Dkt. No. 155-7/ Exhibit 7 to the Excerpts DENIED. (149-9) Declaration of Henry Lien Designating party in Support of Pinterest’s stated that there is Motion for Summary no reason to seal Judgment these materials. See Dkt. No. 169. Dkt. No. 155-8/ Exhibit 8 to the Excerpts DENIED. (149-11) Declaration of Henry Lien Designating party in Support of Pinterest’s stated that there is Motion for Summary no reason to seal Judgment these materials. See Dkt. No. 169. Dkt. No. 155-9/ Exhibit 9 to the Excerpts GRANTED. The (149-13) Declaration of Henry Lien excerpts contain in Support of Pinterest’s personal identifiable Motion for Summary information. See Judgment Dkt. No. 149-1. Dkt. No. 155-10/ Exhibit 10 to the Excerpts DENIED. (149-15) Declaration of Henry Lien Designating party in Support of Pinterest’s stated that there is Motion for Summary no reason to seal Judgment these materials. See Dkt. No. 169. Dkt. No. 155-11/ Exhibit 11 to the Excerpts GRANTED. The (149-17) Declaration of Henry Lien excerpts contain in Support of Pinterest’s personal identifiable Motion for Summary information. See Judgment Dkt. No. 149-1. Dkt. No. 153-13/ Exhibit M to the Excerpts GRANTED. The (149-19) Declaration of Thomas R. excerpts contain Wakefield in Support of personal identifiable Pinterest’s Motion for information. See Summary Judgment Dkt. No. 149-1. Dkt. No. 154 – GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART D

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Davis v. Pinterest, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2022).

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Related

Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.
435 U.S. 589 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Pintos v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS'N
605 F.3d 665 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Phillips v. General Motors Corporation
307 F.3d 1206 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)