Davis v. Elba Bank & Trust Co.

114 So. 211, 216 Ala. 632, 1927 Ala. LEXIS 295
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedOctober 20, 1927
Docket4 Div. 281.
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 114 So. 211 (Davis v. Elba Bank & Trust Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis v. Elba Bank & Trust Co., 114 So. 211, 216 Ala. 632, 1927 Ala. LEXIS 295 (Ala. 1927).

Opinion

BOULDIN, J.

The equity of the bill was sustained on appeal from decree on demurrer. Elba Bank & Trust Co. v. Davis, 212 Ala. 176, 102 So. 117. The present appeal is from a final decree upon pleadings and proof denying relief to complainants.

One phase of the bill seeks to cancel a mortgage given to the Elba Bank & Trust Company on the lands of Jane Davis, upon the ground that it was given to secure the debt of the husband, George Davis; and cancel upon like ground a deed conveying the equity of redemption in satisfaction of this mortgage in the nature of a voluntary foreclosure. On this feature of the bill we find no error in the decree.

The initial indebtedness entering into the mortgage in question was a loan for the- purpose of satisfying an existing mortgage on the same lands held by the First National Bank of Elba. This loan was secured by a mortgage for $3,122, December 29, 1915. Without going into details, we do not think, after careful study of the record, that complainants have carried the burden of showing the mortgage to the First National Bank thus taken up was itself subject to the same infirmity, or that the two banks were, at that time, eollusively passing the debt and securities from one to the other to avoid this and other infirmities in the security.

It appears that Jane Davis owned a farm, the home of the family, containing some 144 acres, and of the value of $5,000 to $6,000. George Davis, her husband, owned the personalty on the farm and used in connection with farming operations. He managed the farm business. The Elba Bank & Trust Company financed it with loans to purchase fertilizers, procure supplies, etc., from year to year. The rents and income -from the farm, after paying taxes and carrying charges on a first mortgage held by third parties, were paid from time to time to the bank on account of mortgage indebtedness, including accumulated indebtedness secured by the mortgage on the farm. From year to year the land mortgage was renewed for unpaid balance on the general mortgage indebtedness and further advances for the current year. Stated in broad outline, this course of business resulted in the final mortgage for $2,128.75, given January 4, 1922, due October 1st of the same year.

The husband and wife were engaged in a joint adventure, the wife furnishing the lands, the husband the personalty and management, and both their services in providing a common home and support for the family. They had a joint or common interest in the necessary loans and advances for current operations and in meeting the accumulated burdens of the joint enterprise.

The wife’s lands may be mortgaged to secure the joint debt of husband and wife. Such mortgage is void only in so far as it secures the sole debt of the husband. The burden is on the wife to reasonably show that fact.

A mortgage given to secure an existing debt and any debt incurred while it is in force is a valid security for loans and advances made in good faith pursuant, to its terms. A mortgage on the wife’s lands for such advances made in good faith to her agent in the conduct of a joint adventure, such as this, is valid. If there is an established course of business, known to all parties, by which advances are made for joint benefit of husband and wife in contemplation that any unpaid balance shail be secured by a mortgage on the wife’s property, a mortgage given in pursuance of such common understanding is binding. It is not essential that a partnership-named be assumed in the conduct of business. The substance of the agreement, express or implied from all the circumstances, determines the relation of the parties.

So far as we recall, the several loans or advances made from year to year by the bank come within the principles announced.

Any loan or other indebtedness contracted by the husband alone for his sole *635 benefit, or upon his sole credit or security,' and afterwards merged into the mortgage upon the wife’s property, is not her debt.

Such items, if any there be, do not render the mortgage subject to cancellation, but should be eliminated on accounting and redemption hereinafter considered.

The mortgage for $2,128.75 given to the Elba Bank & Tru§t Company upon the wife’s lands, became due October 1st, 1922. On September 28th the mortgagee assigned the mortgage to the First National Bank of Elba. This bank urged payment. It declined to renew for another year. Cotton season being on, frequent small payments were made. Meantime a loan was being negotiated with the Federal Land Bank to take care of a first mortgage known as the. Taft mortgage, and with the hope of getting funds to build, or aid in building, a new house on the farm. On November 27th a further payment of $300 was made, reducing the debt to $1,500, and on the same day the mortgagor and her husband ■executed an absolute deed, in consideration of the balance of the mortgage debt, conveying the equity of redemption to the First National Bank. At the same time, the husband •executed a bill of sale to his personal property covered by a separate mortgage which had been assigned to the First National Bank along with the real estate mortgage. On the -same day the First National Bank deeded the lands and transferred the personalty to the Elba Bank & Trust Company; the latter bank paying the former the amount due on the mortgages.

On the same day the Elba- Bank & Trust Company entered into a lease sale contract agreeing to sell the lands to George Davis, the husband. This contract called for $750 to be paid by the Elba Bank & Trust Company for building the house. The price to be paid by George Davis October 1st of the following year was $2,640, a profit of near 20 per cent.

Upon default in payment of the purchase price, $600 rent was to be paid for which a note was taken. The net result of the day’s work was to close out the wife entirely, pass the lands to the husband under a contract carrying heavy profits to the bank, imposing burdens on the husband he could not be expected to meet, and upon default converting him into a tenant, automatically vesting possession in the bank, with a rent charge of $600 and the loss of $150, part proceeds of the Federal Land Loan put into the house under the same agreement.

The personalty was also resold to the husband at a similar profit.

One alternative of the biU attacks this transaction, and aims at reclaiming and exercising the equity of redemption.

A mortgagee may acquire by purchase the mortgagor’s equity of redemption, “but ■equity looks with a jealous and distrustful ■eye upon such transactions * * * and they will be sustained only when ‘supported by a sufficient consideration, and there 'is an absence of fraud, oppression, and undue advantage.’ ” Shaw v. Lacy, 199 Ala. 450, 74 So. 933.

Equity “will not permit a mortgagee to use his position of superiority to oppress the debtor, or drive an unconscionable bargain, or take any undue advantage.” Pearsall v. Hyde, 189 Ala. 86, 66 So. 665.

Here the husband was past 70 years of age, the wife 60. Neither could read nor write. Their names were signed to each of the -long series of papers by mark. The papers on this day were drawn, witnessed, and acknowledgments taken by officers of the banks. No outside advide.

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Bluebook (online)
114 So. 211, 216 Ala. 632, 1927 Ala. LEXIS 295, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-v-elba-bank-trust-co-ala-1927.