Davis v. McMillan

241 S.W. 723, 1922 Tex. App. LEXIS 917
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedApril 17, 1922
DocketNo. 800.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 241 S.W. 723 (Davis v. McMillan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis v. McMillan, 241 S.W. 723, 1922 Tex. App. LEXIS 917 (Tex. Ct. App. 1922).

Opinion

HIGHTOWER, ,C. J.

The appellee, as plaintiff below, filed this suit in the district court of Robertson county against appellant, as defendant, in his official capacity as Federal Agent, seeking to recover damages in consequence of injuries to a shipment of 22 head of mules from Franklin, Robertson county, Tex., to Brownwood, in Brown county, Tex. It was alleged substantially by ap-pellee that appellant was guilty of negligence by reason of the rough manner in which the shipment of mules was handled, and was also guilty of negligence in failing to transport the shipment within a reasonable time, and was also guilty of negligence in failing to feed and water the mules en route, or to permit the same to be done, and that appellant was also guilty of negligence in permitting the mules to escape from the stock pen at Brownwood, where they were unloaded, in that the gates of the pen were negligently left open, and that the mules, after being unloaded from the car, escaped from the pen through such open gates, and scattered around over the highways around the town of Brownwood, and that at the time the *724 weather was very cold and severe, and that the mules, by reason of the injuries received on route from the rough handling of the train and the want of feed and water, and the exposure and effects of the bad weather after their escape from the pen at Brown-wood, were greatly injured and damaged, and their market value at Brownwood, where they were to be sold, greatly reduced, etc.

Appellant answered by general demurrer and several special exceptions unnecessary here to mention, by general denial, and by a plea of contributory negligence on the part of one D. O. Walker, who was plaintiff’s representative and agent, and who accompanied the shipment of mules.

The case was tried with a jury, and the court’s charge was in the form of special issues, and upon the jury’s answers judgment was rendered in favor of the appellee for $900. After his motion for new trial had been overruled, appellant brought the case to this court, and complains of the verdict and judgment by six assignments of error.

[1 -3] The first assignment is that the court erred in his main charge to the jury in submitting special issue No. 1. Special issue No. 1 was as follows:

“Was plaintiff’s mules injured and damaged as alleged in his petition, by reason of negligence of the agents, servants, and employés of defendant?”

To this issue the jury answered, “Tes.” The objection made to the form of the issue by appellant w£.s:

“Said issue is not clear, and does not submit the issue of negligence, and the negligence is not qualified as to the allegations of the petition; hence the question is likely to mislead the jury.”

The proposition under the assignment is:

“The trial court was in error in submitting special issue No. 1 without instructing the jury more specifically as to what would constitute negligence, under the facts in this case.”

The court had already properly defined negligence in the charge, and there was no objection to the court’s definition of negligence as given the jury. We fail to see wherein the' issue, as submitted, was not clear, or wherein it was calculated to mislead the jury in any way. If appellant thought that the form of the issue was not sufficiently full, his counsel should have requested an issue to meet such lack of fullness in that submitted, and, not having done so, appellant cannot complain of the issue as submitted. Certainly, there was nothing incorrect in the issue, either as to form or substance, in so far as it "went. The assignment is overruled.

[4] Special issue No. 5 was as follows:

“Did the agents, servants, and employés of defendant, operating the train on the Gulf, Col- ' orado & Santa Fé Railway Company line use ordinary care in shipping and handling the car of mules belonging to plaintiff from Milano Junction to Brownwood, and delivering the same to the agent of plaintiff at Brownwood?”

To this issue the jury answered, “No.” Appellant objected to issue No. 5; the objection being as follows:

“Defendant objects to special issue No. 5, wherein the court submits the issue as to the .operation of the train on the Gúlf, Colorado & Santa Fé Railway Company line from Milano Junction to Brownwood, and delivering same to the agent of plaintiff at Brownwood, Tex., for the reason that same does not submit the question in the case. The question as to ordinary care in shipping said mules over said line would cover the question of the time the said mules were in transit over said line of railway; the carrier is only liable to use ordinary care to make the usual and customary run between the points; hence the court, if he submits this issue at all, should qualify same, under this rule.”

The court overruled this objection, and its action in doing so is made the basis of the second assignment. The proposition under the assignment is:

“The trial court should have instructed the jury in connection with special issue No. 5 that defendant, Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fé Railway Company, owed the duty only to exercise ordinary care to make the usual and customary run between the points named.” \

We are not certain that we clearly understand the contention that appellant makes by this proposition, but we have concluded that it is contended that the jury ought to have been clearly informed by the court that the only duty resting upon appellant was to see that the run between the points mentioned in the issue should be made by the use of ordinary care in a reasonable or the usual time required for such run. If such be the contention, it is clear that1 it cannot be sustained, because appellant not only owed the duty of making the run within a reasonable time, but was also required to use due and proper care in the handling of the train while making the run. Therefore had the trial court adopted the view of counsel for appellant on this point, and had instructed the jury accordingly, which, however, was not requested, the court would have been in error. We see nothing in the contention, and it is overruled.

[5] Special issue No. 8 was as follows:

“What sum of money will fairly and reasonably compensate plaintiff for the damages to his said mules? You are instructed that in answering this special issue you will take into consideration the difference in the reasonable market value of said mules at the town of Brownwood, Tex., had said mules been handled and shipped with the usual and customary des-patch incident to the shipment of live stock, if you find from the evidence that they were not so shipped and handled, and the reasonable *725 market value Of said mules as they were delivered to the agent of the plaintiff at Brown-wood, Tex.”

The submission of this issue is made the basis of the third assignment of error.

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Related

Houston T. C. R. Co. v. Stribling
293 S.W. 890 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1927)

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Bluebook (online)
241 S.W. 723, 1922 Tex. App. LEXIS 917, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-v-mcmillan-texapp-1922.