Davis v. Kia Motors America, Inc.

408 F. App'x 731

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: January 21, 2011
• Docket: 09-2296A
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

ON REHEARING

PER CURIAM:

Sabrina D. Davis appeals a decision of the district court dismissing her action against Kia Motors America, Inc. (“KMA”) for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm. *

Davis’s action proceeded under diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). The district court dismissed Davis’s action for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that, “to a legal certainty,” Davis could not recover damages in excess of the $75,000 jurisdictional amount applicable in diversity cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

We review de novo an order dismissing a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. JTH Tax, Inc. v. Frashier, 624 F.3d 635, 637 (4th Cir.2010). “In most [diversity] cases, the ‘sum claimed by the plaintiff controls’ the amount in controversy determination.” Id. (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938)). However, even if the plaintiff seeks damages sufficient to satisfy the statutory amount, a court can dismiss the action when, “from the proofs, the court is satisfied to a [legal] certainty that the plaintiff never was entitled to recover that amount.” St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 289, 58 S.Ct. 586.

Here, the district court concluded that, “to a legal certainty,” Davis could not recover the jurisdictional amount, based on the warranty under which Davis sought relief. We agree with the district court’s conclusion. Accordingly, we affirm the de cisión of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.

* In a prior opinion we dismissed Davis’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that her notice of appeal was untimely. Davis v. KIA Motors America, Inc., 370 Fed.Appx. 408 (4th Cir.) (No. 09-2296), cert. denied, U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 196, 178 L.Ed.2d 118 (2010). However, because no separate entry of judgment was filed in the district court, judgment was not entered until January 15, 2010, and Davis’s notice of appeal was timely. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(2), (7). Under these extraordinary circumstances, we have exercised our inherent authority to sua sponte grant rehearing and recall the mandate in this appeal. See Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 549-50, 118 S.Ct. 1489, 140 L.Ed.2d 728 (1998). We vacate our original opinion, and replace it with this opinion.