Davis v. District of Columbia

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: April 16, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-0703
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CRYSTAL DAVIS Individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of David F. Dowell, Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 24-cv-703

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION

Plaintiff Crystal Davis alleges that Defendants District of Columbia, and Emmanuel

Agbara, Innocent Opara, Alex Colvin, Sheila Benjmanin, Todd Lockhard, Darren Marin, and

Unnamed Officers—each of whom were employees of Saint Elizabeth’s Hospital on March 9,

2022—contributed to the death of her father, David Dowell, a patient at St. Elizabeth’s who was

killed by another hospital patient. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 6–10, 12–91, ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff

brings a six-count complaint, three counts of which state common law claims of negligence, gross

negligence, and wrongful death against all Defendants, one count under the District of Columbia’s

Survival Act, D.C. Code. § 12-101 against all Defendants, one count under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against the District of Columbia, and another Section 1983 count against the other Defendants. Id.

¶¶ 92–139.

Defendant Emmanuel Agbara moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint against him for lack

of sufficient process. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 1–3, ECF No. 14 (“Def.’s Mot.”). He claims that

Plaintiff should have served him within 60 days of filing her Complaint on March 11, 2024,

Page 1 of 4 pursuant to Rule 4(m)(1)(A) of the District of Columbia’s Civil Rules, rather than 90 days under

Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. ¶¶ 2–3, 5.

Agbara’s motion appears premised on a misinterpretation of the applicable rules. He

claims that on June 10, 2024, when Plaintiff sought more time to serve Defendants Opara and

Martin, Plaintiff impliedly conceded that she had missed the 60-day local deadline to effect

service. See id. ¶ 5. This argument is unavailing. First, Plaintiff’s request for more time concerned

Defendants Opara and Martin and raised a good faith argument as to why she needed more time

to serve them. See Pl.’s Mot. for Extension of Time for Serv. at 1–4, ECF No. 4 (contending that

Opara was “evading” service” and that Martin’s home address was difficult to find). Plaintiff’s

request did not address whether the District of Columbia’s Civil Rules should supplant the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure for any Defendant, as the “Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are ‘as

binding as any statute duly enacted by Congress’” for federal civil cases. S.E.C. v. Selden, 484 F.

Supp. 2d 105, 107 (D.D.C. 2007) (citation omitted). Consequently, Plaintiff’s request for an

extension did not apply to Agbara and did not affect her duty to comply with the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure to serve Agbara within 90 days.

Second, Plaintff did timely serve Agbara, on June 4, 2024. Agbara’s motion confuses the

date on which the affidavit of service was filed, June 12, 2024, with the date that the affidavit says

service occurred, June 4, 2024. Aff. of Service at 1, ECF No. 7 (“Aff.”); see Def.’s Mot. ¶ 6.

Under Rule 4, “plaintiff is responsible for having the summons and complaint served within,” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1), “90 days after the complaint is filed.” Id. 4(m). If the plaintiff fails to serve the

defedent within the 90-day period,“the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the

plaintiff—[can] dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant[.]” Id. Plaintiff filed

her Complaint on March 11, 2024, ECF No. 1, and was required to serve the Defendant by June

Page 2 of 4 10, 2024. She did so on June 4, 2024, as indicated in the affidavit. Aff. at 1 (showing that

Defendant Agbara was “personally served” on June 4, 2024, but that the execution date was June

7, 2024, and the filing date was June 12, 2024); Pl.’s Ex. 1 at 1, ECF No. 17-1. Furthermore,

Agbara’s counsel received notice of service via an email from Plaintiff informing him that his

“client was personally served [] June 4, 2024, within [the] 90 day[]” window. Pl.’s Ex. 2 at 1, ECF

No. 17-2.

In response, Plaintiff requests that the court enter default judgment because Defendant

failed to file a timely answer. Pl.’s Opp’n at 2, ECF No. 17 (“Pl.’s Opp’n). The court declines to

do so. Under Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(i), a party has “21 days after being served with summons and

complaint” to file an answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). Defendant moved to dimiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint on June 26, 2024, one day after the deadline for a responsive pleading. ECF No. 14.

But “default judgements are not favored by modern courts.” Nix El. v. Williams, 174 F. Supp. 3d

87, 91 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Peak v. District of Columbia, 236 F.R.D. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2006)).

Entering a judgement for “filing delays” is an “inherently unfair [] use [of] the court’s power[.]”

Id. at 91.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she was prejudiced by Defendant Agbara’s one-day-late

motion, and it is difficult to see how she could be because on August 9, 2024, nearly two months

after Defendant’s answer deadline, both parties agreed to an “order staying proceedings (including

deadlines for filing a response), pending parties’ attempts to resolve th[e] case[.]” Consent Mot.

to Stay Proceedings at 1, ECF No. 16.

Moreover, Plaintiff is not automatically entitled to default judgment immediately after a

missed filing deadline. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a); see Pl.’s Opp’n at 2. Indeed, “no default has been

issued against the Defendant[] [Agbara]”—the prerequisite to a default judgment. Nix El., 174 F.

Page 3 of 4 Supp. 3d at 92; Peak, 236 F.R.D. at 15. And given the parties’ active participation in the lawsuit

and consent to stay the proceedings, default judgement would be inappropriate. See ECF No. 16.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Agbara’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. A

corresponding order will follow.

Date: April 16, 2025

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

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