Davis v. Morse
This text of Davis v. Morse (Davis v. Morse) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. RE-OR-094' fJt""" f\ \..~. . . ~ \-r .,.{ \;'( q .~- D/ T~ 7..\ .;>/ ';)IJ! ZACHARY DAVIS, 2: JS Plaintiff ORDER ON DEFENDANT TOWN OF CASCO'S MOTION TO v. DISMISS
TIMOTHY A. MORSE, and THE TIMOTHY A. MORSE FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, and TOWN OF CASCO, and KENNETHF. FARRAR, Defendants
Before the Court is Defendant Town of Casco's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Count
VIII and Count IX insofar as it seeks declaratory relief against the Town of Casco.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 15, 2008, Plaintiff Zachary Davis ("Davis") filed an eleven-count
Complaint asserting claims against Timothy Morse ("Morse"), Timothy A. Morse
Family Limited Partnership ("Morse Partnership"), the Town of Casco (Town), and
Kenneth F. Farrar ("Farrar").
Defendants Morse and the Morse Partnership are the sellers of the property that
is the subject of this lawsuit. Neither Morse individually nor the Morse Partnership
filed an answer to the Complaint. Accordingly, the clerk entered a default against both
parties on June 20,2008. On July 9, 2008, Davis filed an unopposed Motion for
Attachment and Trustee Process against Morse and the Morse Partnership. The Court
granted this motion on August 18,2008.
The claims against Defendant Farrar are based on his work as a Maine licensed
surveyor and his involvement in the preparation of the disputed subdivision plans. Farrar is not involved in the motion currently before the Court.
Counts VIII and IX of the Plaintiff's Complaint implicate the Town. Count VIII is
brought against the Town only and seeks a declaratory judgment establishing the
invalidity of a subdivision approved by the Town. Specifically, Davis urges the Court
to hold that the Town "should be required to declare that its previous approval was
obtained through misrepresentations and/ or error and that the conditions have not
been satisfied." Complaint under Davis' deed pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 5954 (2007) against the Town and others. Specifically, Davis seeks "judicial construction and determination of the validity of his deed and a declaration of his rights, status or other relations thereunder and a construction of the subdivision approval conditions and directives ... and the validity of the subdivision approval." Complaint BACKGROUND On November 13, 2005, Davis entered into an option agreement to purchase a lot for $35,000 in a proposed subdivision located in Casco, Maine. The option agreement was conditioned on the Casco Planning Board's ("Board") approval of the subdivision. Due to some changes in the subdivision plan, Davis ultimately purchased a different lot in a nearby proposed subdivision rather than the lot specified in the original option contract. In late November 2005, the Morse Partnership submitted the subdivision plans to the Board. After several revisions, the Board approved the Stone Crest Estates Subdivision ("Subdivision") on or about May 16, 2007 and attached a listed of conditions to the approval. The conditions relevant to the current dispute require that setbacks and other demarcations be displayed on the land upon the issuance ofa building permit. On June I, 2007, Davis paid the balance owed on the option agreement and 2 received a deed to a lot within the Subdivision. At that time, Davis believed he was purchasing a lot on which he could construct a home that would comply with the deed restriction that forbade any house having less than 2000 square feet of living space. 1 Given the setback limitations, Davis could not build a home larger than 408 square feet. Davis brought this problem to Morse and Farrar. However, attempts at amicably resolving this dispute failed. Plaintiff subsequently brought this action seeking, inter alia, rescission of the deed; damages for misrepresentation, unfair trade practices, breach of contract, negligence; and declaratory relief. The motion before the Court is limited to testing the legal sufficiency of Counts STANDARD OF REVIEW When a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint pursuant to M.R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint are accepted as true. See e.g., McAfee v. Cole, 637 A.2d 463 (Me. 1994). "A dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts that he might prove in support of his claim." Doe v. District Attorney, 2007 ME 139, err 20, 932 A.2d 552, 558 (citations omitted). DISCUSSION The threshold issue is whether the Plaintiff is barred from bringing a declaratory judgment action against the Town after failing to appeal a planning board decision pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B. 1 The Warranty Deed provides that "[a]ll dwelling places on the premises shall have no less than 2,000 square feet of living space, not including barns, sheds, garages or breezeways." Warranty Deed Exhibit A tJ 5. This restriction is binding on all property owners in the Stone Crest Estates Subdivision. See id. tJ 6. 3 The Town contends that Davis cannot challenge the subdivision approval or the conditions therein through a declaratory judgment action. The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act states that: "[a]ny person interested under a deed ... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. 14 M.R.S.A. § 5954 (2007). The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act "does not provide a self-help device for parties who have failed to timely appeal a municipal administrative decision to gain an extension or revival of the time to appeal and reopen a decision that has otherwise become final." Sold, Inc. v. Town of Gorham, 2005 ME 24, 110, 868 A.2d 172, 176. In short, an "after-the-fact challenge" is pursued in vain when a party has failed to timely appeal an administrative adjudicatory action pursuant to Rule 80B. Id. 115,868 A.2d at 177. Unless there is specific statutory authority, challenges to municipal administrative actions must be filed "within 30 days after notice of any action or refusal to act of which review is sought." M.R. Civ. P. 80B(b). Davis could have participated in the Board's review because his option was conditioned on the Town's approval of the subdivision plans. See e.g., Lewis v. Town of Rockport, 2005 ME 44, 1 8, 870 A.2d 107, 110 (stating that an "abutting landowner has a particularized injury if there is a conceivable injury."); Norris Family Associates, LLC v. Town of Phippsburg, 2005 ME 102, 116, 879 A.2d 1007, 11012-13 (stating that "party" is interpreted very broadly and that participation in such proceedings may be formal or informal). It is undisputed that Davis did not file a Rule 80B appeal after the Board issued its approval on or about May 16, 2007. Davis' failure to participate in the administrative proceedings does not 4 provide a legal excuse for his failure to do so. Hence, Davis is time-barred fromVIII and IX against the Town.
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