Davis v. Miller

109 Ala. 589
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedNovember 15, 1895
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 109 Ala. 589 (Davis v. Miller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis v. Miller, 109 Ala. 589 (Ala. 1895).

Opinion

McCLELLAN, J.

This action sounds in damages for vhé death of plaintiff’s intestate, Rudolph Miller, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, Davis, or of persons for whose negligence he is responsible. The complaint contains four counts, each alleging that Miller, being a brakeman on a logging railway owned and operated by Davis, came to his death while in the discharge of his duties, &c., by being thrown from a train or car and run over by other cars, &c. The first count attributes intestate’s death to defects in the condition of the track, whereby the train was thrown from the rails, &c. The second count relies on the alalleged imperfect and defective condition of one of the cars in said train, whereby Miller was thrown to the ground and killed. The third count charges that Miller was “thrown to the ground and killed by reason of the fact that the engineer in charge of the locomotive, which was drawing said train, and who was in the employment of the defendant, negligently ran said train of cars at a speed at which it was unsafe to run said train over said track in its then condition,” and that by reason of such negligence Miller was jostled and jolted and thrown from his position on said train, &c.” The fourth count also relies upon negligence of the engineer in running the train at too great a rate of speed, and thereby jostling, jolting and throwing Miller off the train and killing him.

The general issue and contributory negligence were pleaded to each count; and to the plea of contributory negligence there were replications setting up wanton and willful misconduct on the part of the engineer as the cause of Miller’s death.

[596]*596There was no evidence adduced on the trial in support of the third and fourth counts of the complaint, or in support of the replications which set up such wantonness and willfulness. It was not shown at all that the engineer was either negligent or that he recklessly, wantonly or willfully brought about Miller’s death. Nor was there any evidence in- support of the second count of the complaint, charging that one of the cars in the train was in a defective condition. The only evidence relied on as supporting this count was that Cantrell, the conductor of the train, told Miller, a few-minutes before the latter was killed, that he had found that a nut or tap which held the brake hanger was loose; but this evidence goes further and shows that Cantrell then and there remedied that defect by screwing up this nut or tap, so that at the time of the fatality — six or seven minutes after this — this defect did not exist. There was evidence tending to show that the brake rod extending from one set of trucks to the other underneath the car and trucks, and, indeed, next the ground, was found to be broken after the derailment, but it is very clearly shown that this was caused by, and was not the cause of, the derailment, having resulted from the rod coming in contact with the ground and crossties while the car ran for some distance with the wheels on the side on the roadbed between the rails and those on the other side off the roadbed and in the depression, drain or ditch extending along the ends of the cross-ties, so that the brake-rod came in contact with the ground, ties, &c., which were higher than the surface on which the wheels of one side were rolling.

The case was really fought out and determined on the first count of the complaint. Under that count there was some evidence going to show that the track at the point where the cars left the rails was in a defective condition. Two witnessses for the plaintiff testified that the3r went to the place a week afterwards and found there two rotten cross-ties, which appeared to have been taken out of the track 'at the point of the derailment, and bore the mai’k of car wheels upon them. To the contrary, the preponderance of the evidence goes to show that the track all along there was in excellent condition, that no rotten or defective cross-ties were in it, and that but one tie was taken out after the derailment, [597]*597and that was a sound tie but had been split in the wreck.

But whatever conclusion the evidence might have justified the jury in reaching as to whether the track was defective at that point, the evidence is so overwhelming in the establishment of the proposition that Miller did not come to his death in consequence of such defect, if any existed, that we feel constrained to hold that the court erred in not granting the defendant’s motion for a new trial, based on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. This was a log train, consisting of an engine and eight skeleton log cars or carriages. These cars are mere frames, used only for the transportation of logs, and are very light as compared with cars of any sort used on regular roads. The engine, of course, is much heavier than any of the cars. None of the cars were loaded on this occasion. The engine and five of the cars passed safely over the point of derailment, and only the three last cars were wrecked. It would seem that if the derailment was due to the presence under the rails at that point of rotten ties, the rails would have given away or spread under the heavier burden of the engine, and not have passed it and five of the cars safely over, only to succumb to the much lighter weight of the sixth car. Nay more,'it is shown that this train had passed over that point once or twice before on that day, loaded with logs, and no trouble was experienced with the track at this or any other point. It would seem, in all reason, that if there were crossties under the track at this point so rotten as not to be capable of supporting a light, skeleton, empty car, the track would certainly have given away or spread uüder the incomparably severer test to which it had that day been subjected by the running of the same train heavily loaded with logs over it. Again, all the witnesses who had any opportunity of knowing testify that the rails were not loosened from the ties at all, that the rails did not spread at all, and that the gauge of the rails was Hot changed in any degree by the wreck ; but that the only injury done to or shown by the track was that one cross-tie was split and that the track at the point of the wreck was slewed out of line as much as from one to three or four inches, i. e., that the whole track, both rails and the ties, was for a distace.of several feet slightly out of alignment, but that the rails, notwithstanding this, remained the same distance apart [598]*598as before, at all points ; the gauge was maintained; and these witnesses say that the train could have safely passed over this track before it had been repaired, further than to remove the wreckage. This slight change in the alignment of the track was not the cause, but a consequence of, the derailment of the last three cars ; it existed after, but not before the wreck. And it is inconceivable that this slewing of the track — both rails to an equal extent, and the ties to one side — and the splitting of one tie, to which, however, the rails were still fastened, could have been the only consequences of a derailment caused by the spreading of the track or its otherwise giving away on account of the rottenness of cross-ties under it. That these were the only consequences to the track, that it showed no oth.er defect or injury after the wreck, is proved by such overwhelming evidence as left no justification for a contrary finding by the jury. It would seem of necessity to follow from this also that the derailment of said cars was not caused by any defect in the defendant’s track.

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Bluebook (online)
109 Ala. 589, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-v-miller-ala-1895.