Davis v. Marshall

Superior Court of Delaware

Davis v. Marshall

4 Del. 64

DecidedJuly 5, 1843

StatusPublished

This text of 4 Del. 64 (Davis v. Marshall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Davis v. Marshall, 4 Del. 64 (Del. Ct. App. 1843).

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Opinion

Harrington, Judge,

charged the jury:—That the liability of vessel owners on the contracts of the captain or master, depends upon the question whether the contract was made in the usual course of trade and business in which the vessel was engaged, and was within the scope of the master’s authority. That authority may be proved by the usual employment of the vessel, as well as by the recognition of the owners.

If it be proved that it was customary for the captain of this vessel to buy wood for transportation and sale, and pay for it on the return from market, it is evidence that Mr. Wilson knew of, assented to, and authorized such contracts on the part of his captain, and he is liable accordingly for the price of the wood. But if the usual business of this vessel was to carry the wood of others for freight, and not to buy it on account of the vessel, then Wilson, the owner, would not be liable to Mr. Marshall for a contract made with the captain, which was thus out of the usual course of sailing this vessel. As to such a contract, it would be out of the scope of the captain’s authority as agent of the owners; and they would not be liable on account of it.

The question for the jury will then be, whether it is proved to their satisfaction, that the captain, Jeffers, bought this wood within the usual course of his employment as captain of the vessel; if he did so, it is evidence of authority from the owner to make such contracts on account of the vessel, and the defendant Wilson is liable as owner of the vessel for the price of the wood. But if the purchase of wood is not proved to have been in the usual course of employment of the vessel and the usual practice of the captain, the* defendant is not liable; because the purchase of the wood was not within any authority con *66 ferred on the captain by the owner, and the party dealing with the captain out of the scope of his authority must look to him alone, and not to the owner, for payment.

Cullen, for plaintiff. Ridgely, for defendant.

Verdict for plaintiff.

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Harrington, Judge,

charged the jury:—That the liability of vessel owners on the contracts of the captain or master, depends upon the question whether the contract was made in the usual course of trade and business in which the vessel was engaged, and was within the scope of the master’s authority. That authority may be proved by the usual employment of the vessel, as well as by the recognition of the owners.

If it be proved that it was customary for the captain of this vessel to buy wood for transportation and sale, and pay for it on the return from market, it is evidence that Mr. Wilson knew of, assented to, and authorized such contracts on the part of his captain, and he is liable accordingly for the price of the wood. But if the usual business of this vessel was to carry the wood of others for freight, and not to buy it on account of the vessel, then Wilson, the owner, would not be liable to Mr. Marshall for a contract made with the captain, which was thus out of the usual course of sailing this vessel. As to such a contract, it would be out of the scope of the captain’s authority as agent of the owners; and they would not be liable on account of it.

The question for the jury will then be, whether it is proved to their satisfaction, that the captain, Jeffers, bought this wood within the usual course of his employment as captain of the vessel; if he did so, it is evidence of authority from the owner to make such contracts on account of the vessel, and the defendant Wilson is liable as owner of the vessel for the price of the wood. But if the purchase of wood is not proved to have been in the usual course of employment of the vessel and the usual practice of the captain, the* defendant is not liable; because the purchase of the wood was not within any authority con *66 ferred on the captain by the owner, and the party dealing with the captain out of the scope of his authority must look to him alone, and not to the owner, for payment.

Cullen, for plaintiff. Ridgely, for defendant.

Verdict for plaintiff.

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Bluebook (online)

4 Del. 64, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-v-marshall-delsuperct-1843.